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CHAPTER I 
Introduction 
 
 
 
The subject of this thesis is the eighth round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade 
negotiations (GATT). The round is called the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations (MTN). It lasted from 1986 when a Ministerial Meeting in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, agreed to launch new negotiations, and ended at a Ministerial Meeting in 
Marrakech, Morocco in 1994. Important issues to developing countries such as agriculture 
and textiles were included in the negotiation. Areas important to industrialised countries, 
mainly issues that were new in GATT, such as trade in services and intellectual property 
rights, were also included. The Uruguay Round was the longest and most comprehensive 
round of negotiations in the history of GATT, and because of difficulties in the negotiations it 
was delayed for more than three years. The results of the negotiations were that an agreement 
on tariff reductions was reached, new issues were included and GATT was institutionalised 
through the establishment of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
 This study focuses on Norwegian agricultural policy and the developing countries in 
the Uruguay Round. How did Norway combine the goal of protecting national agricultural 
interests with the developing countries’ demands in the Uruguay Round?  It shall be pointed 
to what extent Norway took the developing countries’ situation into consideration when 
establishing the Norwegian positions, and to what extent domestic agricultural interests did 
influence Norwegian trade policy. To answer these questions, one central aspect will be 
whether a conflict existed between Norway’s desire to be viewed as a nation friendly to 
developing countries and Norwegian agricultural interests. The thesis shall examine the 
demands proposed by different groups and countries in the negotiations, focusing on the 
demands of the developing countries. It shall also be discuss how the Norwegian negotiation 
goals and strategies were made. In addition, the domestic debate in Norway shall be 
identified. Lastly it shall be discuss what role the Norwegian Parliament, the Storting, play.1 
What was the domestic debate on the negotiations like, and how did interest groups influence 
Norwegian policy?  
 
                                                 
1 The Norwegian Parliament is named the Storting, and I will use this name in the thesis.  
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Frames for the Thesis and Procedures 
Agricultural protection and liberalisation are issues that are often debated. Farming 
organisations are working against cuts in agricultural subsidies and demand protection, and 
there is a debate on whether agricultural liberalisation actually benefits the developing 
countries. This thesis shall not broach this debate, as the focus here shall be on the actual 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round, what the developing countries demanded and what the 
countries’ actually achieved, and Norway’s positions on these issues.  
 Since there exists only limited research on Norway’s positions in the Uruguay Round 
it have been necessary outline the international process and to write rather extensive about 
what actually took place in the negotiations from a Norwegian perspective. The thesis has 
therefore a relative broad overview of the negotiations, rather than only focussing on the 
domestic debate and negotiation strategies.  
A question is whether it is possible to group all the developing countries together in 
one group, since their level of development and needs were different. In this thesis the term 
“developing countries” and “least developed countries” shall be used. These are the terms 
used in international literature, in the Norwegian documents that have been examined and in 
the political debate both in Norway and internationally. However, the developing countries 
had different interests and positions according to their level of development, their export 
industries and import needs. These differences shall be identified, and the countries’ positions 
shall be discussed according to their interests and needs. Another key part will be to analyse 
how Norway differentiated between the developing countries. Of course, there are huge 
differences between the developing countries: countries such as Singapore, Taiwan and South 
Korea were considered to be developing countries at the start of the negotiations, but could 
hardly be referred to as developing countries in 1994. However, countries like Tanzania, 
Bangladesh and India were regarded as developing countries throughout the negotiations. 
Brazil was also grouped as a developing country in the Uruguay Round, even though Brazil 
experienced rapid economic growth during the negotiations. Eastern European countries that 
experienced the fall of the Soviet Union during the negotiations are not defined as developing 
countries.2  
The Cabinet, the Storting and farming organisations used “national agricultural 
interests” to explain the interests Norway had in agriculture with the focus being on non-
economic factors and the special characteristics of agriculture. The aspect of food security 
                                                 
2 Except Yugoslavia that was active in the group of developing countries. 
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was central, but so was the fact that agricultural production led to regional development, 
employment outside central areas of the country, and that agriculture maintained the cultural 
landscape and had important environmental aspects. There is not one unanimous definition of 
“national interests” and the Cabinet and the farming organisations could have different 
opinions on the content of the term. The main demand was, however, that Norway should 
maintain national autonomy in agriculture, and to have the possibility to pursue the policy that 
was regarded as necessary to continue with agricultural production also in remote parts of 
Norway.  
In an edited volume dealing with the transition from GATT to the WTO, Arne 
Melchior and Victor D. Norman point out that even though countries benefit from a liberal 
trade policy and that, as such, trade agreements should be unnecessary, formal international 
agreements are indeed needed. Strong interest groups working in favour of protectionism due 
to their own interests often influence governments and political parties to follow a 
protectionist policy.3 Kym Anderson writes that those who lose from a protectionist policy are 
consumers and export companies, but these are spread out around the country and do not have 
the resources or the specific interests to form any pressure groups.4 These factors have been 
pointed to as the reasons why protectionism, especially in the sphere of agriculture, has been 
the rule in most countries, even though liberalisation might be the most economically efficient 
route.  
This theory can be applied to Norway, as Norway has had strong interest groups, and 
the farming organisations in particular have influenced Norwegian policy on trade in 
agriculture and pointed to non-economic factors as reasons for a high level of protection. The 
need to maintain agriculture in the more remote parts of Norway has been met with general 
approval. Reforming the Norwegian agricultural sector has therefore been a difficult topic for 
all the political parties in Norway to broach, except for the Progress Party.5  
In his article, Diplomacy and Domestic politics: The logic of two-level games, Roger 
D. Putnam describes the linkage between the international and national level in international 
                                                 
3 Melchior, Arne and Victor D. Norman 1998. ”Introduksjon” [“Introduction”], in Arne Melchior and Victor D. 
Norman (eds.), Fra GATT til WTO. Handelspolitiske utfordringer ved GATTs 50-årsjubileum [From GATT to 
the WTO. Trade Policy Challenges on GATT’s Fiftieth Anniversary]: 6-11. Oslo: NUPI, p. 8. 
4 Anderson, Kym 1998. “Perspektiver på WTOs fremtid” [“Perspectives on the Future of the WTO”], in Arne 
Melchior and Victor D. Norman (eds.), Fra GATT til WTO. Handelspolitiske utfordringer ved GATTs 50-
årsjubileum [From GATT to the WTO. Trade Policy Challenges on GATT’s Fiftieth Anniversary]: 12-35. Oslo: 
NUPI, p. 14. 
5 Liland, Frode with Kirsten Alsaker Kjerland 2003. 1989-2002. På bred front, Norsk utviklingshjelps historie 
[1989-2002. A broad approach, The History of Norwegian Development Aid], volume 3. Bergen: 
Fagbokforlaget, p. 63.  
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negotiations. Putnam’s model operates with so-called win sets, which is what the negotiators 
can agree on and what can be ratified at the national level. The sizes of the win sets depend on 
preferences, power distribution, constellations and the ratification process in the home 
country. In addition, the win sets are influenced by the strategy of the negotiator, and whether 
the negotiator can be seen as an agent for domestic interests or an independent player with his 
or her own preferences.6 This theory can help explain a negotiation round and the preferences 
and decisions taken by each country. The thesis shall describe how national debates, national 
organisations and the ratification process influenced the win sets of the negotiators and how 
this affected the negotiations.  
 
Why is this Important? 
It has been stated that ”nowhere is the interrelationship between domestic and international 
politics more evident than in trade policy-making.”7 As mentioned above, domestic interest 
groups often influence international trade and national trade policy. It is therefore important to 
analyse the Uruguay Round from a national perspective. Little research has been conducted 
on the Uruguay Round in Norway, and hardly any on the role of Norway in the actual 
negotiations. During recent years, trade and the WTO have received more attention, both in 
Norway and internationally. It is therefore important to be aware of inconsistencies in the 
Norwegian policy. The creation of the WTO represented a huge change in the world trading 
system that few had predicted. Since both support and criticism of the WTO have increased in 
step with the attention the organisation has received, it is particularly important to analyse 
what actually took place in the negotiations that created the organisation, and what the 
developing countries were working towards. 
It is also interesting to analyse Norway’s role vis-à-vis the developing countries in the 
round. Norway wants to be viewed as a nation friendly to the developing countries; however, 
the focus in Norway has been mainly on aid, not trade. This may have created a misleading 
picture with regard to Norway’s policy towards developing countries, as trade has been 
pointed to as more important for economic growth in developing countries than aid. In the 
                                                 
6 Putnam, Roger D. 1988. “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The logic of two-level games.” International 
Organization No. 42: 427-460. 
7 Langhelle, Oluf, 2001. WTO-forhandlingene – et utenrikspolitisk møtested for norsk innenrikspolitikk? [The 
WTO Negotiations – a Foreign Policy Meeting Point for Norwegian Domestic Policy?] RF report: 2001/232. 
Stavanger: Rogalandsforskning, p. 3. Refers to Goldstein, J. 1998. ”International Institutions and Domestic 
Politics: GATT, WTO and the Liberalisation of International Trade”, in A. O.Krueger (ed.), The WTO as an 
international Organization. Chicago: The University and Chicago Press. 
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national debate, both those who were in favour and those who opposed the liberalisation of 
trade in agricultural goods claimed that they were working to improve the conditions of the 
developing countries. In addition, the developing countries were used in the argument both in 
favour of and against including agriculture in the agreement. To analyse the demands that 
were presented in the round by different developing countries may provide more information 
on what the developing countries actually wanted from the negotiations, and what the 
developing countries considered to be their needs.   
 
Earlier Research  
Only limited research on Norway’s positions in the Uruguay Round exists, and the literature 
that is available focuses on the results of the negotiations. The situation for the developing 
countries in the round has been analysed in books and reports, and the issue of agriculture has 
also been analysed in the literature. Norwegian agricultural protectionism has been subjected 
to research, but earlier research on GATT has not focused on what took place in the actual 
negotiations. Åsmund Glende Jakobsen has written a MA thesis8 in history in which he 
analyses the coverage of the Uruguay Round in three Norwegian newspapers.9 His research 
shows that even though the coverage in Norwegian newspapers was not as high as when the 
debate regarding Norwegian membership of the European Union was being reported, for the 
first time a negotiation round in GATT made headlines in Norwegian newspapers. Frode 
Liland writes about the contradiction in the Norwegian position on import from developing 
countries. Policy-wise it was stated that the preferences that should improve market access for 
developing countries should not challenge Norway’s national agricultural goals. Liland writes 
that this was not possible since the goal of improving market access for the developing 
countries and the national, Norwegian, agricultural goals were mutually incompatible.10 
Three MA theses in history have been completed on Norwegian policy during the 
negotiations concerning New Economic World Order.11 They focus on the tension between an 
                                                 
8 A Norwegian MA thesis, ”hovedfagsoppgave”, is frequently more of an extended piece of original research 
than the normal MA thesis.    
9 Jakobsen, Åsmund Glende 2001. Fra GATT til WTO: Uruguay-runden i tre utvalgte norske aviser: en 
vurdering [From GATT to WTO: The Uruguay Round in three selected Norwegian Newspapers: an Assessment]. 
MA Thesis in History, University of Bergen. 
10 Liland 2003: 64. 
11 Aschim, Gisle 1995. Norge og UNCTAD 1964-1974 [Norway and the UNCTAD 1964-1974]. MA Thesis in 
History, University of Oslo. Drolsum, Nina 1996. Realpolitikk og idealisme: Norge i forhandlingene om en ny 
økonomisk verdensordning, 1974-1976 [Realpolitik and Idealism: Norway in the Negotiations on the New 
Economic World Order 1974-1976]. MA Thesis in History, University of Oslo. Børrud, Ane 1998. Solidaritet og 
særinteresser: Norges holdninger til regulering av råvarehandel og skipsfart i forhandlingene om en ny 
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ideological desire to be a nation friendly towards developing countries, and national interests 
such as protection of national industries. Frode Aschims writes that Norway was positive to 
the developing countries’ demands when the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) was established in 1964, but a dilemma appeared in that the 
developing countries’ demands would be expensive for the Norwegian shipping industry.12 
The Norwegian government was positively disposed to measures to improve the conditions 
for the developing countries, but did not want to make concrete commitments.13 He writes 
that the political will to make trade policy concessions disappeared when specific measures 
that would adversely affect Norway were tabled.14 Nina Drolsum found that the Norwegian 
government was positive to the developing countries’ demands, and went far to support 
demands concerning market access, nationalisation of natural resources and new rules for the 
international economy.15 The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (NMFA) believed it 
important not to focus on the special needs of the industrialised countries, and the Cabinet 
wanted to assist the developing countries.16 Ane Børrud writes that Norway was positive to 
regulating trade in raw materials, but when it came to the shipping industry, the Norwegian 
government opposed the developing countries’ demands to regulate the industry.17  
 
Archives, Literature and other Sources 
I have used the archives at the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The material was 
extensive and I limited my reading to the files on agriculture and to the general files. The 
material consisted in the main of reports from the Norwegian delegation in Geneva to the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice versa. Reports from meetings in Geneva, 
meetings between the Nordic countries, meetings in Norway and general correspondence to 
and from the NMFA were also to be found in the files. I have also used the archive at the 
Norwegian Parliament and have gone through the debates in the Storting and the Reports to 
the Storting18 and Propositions to the Storting. The files from the Storting are organised both 
thematically and chronologically, and this made the work easier since it was less likely to 
                                                                                                                                                        
økonomisk verdensorden 1976-1980 [Solidarity and Own Interests: Norway’s attitude to the Regulation of Trade 
in Raw Materials and Shipping in the Negotiations on the New Economic World Order 1976-1980]. MA Thesis 
in History, University of Oslo. 
12 Aschim 1995: 1.  
13 Aschim 1995: 38. 
14 Aschim 1995: 52. 
15 Drolsum 1996: 5-6.  
16 Drolsum 1996: 34-40. 
17 Børrud 1998: 76. 
18 Reports to the Storting is equal to White Papers.  
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miss anything. In addition to this I have interviewed the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Bjørn Tore Godal, from the Labour party, former agricultural spokesperson of Socialist Left 
Party, Inger Dag Steen, former foreign spokesperson of Socialist Left Party, Paul Chaffey, 
former Director General of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tor B. Næss, and 
Sverre Kvakkestad from the Ministry of Agriculture.  
International and Norwegian literature has also been used. The literature was used as 
an initial guide to the field of research and to the general framework. It has also been used as 
a supplement to sources of specific issues, mainly to supplement the archive sources. My 
thesis is principally based on Norwegian sources and files. The description of the positions of 
other countries and the positions of the developing countries have been constructed on the 
basis of Norwegian documents, and they are of course based on the views of the Norwegians 
conducting the negotiations. Where possible, I have confronted these views with international 
literature.  
 
The Chapters 
In chapter two the preparatory phase will be analysed. The countries identified positions and a 
disagreement between the developing countries and industrialised countries came out openly. 
The phase ended with the Ministerial Meeting in Uruguay that launched the negotiations. In 
addition a Norwegian dilemma in the negotiations will be identified. Chapter three is about 
the initial phase of the negotiations. The discussions on agriculture became difficult and the 
period ended in a breakdown at the Mid Term Review meeting. In Norway it was realised that 
the Norwegian import protection system was vulnerable. In chapter four it will be discussed 
how the Norwegian position in agriculture was put under pressure, and that Norway found it 
necessary to hold an explanatory statement that underlined the special characteristics of 
agriculture. The Ministerial Meeting that was suppose to finalise the round, ended in a 
breakdown. Chapter five describes the last phase of the negotiations. At first the period was 
characterised by stagnations, but eventually an agreement was reached, mainly since the 
disagreement between the US and the EC resulted in an agreement. Norway established a new 
agricultural policy, but non-trade concerns were still underlined. Chapter six describes the 
closing Ministerial meeting that adopted the Final Agreement, and outline the domestic debate 
regarding Norwegian ratifications. The last chapter seven will conclude the thesis. What 
follows next in this chapter is an introduction to GATT and the Uruguay Round.  
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Historical Introduction to GATT 
GATT was created in 1947, and was a temporary agreement that existed for 47 years. In 1946 
the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) agreed to create an International Trade 
Organisation (ITO). It was believed that an international trade organisation was needed, as 
well as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB). Parallel to the 
negotiations to establish ITO, it was decided to start negotiations on tariff reductions.19 In 
1947 the first meeting on tariff reductions was held in Geneva. The 23 participating countries 
signed an agreement, the temporary General Agreement on Tariff and Trade. Norway was the 
only Nordic country present in Geneva, and the first bilateral agreement on tariff reductions 
was signed between Norway and Canada.20 Shortly after this meeting, 58 countries met in 
Havana, Cuba, to create the ITO. After four months of discussion on the content of the 
Charter, 53 countries signed it finally. However, the American Congress opposed ratification 
and in 1950 the American President, Harry Truman, realised that the US Congress would 
never ratify the Charter.21 Without American ratification, ITO was never established and 
GATT remained an agreement for international trade. Its main aim was to work for a more 
liberal world trade order through the elimination of tariffs and trade barriers.  
Norway played an active role in the creation of GATT and has been active throughout 
its history. A liberal trade regime has been deemed very important for Norway as a small 
country dependent on access to the markets of other countries. Norway also had interests in 
the expansion of international trade due to the importance of the shipping industry as the main 
provider of foreign exchange prior to the discovery of oil on the continental shelf.22 Through 
seven multilateral rounds of trade negotiations, the GATT agreement developed round a broad 
set of rules.23 In 1986, by the start of the Uruguay Round, GATT had 95 member states, or 
Contracting Parties as the members also were called, which together had 4/5 of the total world 
trade. Though it was possible to vote in GATT based on the principle of “one country one 
vote,” the main rule was that all decisions were arrived at by consensus. GATT aimed to 
secure equal competition and preventing discrimination in international trade. Two principles 
were important in GATT, and are still central principles in WTO: the ‘Most Favoured Nation 
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Treatment’ requires tariff reductions given to one country to be given to all other Contracting 
Parties in GATT, and the National Treatment requires imported products be given the same 
treatment as products produced in the country.24 The Enabling Clause and the GATT 
agreement part IV underlined the special and differential treatment for the developing 
countries. 
In 1979, the Tokyo Round was formally completed with 99 participating countries. 
The developing countries were not satisfied with the final results, since areas of special 
interests to them such as agriculture, textiles and tropical products were not central parts of 
the agreement.25 The North/South polarisation had been high, and many developing countries 
refused to attend the closing ceremony.26 In the years following the Tokyo Round, 
protectionism and trade disputes increased, especially within agricultural trade.27 The 
implementation of the results came slowly, and the US administration wanted a new round, 
focusing on more free trade. The Americans also wanted to include new issues such as trade 
in services, investments and agriculture in the negotiations. The EC wanted, however, to focus 
on internal integration of the expanding organisation and opposed new initiatives in GATT.28 
The Director General of GATT, Arthur Dunkel, feared that GATT would be undermined if 
nothing was done, and through consultations with the Contracting Parties he pushed for new 
negotiations.29  
It was decided to hold a Ministerial Meeting in 1982.30 After long negotiations, the 
Contracting Parties managed to agree on a Working Programme that focused on the issues of 
textiles, agriculture, dispute settlement, services and trade in counterfeited goods.31 It was also 
decided that an examination of all measures affecting agricultural trade should take place, and 
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the special needs of developing countries should be examined. A committee on how to reform 
the agricultural sector was also established.32  
In the years following the Ministerial Meeting bilateralism increased, and it was a time 
of global recession and a decline in world exports and production. The Working Programme 
was far from being implemented.33 The developing countries developed differently, some 
countries experiencing fast economic growth while others faced stagnation. Many 
industrialised countries wanted the more developed developing countries to take on more 
commitments in international trade.34 The GATT Committee on trade in agriculture studied 
the agricultural policies of the Contracting Parties, and gave its recommendations for 
improvements in trade rules and liberalisation. The Committee agreed that negotiations on 
quotas, subsidies and technical barriers were necessary, and a ban on export subsidies should 
be considered.35  
In 1984, the Annual Session of GATT members aimed to establish conditions “[…] 
under which substantially all measures affecting agriculture will be brought under more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines.” Action was to be taken on four fronts: 
better access to markets, greater disciple in export competition, clearer definition of GATT 
rules on quantitative restrictions and subsidies and more effective, special treatment under 
GATT for developing countries. This preparatory work, especially within agriculture, brought 
about the Ministerial Declaration that launched the Uruguay Round, was more specific on 
agriculture than on other issues.36 The recommendations from the GATT Committee on 
agriculture and the results of the Annual Session in 1984 put agriculture on the agenda in 
GATT, and the work on liberalising the agricultural sector started. The fact that the members 
of GATT agreed to put agriculture under more GATT control represented a change from 
earlier, when agriculture had been kept outside many agreements and was exempt from 
reduction commitments.  
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The Uruguay Round 
The Uruguay Round was the most comprehensive and longest negotiation in the history of 
GATT. When the negotiations was launched, three main goals were established in the final 
declaration from the Ministerial Meeting in Uruguay: 
A further reduction in trade barriers such as tariffs and quantitative restrictions.  
To strengthen and develop GATT’s set of rules such as safeguards and trade in 
agricultural products. 
To develop a multilateral set of rules in areas in which rules do not exist, such as 
counterfeited goods, trade in services and trade related investments.  
It was decided that the negotiations should be conducted according to the principle of a 
“single undertaking”, which meant that all participating countries had to accept the whole 
agreement before an agreement could be reached. This would ensure that no country could 
accept only parts of the agreement, but it also made it more difficult to reach an agreement 
every country could agree on.37 During the negotiations some countries wanted an “early 
harvest”. This meant that some parts of the negotiations could be agreed upon and finished 
before the closing of the round. The desire was for this to signal that the negotiations were 
already producing results, and that it was important to conclude as soon as possible.  
The Contracting Parties joined together in different groupings in the negotiations. The 
groupings varied in size and to what extent they stuck together. The developing countries had 
traditionally acted as one group in GATT and in UNCTAD negotiations, and to a certain 
extent the countries did act together in the Uruguay Round as well. The developing countries 
formed a group called “the Informal Group of Developing Countries”. The name was given to 
differentiate it from the G 77 that had a more official status in UN and UNCTAD. India and 
Brazil led the group that consisted of countries with great differences in the level of 
development.38 The term “the Informal Group of Developing Countries” is not used in the 
Norwegian sources I have examined, nor mentioned as an active group in those interviews I 
have conducted. However, the international literature points to the group. This may indicate 
Norway did not pay any attention to the group, or considered it to have to general positions. 
The fact that India and Brazil led the group might also have weakened their influence since it 
could be understood that India and Brazil were only speaking on behalf of the “hardliners” 
though the countries tried to appear to be speaking on behalf of the Informal Group of 
Developing Countries. The hardliners was a group of developing countries chaired by India 
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and Brazil, with Yugoslavia, Egypt and Cuba as strong supporters as well as some African 
countries. The group had more extreme positions than other developing countries. The name 
was given since the group consisted of countries that opposed new negotiations the strongest, 
and refused to include trade in services. India and Brazil were often criticised by the 
industrialised countries claiming to have an adverse effect on the negotiation atmosphere. The 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wrote that: “among the developing countries India and 
Brazil play a central, but not always a constructive role in the negotiations.”39 In the same 
memorandum, Egypt, Yugoslavia, Argentina and Chile were mentioned as other active, more 
constructive developing countries.40  
In addition, we have the group of least developed countries, with Bangladesh as the most 
active member. The countries in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had 
coordinated meetings and spoke mostly with one voice during the negotiations. The African 
countries and the Latin American countries did not have the same level of coordination. 
Common for the developing countries was demands that the round had to address issues 
important for them. Agriculture, tropical products and textiles, together with special treatment 
for developing countries were the main demands. On agriculture it was wanted that the 
industrialised countries should improve market access especially through a reduction of tariffs 
and quantitative restrictions. It was also important for the developing countries to reduce the 
level of subsidies in the industrialised countries, and especially the export subsidies. In 
addition a clear set of rules to address the problems of dumping of food to developing 
countries’ markets. 
However, the demands differed in between the net food importing developing countries 
and the net food exporting developing countries. The net food importers was not a formal 
group, but consisted of developing countries that were food importers and would be 
negatively affected by increased food prices after a reduction in subsidies. Egypt often spoke 
on behalf of the net food importers. This group wanted the round to address the problems of 
increased world market price on food, and more use of preferences towards the developing 
countries in agricultural trade. With the use of special and differential treatment, the net food 
importers wanted to continue the use of protection of third world market, while at the same 
the industrialised countries should open up the markets for the developing countries. The 
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group that was most coordinated in the round was the Cairns Group.41 This was constituted by 
net exporting agricultural countries that pushed for agricultural reforms and liberalisation. The 
group consisted of both developing countries and industrialised countries. This marked a split 
in unity of the developing countries and it was the first time in the history of GATT that 
developing and industrialised countries acted together in one group.42  
 The EC negotiated as one group, and also the Nordic countries formed an alliance and 
negotiated in one block. The Nordic countries were Sweden, Norway, Finland and Iceland, 
the latter in a limited way. As a member of the EC, Denmark was not in the Nordic Group. 
Being a small country, Norway considered the Nordic cooperation very important. Nordic 
cooperation had been the norm since the other Nordic countries had joined GATT in 1950.43 
The Nordic countries constituted the fifth largest “trade group” in the world after the EC, the 
US, Japan and Canada. Nordic cooperation meetings were held quite frequently, and meetings 
with representatives from Denmark, the EC and the US were also conducted.44 The Nordic 
countries spoke with one voice, presented common suggestions and divided the responsibility 
of different negotiation groups between themselves. In addition to this, joint strategies were 
worked out. Occasionally, Denmark was present at coordination meetings, but this was rare. 
Informal contact, however, did exist and documents stating the position of the EC were often 
passed from Denmark to the Nordic countries. The Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-
94), The results of the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) and acceptance of the ratification of the 
Agreement to establish the World Trade Organisation (WTO) etc.45 underlined that Nordic 
cooperation had been very good.46 However, as we shall see in this thesis, there were times in 
the negotiations on agriculture when disagreements between Norway and Sweden were 
strong. Norway used quantitative restrictions, but Sweden and Finland used variable import 
restrictions.47 The countries had therefore different interests in the negotiations. Sweden was 
also more willing to implement structural changes in its agricultural sector, while Norway 
emphasised a continued focus on non-economic factors. It was only Japan and Switzerland 
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that used the same import protection system as Norway with quantitative restrictions, and this 
put the Norwegian system under high pressure.48  
Regarding the agricultural negotiations, Dale E. Hataway and Merlinda Ingco point to two 
coalitions of countries: on the one hand those who wanted significant liberalisation (the US 
and the Cairns Group), and on the other hand those who wanted to protect their agricultural 
sector (in particular the EC, EFTA, Korea and Japan).49 The US wanted initially to ban all 
import barriers and trade-distorting subsidies within ten years, and improved market access. 
Also the Cairns Group wanted a prohibition of all use of subsidies and support measures. The 
EC on the other hand did not want to focus on agriculture in the negotiations, and wanted to 
continue with export subsidies and variable import levies. The Nordic countries, especially 
Norway, wanted to maintain the national autonomy in agriculture, and together with Korea, 
Japan and Switzerland worked for a continued possibility to use quantitative restrictions. The 
special characters in agriculture were underlined.  
 
The Developing Countries and GATT 
“The developing countries have had an ambivalent attitude to the GATT, and their attitude 
towards integrating their economies with the global trading system has evolved from one of 
hostility to active promotion.”50 Even at the beginning of GATT, the developing countries had 
been part of the agreement, but the 30 developing countries that participated in the Havana 
conference in 1947 condemned the draft and said it only served the interests of developed 
countries. Nevertheless, apart from Argentina and Poland, all countries approved the final 
charter.51  A report in 1958 concluded that trade barriers contributed to the trade problems of 
developing countries. A committee was therefore established but this did not give any 
concrete results in improving the conditions for the developing countries. In 1963, 21 
developing countries called therefore for an action plan with standstill, elimination of illegal 
quantitative restrictions and removal of duties on tropical products.52 To meet the developing 
countries’ scepticism, UNCTAD was established in 1964 to focus on the developing 
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countries’ special needs. The developing countries wanted special and differential treatment, 
access to Western markets and possibilities to protect their own markets from competition.53 
A result of this work was that in 1965 part IV of the agreement named Trade and 
Development introduced special treatment for developing countries.54 
Before the Uruguay Round, the developing countries were the strongest opponents of 
a new round. The countries’ main demand was that the Working Programme from 1982 
should be implemented before a new round could be initiated. In addition action on 
safeguards, freezing import quotas and freezing the protectionism of industrialised 
countries.55 Despite the scepticism of the developing countries towards free trade and GATT, 
many developing countries joined the agreement before and during the negotiations. Melchior 
and Norman explain this with the protection GATT was giving to small countries. GATT 
prevented increased bilateralism where regional trade agreements could take over the global 
trade system. The developing countries considered that to be outside GATT would be more 
harmful than being a part of GATT.56  
The Uruguay Round led to an important change in the relationship between GATT and 
the developing countries. For the first time in the history of GATT, the developing countries 
participated in the GATT negotiations not only as passive observers, but also as active 
members.57 The majority of the developing countries joined GATT shortly before the 
Uruguay Round, and those that had participated in previous rounds had not been much 
involved in the actual negotiations.58 The integration of developing countries in GATT came 
at the same time as the economic expansion in East Asia, a time when many countries became 
more positive to liberalisation.59 In Africa, the structural adjustment programmes from the 
IMF and the World Bank that focused on liberalisation and the opening up the economies of 
the developing countries were implemented at the same time. The Uruguay Round was also 
special since it was the first time alliances and groups that were composed of both developing 
and industrialised countries, occurred. The Cairns Group was the most influential of these 
groups. In his book, Recolonization, GATT, the Uruguay Round and The Third World, 
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Chakravarthi Raghavan writes that the industrialised countries wanted to break third world 
unity by forming other groups and by identifying differences among the developing 
countries.60 We shall see that especially during the beginning of the negotiations the 
industrialised countries benefited from an increasing polarisation between the developing 
countries.   
 The Punta Del Este declaration, adopted at the Ministerial Meeting in Uruguay, 
contained references to the need for special and differential treatment of the developing 
countries. The industrialised countries should only claim reciprocity according to the 
developing countries’ level of development. However, the developing countries were 
expected to contribute more, according to their level of economic development. For the 
industrialised countries, including Norway, it was important to differentiate between the 
richest and the poorest developing countries.61   
   
Agriculture in GATT 
When the GATT was established, exemptions for agriculture were introduced. At that time 
food import was not a desire of the majority of the members, and food security was regarded 
as important. The focus was on protecting national markets rather than exporting food.62 
Agriculture was therefore not fully integrated in GATT.63 Terence Stewart writes that the 
agricultural rules were designed to adapt to the policies of the big nations, rather than vice 
versa. Most Western European states tried to gain as much self-sufficiency as possible and to 
avoid importing food. This is why GATT adopted special rules on agriculture when these 
states needed to protect their own agricultural sector against imports from food exporting 
nations and developing countries.64 However, exemptions were the UK, which was heavily 
dependent on food imports especially from other Commonwealth countries, and Denmark that 
relied on exports of food. The GATT article XI accepted quantitative restrictions on the 
import of agricultural goods that would be in direct competition with domestically produced 
food. Subsidies both for production and export were also allowed.65 To protect own markets, 
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exporting countries also used sanitary and phytosanitary regulations. Stewart argues that the 
sanitary and phytosanitary regulations often reflected an emotional bias rather than any 
recognised, scientific evidence regarding food safety standards. It was also a measure that was 
almost only used by industrialised countries since sanitary and phytosanitarian regulations 
often required a scientific infrastructure that few developing countries possessed.66 It was 
therefore important for developing countries to have a clear set of rules on these issues, and to 
integrate agriculture into the agreement.67  
 International trade in agriculture went through a massive change after the Tokyo 
Round. Agricultural products changed from being a scarce resource to being an area with a lot 
of overproduction. The subsidised exports increased the problems and led to an imbalance 
between supplies and demands. The consequences of this situation were trade “wars” and a 
lack of multilateral discipline.68 The panel-case handling the dispute between Norway and the 
US about apples and pears influenced the Norwegian negotiations. Norway used a system of 
seasonal regulations for imports of apples and pears. The US maintained that this system was 
not according to GATT’s regulations. In 1989 the panel concluded that Norway had to change 
the seasonal import restrictions. However the dispute continued and was not solved before the 
end of the round. This case was used as an example of how vulnerable Norway was, and that 
small countries needed more rules and regulations through GATT.  
 The subsidies and support to farmers in industrialised countries were debated and were 
issues at the top of the political agenda in many industrialised countries. Programmes were 
designed to give farmers an adequate income and to restrict access for imports to their 
agricultural markets. Quantitative restrictions were effective, not costly and limited import. 
Tariffs was considered to be more transparent, but again more difficult to defend since the 
costs to consumers because of increased prices on food were more visible.69 In the absence of 
effective rules and discipline in agriculture, domestic pressure led to the increased use of 
subsidies and restrictions in agricultural trade.70 Food exporting agricultural countries and 
developing countries worked, therefore, to include agriculture in the round.71 
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Norway and the Agricultural Negotiations 
Norwegian trade with developing countries was limited compared to other industrialised 
countries.72 The Norwegian import protection system made it difficult for developing 
countries to gain access to the Norwegian market. However, the Norwegian government 
stated that the Norwegian import protection system, which used quantitative restrictions, was 
legal within the framework of GATT, because of the “grandfather’s clause”, since the 
Norwegian import restrictions had been introduced in 1934, before Norway entered GATT. 
The Norwegian ambassador to the delegation in Geneva, Martin Huslid, gave a speech at a 
meeting with The Federation of Norwegian Agricultural Co-operatives,73 at which he 
discussed Norwegian agricultural policies and challenges within GATT. Huslid did not fear 
any great pressure against the Norwegian import restrictions in the Uruguay Round, and did 
not expect any big changes in the agricultural sector after negotiations. It was important for 
the Norwegian and Nordic delegations always to include “specific characteristics” in all 
documents mentioning agriculture. Huslid said that the Norwegian climate together with the 
high costs in Norway and geographical conditions made it necessary to have a relatively high 
level of protection. This could be defended by the fact that Norway was one of the largest 
food-importing countries in the world.74 The Norwegian negotiators were offensive before the 
negotiations, and it was clear that keeping the Norwegian import protection system was 
regarded as important. 
The Uruguay Round was presented to the Storting for the first time in Report No. 63 
to the Storting (1986-87), On some Trade Political Issues.75 The Cabinet considered the 
Norwegian mandate to have been established in this report, however, Inger Dag Steen from 
the Socialist Left Party and Kåre Gjønnes from the Christian Democratic Party later 
questioned this, especially since the report was presented after the Ministerial Meeting. 
Norway’s main goals in the negotiations were to strengthen the multilateral set of rules and to 
secure room for national agricultural production; it was also regarded as important to include 
trade in services in the agreement.76 The conflicting interests in the agricultural negotiations 
between Norway and the developing countries were visible throughout the round. In 
Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94), it was stated that the negotiations on agriculture 
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were complex and Norway had to consider different solutions.77 Also in the Report No. 63 to 
the Storting (1986-87), awareness of a Norwegian dilemma can be identified: “For Norway, 
the agricultural negotiations in the coming GATT round will be a challenge with many 
important and often contradicting aspects.”78 It was identified that Norwegian interests to 
protect agriculture would be in conflict with the interests of the developing countries that 
wanted improved marked access and reduced tariffs. In order to meet these demands, Norway 
tried to balance its position through a dualism in the policy, giving up important position in 
some fields, while at the same time maintaining the focus of the special characteristics of 
agriculture. It was also underlined that Norway would have to make concessions on other 
areas than agriculture, benefiting the developing countries. It was a wish that these 
concessions would lead to the active participation of the developing countries in the 
negotiations.79 Another challenge was that Norway had defensive interests in agriculture and 
offensive interests in the negotiations on fish and services. 
 
The Norwegian approach to the Negotiations 
The Ministry of Trade and Shipping initially coordinated the negotiations, and there were 
signs of some coordination problems with the NMFA. In 1988, the Ministry of Trade and 
Shipping was integrated into the NMFA, and the coordination was performed in the 
Department of External Economic Affairs II. The department was also referred to as the 
GATT office. The fact that responsibility for the negotiations was transferred to one office 
eased the problems of coordination, and the level of conflict was reduced. In addition the 
North/South department in the NMFA was only limited involved in the negotiations.  
The Cabinet had a GATT reference group with representatives from The Norwegian 
Farmers' Union, the Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union, The Norwegian 
Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO). In 
addition, experts from different Ministries provided advice during the negotiations. Reference 
groups were also established within the main negotiations areas. Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO’s) that were interested in participating in these groups were allowed to 
do so.80 Among the organisations, the farming organisations were the most important policy-
makers and they also participated at the Ministerial meetings. Other pressure groups were 
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only limitedly interested and involved in the negotiations. However, the involvement of 
NGO’s increased towards the end.   
The Norwegian delegation in Geneva coordinated the negotiations when conducted in 
Geneva and were in constant contact with the Department of External Economic Affairs II. 
The different embassies were to some extent involved in the negotiations. The NFMA 
cooperated with the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Agriculture and other Ministries that 
had an interest in the negotiations.  
 The Conservative Party and the Labour Party have traditionally agreed on the main 
foreign policy issues, also in the area of trade. Little discussion in the Storting and a minimum 
of public attention have characterised earlier GATT negotiations.81 The majority in the 
Storting agreed on the main goals of the negotiations and to work for a more liberal trade 
regime, while experts handled the technical details and the actual negotiations.82 This was the 
situation at the beginning of the Uruguay Round as well. However, during the round the 
involvement from the Storting and the media coverage increased. The Members of the 
Storting were briefed about the negotiations, but the NMFA was reluctant to provide 
information at critical stages. They feared this would create confusion and unnecessary 
interference. Members of the Storting, especially during the first phase of the negotiations, did 
not speak about the Uruguay Round at all when trade related issues were discussed in the 
Storting. The debate on Norwegian membership of the EC took almost all the attention in 
these discussions.  
The unity between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party on this issue 
continued throughout the negotiations, and changes in the Norwegian positions can hardly be 
identified when Norway changed Cabinets. The Labour Party, the Conservative party and 
Progress Party established by the end of the round, a new Norwegian position in agriculture 
more adapt to the international development. In addition these parties agreed on common 
recommendations regarding the Final Agreement, and Norwegian ratification. However, the 
internal disagreement inside the Cabinet was more visible in the coalition Cabinet between the 
Conservative Party, the Centre Party and the Christian Democratic Party with Jan P. Syse as 
prime minister from October 1989 until November 1990. The Centre Party wanted to continue 
the high level of Norwegian support to agriculture, and to maintain the Norwegian import 
protection system. The limited involvement of the Storting increased the influence the 
farming organisations had on the negotiations.  
                                                 
81 Nordvik 1998: 72. 
82 Nordvik 1998: 73. 
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 The main goal for Norway was, according to the Cabinet, to strengthen the multilateral 
set of rules. This was especially important to Norway as a small country. On agriculture it was 
agreed to improve the conditions on the world market by reducing overproduction and 
subsidised exports, but it was also important for Norway to secure national self-control over 
agricultural policy and to underline the importance of non-economic factors. It was also 
important to establish an internationally accepted import protection system, which had been 
questioned in the dispute with the US regarding seasonal tariffs on apples and pears. Keeping 
quantitative restrictions and maintaining subsidies and tariffs on agriculture were also central 
issues for Norway.83   
 
The Results of the Negotiations 
The negotiation results were the most comprehensive in the history of GATT. The results 
were expected to lead to the development and strengthening of the international rules on trade. 
Trade in services and intellectual property rights were included in the set of rules, and textiles 
and agriculture were, for the first time, affected by the rules.84 The Cabinet found that the 
creation of WTO would give the agreement higher authority.  
 On agriculture, the goal was a reformative process for trade in agricultural goods that 
would lead to a market-oriented trading system. The results were that protection of and 
support to agriculture should gradually be reduced with regard to market access, internal 
support and export subsidies. This should be implemented over a period of six years. 
However, the support was divided into three boxes, amber, green and blue. Support that could 
be defined as blue and green were not subjected to reductions, and this contributed that the 
Final Agreement was regarded as acceptable for Norway. On market access, the import 
protection system should develop into a tariff-based system, tariffication, with an average 
reduction of the tariffs of 36 percentages over a period of six years. All import barriers had to 
be changed into tariffs which should gradually be reduced.85 The Cabinet stated in Proposition 
to the Storting No. 65 that Norwegian agricultural policy could continue with the focus being 
on non-economic factors such as the environment, regional policy and food security. This was 
important to Norway. However, the agreement would lead to more competition and cost 
                                                 
83 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94): 11. 
84 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94):  9.  
85 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94): 16. 
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cutting. Tariffication, it was judged, would make it easier to make arrangements that would 
give the developing countries access to the Norwegian market.86 
 
                                                 
86 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94): 17-18. 
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CHAPTER II 
Towards A New Round Of Negotiations  
 
 
 
In this chapter the development towards a new round of multilateral negotiations shall be 
described. The phase was called the preparatory phase, and can be characterised as a time 
when the countries’ positions were being clarified. The developing countries opposed a new 
round before the Working Programme had been implemented, and we shall identify how 
some developing countries worked against new negotiations, and how it was worked to get an 
increased focus on areas such as textiles, agriculture and tropical products. The EC also 
wanted to limit the negotiations and was especially reluctant to include agriculture in the 
round. It will be discuss how the US and the Cairns Group managed to get support for a new 
round at a time when many industrialised countries were sceptical and major developing 
countries opposed new negotiations.  
The differences between the developing countries shall be described. In addition the 
polarisation between the industrialised countries and the developing countries on the one 
hand, and the increasing disagreements among the developing countries on the other hand, 
and how this affected the negotiation climate shall be discussed. The difficult preparatory 
phase that ended with the Ministerial Declaration in Punta del Este that officially launched the 
negotiations shall be analysed.  How could the Ministerial Meeting be conducted in a positive 
atmosphere when the work in the Preparatory Committee was characterised by polarisation 
between industrialised countries and the developing countries?  
The Norwegian position changed from supporting the initial demands of the 
developing countries, to working actively in favour of a new round. Why did Norway support 
a new round and how did Norway work to get new negotiations? Agriculture was put on the 
agenda accompanied by pressure for liberalisation of the sector. How did the Norwegian 
government welcome this and what were the domestic reactions to this issue? It shall also be 
pointed to the Norwegian strategy in the agricultural negotiations, and a Norwegian dilemma 
in the agricultural negotiations shall be identified.  
 
A new Round or Not? 
The main disagreement among the Contracting Parties in the years before the launching of the 
Uruguay Round was whether a new round of negotiations was desirable or not. The US and 
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the Cairns Group worked actively in favour of a new round, while developing countries 
opposed this. The initial initiative for a new round came from the US. The scepticism was 
high both among developing countries and the industrialised countries. The developing 
countries opposed a new round before the Working Programme from 1982 had been 
implemented. The deadline for this implementation was November 1984 but not much had 
been done, especially on issues important to developing countries. The developing countries 
were disappointed with the lack of progress and a representative from Uruguay put it this 
way: “Any initiative such as a new round of negotiations in GATT would be lacking the 
credibility and devoid of relevance particularly for developing countries.”1 
The position of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on possible new 
multilateral trade negotiations was that a new round should only be launched after 
preparations involving the developing countries as well. According to the Ministry, a 
North/South conflict dimension existed in GATT, but the NMFA also underlined the positive 
effects for the developing countries that could come out of a new round of discussions and 
dialogue. The Ministry also expressed that a new round should be well prepared and that the 
Working Programme from 1982 should be implemented to as great an extent as possible 
before any official start of a new round. The NMFA stated that a high degree of consensus 
was necessary to achieve support from the majority of the developing countries, and it was 
therefore important to meet the needs of them. Safeguards, North/South trade and agriculture 
were identified as central issues for negotiation for the developing countries.2  
Already at this stage, the Norwegian government underlined that Norway would have 
to give concessions in agriculture as well in order to meet the developing countries’ needs and 
demands. Norway thus had a flexible position towards a new round. Positive aspects for the 
developing countries were underlined, but Norway was not pushing for a new round, most 
likely since the scepticism of a new round was high among the industrialised countries as 
well. The NMFA therefore saw no need to take a clear stand favouring new negotiations. The 
Ministry emphasised that the developing countries should be included in the preparations, and 
that support from the developing countries was necessary before negotiations could start. 
Norway did not want to increase the already existing North/South conflict in GATT, and the 
NMFA knew that new negotiations would de difficult if the developing countries did not want 
a new round. Another reason for the Norwegian position may be that the Ministry saw a need 
                                                 
1 Preed 1995: 52.  
2 NMFA 44.12/51, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs NMFA, Terje Johannessen, 
11.09.84.  
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to meet the demands of the developing countries, and the fact that the Working Programme 
had not been implemented represented a challenge for the developing countries.  
The opposition from the developing countries manifested itself at a GATT Session of 
the Contracting Parties in November 1984. The developing countries presented a common 
paper saying that a new round could only be accepted if it was limited to trade in goods. 
Furthermore, the industrialised countries should remove import restrictions that were 
considered illegal under the GATT framework and which limited the developing countries’ 
export possibilities. The developing countries wanted to get the parts of the Working 
Programme from 1982 implemented that were of special interests to themselves before the 
start of any new round.3 They also placed more focus on textiles, tropical products and 
agriculture in the next round since previous rounds had only focused on industrial tariffs, 
leaving out areas important to developing countries.4  
 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) decided to 
support a new round, but the EC, especially France, did not want agriculture to be included in 
the negotiations in order to protect the EC’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).5 The 
polarisation between the industrialised countries and the developing countries grew after 
OECD decided to support a new round. The new situation in which the majority of the 
industrialised countries favoured a new round influenced the Norwegian position. According 
to ambassador Huslid, further achievements in GATT lay in a new round of negotiations. 
However, the industrialised countries had to be prepared to give concessions on areas 
important to the developing countries. This was of particularly importance according to 
Huslid, since more involvement from the developing countries in a possible new multilateral 
trade negotiation was expected.6 The Ministry of Trade and Shipping shared the analyses and 
the position of the delegation in Geneva, saying that the international trading system had 
experienced increased protectionism and bilateralism. Therefore, a strengthening of the 
multilateral trading system was needed.7 The NMFA confirmed the Norwegian position 
favouring a new round. It was necessary due to the problems GATT was facing. “The time 
                                                 
3 NMFA 44.12/51, del. in Geneva, Martin Huslid to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 11.02.85. 
4 Ricupero, Rubens 1998. ”Integration of Developing Countries into the Multilateral Trading System”, in Jagdish 
Bhagwati and Mathias Hirsch (eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel: 9-
36. Heidelberg: Springer, p. 13. 
5 Preed 1995: 54.  
6 NMFA 44.12/51, del. in Geneva, Huslid to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 11.02.85. 
7 NMFA 44.12/51, letter Ministry of Trade to selected Ministries and Embassies, 09.04.85. 
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has come for all GATT countries to recognise that further substantial progress only on the 
basis of the 1982 programme is no longer attainable; broad negotiations are called for”.8 
The Norwegian position in favour of negotiations was based on a perspective that 
more rules and regulation of the international trading system were necessary for small 
countries and developing countries. The modified Norwegian position, saying that new 
negotiations were necessary also before the Working Programme was implemented, did not 
come as a result of a single decision, but was rather as a result of a process during which the 
Norwegian positions were identified. It was realised that the main industrialised countries 
would not give concessions to the developing countries without a new round of negotiations. 
According to the Norwegian government, Norway and the developing countries had a 
common interest in new negotiations, since a strengthening of the rules and regulations was 
regarded as important for small countries and the developing countries.  
 
Disagreements among the Developing Countries 
After the industrialised countries had decided to favour a new round, disagreement among the 
developing countries grew on the question of whether new negotiations were desirable or not. 
In May 1985, the GATT Council held a meeting at which the question of a new round of 
negotiations was raised. The EC had started favouring a new round and presented a statement 
which underlined the need for a stronger structure within GATT, but also that a new round 
had to consider the trading difficulties of the developing countries. Japan, the US and the 
Nordic countries also expressed their positive attitude towards a new round of negotiations. 
After the EC had come out clearly in support of a new round, all industrialised countries 
favoured new negotiations. This affected the position of many of the developing countries, 
which became more in favour of a new round.  
India referred to the common statement from the Contracting Parties’ session in 
November 1984, and repeated that the implementation of the Working Programme from 1982 
had to be completed before a new round of negotiations could be launched. India’s statement 
was supported by Egypt and Yugoslavia. Brazil demanded a new round be limited to trade in 
goods. The ASEAN countries did not make any statement, and the Norwegian delegation 
reported to the NMFA that the group of developing countries had some difficulties in 
                                                 
8 NMFA 44.12/51, talking points, Department of External Economic Affairs I NMFA, 10.06.85. 
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coordinating their positions. This was considered to be due to the fact that countries from 
Latin America and Asia had changed position and were more positive to a new round. 9  
The disagreements among the developing countries were confirmed prior to a meeting 
of the Council in June 1985 at which the developing countries failed to agree on a common 
paper with demands on what had to be implemented before a new negotiation round could 
take place.10 The ASEAN countries, Israel and South Korea in particular had trouble 
accepting parts of the suggested text, and it was clear that the developing countries had 
different interests in the negotiations.11 When the OECD decided to support a new round, 
more developing countries wanted a new round at which the countries could gain 
commitments to market access in return for accepting new issues.12 Different opinions 
between the developing countries on this question weakened the unity of the developing 
countries, and this lead to a decline in their strength. It was clear that the earlier common 
statement presented by India no longer had the support of all the developing countries.  
At the meeting of the Council in June, a new multilateral trade negotiation was 
discussed for the first time as a point on the agenda. The so-called hardliners, with India and 
Brazil in the forefront, supported by Egypt, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, demanded a better 
trading system with special focus on issues that were considered to be important to the 
developing countries.13 On behalf of 23 countries14, India presented a position paper 
demanding implementation of the Working Programme. The main goal for a new round 
should be increased market access for developing countries, especially on tropical products 
and agriculture. In addition, the group of developing countries wanted to abolish the Multi 
Fibre Agreement (the MFA) on textiles and supported liberalisation and cuts in subsidies for 
agricultural products. The main opponents of new negotiations realised that it would be 
difficult to hinder a new round and wanted therefore to get support for important demands for 
developing countries before possible negotiations. The fact that far from all developing 
countries supported the position paper presented by India showed that, at present, the 
disagreement among the developing countries was the main conflict in GATT, and not as 
previously, a disagreement between the industrialised countries and the developing countries. 
The ASEAN countries, South Korea, Israel, Chile and Turkey supported many of the 
                                                 
9 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 02.05.85.  
10 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 04.06.85. 
11 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 05.06.85. 
12 Preed 1995: 55. 
13 Croome 1999: 17. 
14 The 23 countries were: Argentina, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Colombia, Cuba, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Ghana, Ivory Coast, India, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Yugoslavia and Zaire.  
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demands presented by India but were generally in favour of a new round. 15 The reason for 
these countries favouring a new round was probably a reflection of what would benefit these 
countries the most. They were more economically advanced, and considered increased market 
access as important for economic development. The split in unity among the developing 
countries can therefore be explained by increasing economic difference between the 
developing countries.  
The polarisation between the developing countries weakened their position, and it was 
therefore easier for the US and the Cairns Group to push for a new round. For Norway, too, it 
was easier to take an active stand in favour of new negotiations when this would not lead to a 
confrontation with a united group of developing countries. India and Brazil also lost 
credibility when claiming speaking on behalf of all developing countries, when in fact India 
and Brazil only spoke on behalf of a limited group of developing countries.  
 During the next meeting, Brazil, India and Egypt blocked a suggestion calling for a 
High Official meeting in September that was suppose to initiate the preparations for new 
negotiations.16 The US, therefore, initiated a written poll, and the results showed that 63 out of 
90 countries entitled to vote were in favour of an extraordinary session of the Contracting 
Parties, including all the Nordic countries.17 All decisions in GATT were usually taken by 
consensus, but by initiating a poll, the US wanted to prevent the hardliners from blocking a 
new round. The huge support in favour of negotiations made it visible for the Contracting 
Parties that the developing countries that opposed a new round were isolated. By contributing 
to a split between the developing countries, the US managed to get overall backing for a new 
multilateral trade negotiation. Using a written poll was new in GATT, and by doing so the US 
showed willingness to break the consensual line in GATT in order to initiate new 
negotiations.  
In the extraordinary session of the Contracting Parties in October an agreement was 
reached that a group of Senior Officials (SOG) should start the preparatory work towards a 
new round. The NMFA was satisfied with the result of the meeting and wrote: “The Session 
showed that a small minority can no longer use modalities as a tool to prevent a process the 
vast majority of the members want.”18 The hardliners were identified as a small group of 
                                                 
15 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 07.06.85. 
16 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 19.07.85. 
17 NMFA 44.12/51, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs I NMFA, Arve Thorvik, 13.09.85. 
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difficult countries that were not constructive negotiation partners. The industrialised countries 
could therefore more easily work for their demands and interests.   
The meetings of the Senior Officials were difficult, and the US even threatened to 
remove the countries creating difficulties from the American list of the General System of 
Preferences (GSP). After not managing to block a new round, the hardliners now demanded 
the negotiations not include new issues, especially not trade in services. The industrialised 
countries regarded it as important to establish a Preparatory Committee without an instruction 
not to include new issues. Since the Nordic countries were in favour of the negotiations and to 
include trade in services, it was important to focus on the positive aspects, which might be 
attained from a round for the developing countries. “Small industrialised countries and 
developing countries have much in common,” Sweden stated on behalf of the Nordic 
countries.19  
The increased polarisation between the developing countries made the situation more 
difficult for the hardliners. They could no longer block a new round, so their main concern 
was to exclude trade in services from the next round. The industrialised countries used the 
disagreement between the developing countries to gather support, and worked hard to gain 
acceptance for including new issues in the negotiations.  
 
Norway and Developing Countries  
Since many developing countries still were sceptical about including new issues in the 
negotiations, Norway approached some developing countries in an attempt to influence their 
position. After the difficult situation in the Senior Official Group, the NMFA wrote a letter to 
the Norwegian Embassies in developing countries.20 The Embassies were instructed to contact 
the respective governments to underline the importance of establishing a Preparatory 
Committee without any preconditions at the Contracting Parties session in November. The 
result should be reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade,21 and 
this contact should be made jointly with the Finnish and Swedish embassies.22 This was an 
attempt to prevent the demands of the hardliners that new issues should not be included in the 
                                                 
19 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva, draft Nordic Opening Statement, 11.10.85.  
20 NMFA 44.12/51, letter Minister of Foreign Affairs signed by Director General Johannessen, to selected 
Embassies, 25.10.85. 
21 In the report from the Embassy in Abidjan a person from the NMFA questioned why the Embassy was asked 
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22 NMFA 44.12/51, fax Ministry of Trade to selected Embassies in developing countries, 19.11.85. 
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round. Norway wanted to use its position as a nation friendly to developing countries to 
influence the developing countries to be positive to a new round, and not to support the 
hardliners’ demands.  
The Norwegian Embassy in Manila reported that the Philippines shared the Nordic 
perspective and that ASEAN favoured the establishment of a Preparatory Committee. It was 
however important to Manila to avoid an open conflict with other developing countries.23 A 
meeting with the Malaysian representative confirmed that ASEAN supported the 
establishment of a committee. Malaysia criticised India and Brazil for claiming to be speaking 
on behalf of all developing countries.24 The countries in the group of hardliners were also 
approached. The Embassy in Belgrade reported that Yugoslavia would accept a new round 
and wanted to strengthen the multilateral trading system. It was however important to 
implement the Working Programme from 1982 and to separate trade in goods from trade in 
services. However, Yugoslavia criticised the industrialised countries for not paying attention 
to the demands proposed by the developing countries. Suggestions that were raised by 
developing countries never led to any debate, and little attention was paid to the position of 
the developing countries.25 The Norwegian Embassy in Dar Es Salaam reported that Tanzania 
fully supported the Nordic countries’ position and the government would give instructions to 
the delegation in Geneva to cooperate with the Nordic delegations.26 The Nigerian 
government also agreed with the Nordic countries that trade in services should be included in 
the next round of negotiations. However, the G7727 was generally sceptical about a new round 
taking place before the implementation of earlier resolutions and decisions had been 
accomplished. Nigeria wanted to follow the decisions taken in G77.28  
The information given to the Norwegian Embassies about the position of Nigeria and 
Tanzania was not in line with the position taken by these countries in the actual negotiations. 
In the negotiations, Tanzania and Nigeria in fact supported the hardliners and there were huge 
differences between the position of the hardliners and the Norwegian position. However, at 
the meeting with the Norwegian Embassy it was stated that Tanzania supported the 
Norwegian position. This can be explained by limited contact between the countries’ 
delegation in Geneva and the capital. The developing countries had few resources to use in 
the negotiations, and few people were involved in them on a daily basis. This affected the 
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28 NMFA 44.12/51, fax Emb. in Lagos to NMFA, 26.11.85. 
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level of information to the capital and also the level of involvement, both by the capital and 
by the delegation in Geneva. The delegation in Geneva may not have been informed about the 
position in the capital and vice versa. Another explanation may be that the Nordic countries 
were major donor countries, and the home officials did not want to disagree with the Nordic 
countries. It might be that the officials in Tanzania quite likely wanted to please the Nordic 
Embassies since the Nordic countries gave a great amount of developmental aid to Tanzania.  
 
The Establishing of the Preparatory Committee 
The Preparatory Committee were established at the Contracting Parties’ Session in November 
1985, however, India and Brazil continued with their opposition. It was agreed to establish a 
Preparatory Committee with a mandate to work on negotiation themes, goals, modalities and 
participation in the new round of multilateral trade negotiations. This was the formal 
beginning of the preparation of a new round, and it was officially decided that negotiations 
should take place. Brazil and India had understood that it would not be possible to block 
negotiations, so the next step was to get support for a set of preconditions linked to the work 
in the committee. Furthermore, the hardliners opposed including new issues.29 Brazil and 
India did not gain any support for the preconditions, and this was considered to be a victory 
for the industrialised countries. Despite the disagreement with the hardliners, which now only 
consisted of ten countries,30 the session had few other elements of a North/South polarisation, 
and this was considered to be a great advantage in the upcoming negotiations.31 
The NMFA welcomed the decision to establish a Preparatory Committee. “This would 
make it easier for the national governments to resist pressure from protectionism.”32 The 
belief was that a new round would lead to increased international trade and broader 
integration of the developing countries in world trade.33 The quote underlines what Melchior 
and Norman pointed to, i.e. that international trade agreements are necessary to resist strong 
protectionist pressure groups. The Norwegian Cabinet was accused by farming organisations 
later in the negotiations of using the negotiations as an excuse for major structural changes in 
the agricultural sector.  
                                                 
29 Croome 1999: 21. 
30 The countries were: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, Egypt, India, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Tanzania and 
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31 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade 29.11.85. 
32 Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
33 NMFA 44.12/51, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs I NMFA, Anne Nesmoen, 
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After the meeting in November it was clear that support for Brazil and India had 
further declined. The North/South polarisation was replaced by polarisation among the 
developing countries. Strong groups such as ASEAN saw that cooperation could benefit them 
more than opposition. The ASEAN countries were economically more powerful and 
experienced rapid economic growth. These countries had therefore much more in common 
with the industrialised countries than with many of the developing countries. It is also likely 
that pressure from industrialised countries contributed to a split in the group of developing 
countries. However, many countries, such as Norway, underlined the need to give special 
treatment to the developing countries. The opposition from the hardliners, and their emphasis 
on the problems the developing counties could face in the round, might therefore have 
contributed to increased awareness of the special needs of the developing countries.   
Dunkel led the work in the Preparatory Committee and the main task was to write a 
draft ministerial declaration. Even though the majority of the developing countries supported 
the establishing of the Preparatory Committee, the developing countries repeated their 
demands for special treatment and referred to the Enabling Clause under the already existing 
GATT rules. They underlined textiles, tropical products and agriculture as fields within which 
special treatment for developing countries was necessary. Industrialised countries responded 
to that by saying the most advanced developing countries had to give up some of their 
benefits. The US was the country most strongly opposed to special and differential treatment 
for developing countries.34  
 
Continued North/South Polarisation  
At a meeting in OECD in December 1985, Dunkel informed the OECD countries of the latest 
development in GATT. Dunkel said that the meeting of the Contracting Parties had changed 
the geopolitical situation in GATT, and the North/South polarisation was not as visible as 
before. The OECD member countries agreed not to act as one group during the negotiations. 
This might give the impression of “ganging up” against the developing countries. This 
underlined that the industrialised countries were still aware of the risk that the developing 
countries might claim that the round was only focusing on the needs of the industrialised 
countries. However, many OECD countries expressed the idea that the most advanced 
                                                 
34 NMFA 44.12/51, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs I NMFA, 29.01.86.  
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developing countries should be ready to give up some of their benefits.35 The scepticism 
against having the same conditions for all developing countries was a signal that OECD did 
not regarded the developing countries as a homogeneous group, since the more advanced 
developed countries were expected to give up some of their preferences and benefits.  
At the same time as the OECD meeting, representatives from G77 met in New Delhi, 
together with a group of Indian civil servants. The meeting expressed support for the 
hardliners among the developing countries. The conclusion of the meeting focused on the 
problems in the developing countries, which were considered to be a result of protectionism in 
the industrialised countries.36 The support of the G77 meeting gave an important signal to 
India and Brazil indicating to maintain the strong opposition in the negotiations. The G77 did 
not operate as a group in the negotiations, but India and Brazil enjoyed greater legitimacy 
when the countries claimed to be speaking on behalf of the developing countries. The reasons 
for the renewed support to India and Brazil may have several explanations. The developing 
countries that supported a new round could have felt pressure from the hardliners at the 
meeting in India, especially since industrialised countries were not present at the meeting. 
Another explanation may be that the representatives attending the G77 meeting worked 
mainly with issues related to UNCTAD, and were different people to those from developing 
countries present in Geneva and working with GATT. It may also be the case that the 
developing countries that supported the new round saw the need to express that the 
developing countries had special needs and problems that had to be addressed. The meeting in 
India and the work in the Preparatory Committee showed that the polarisation between the 
developing countries and the industrialised countries still existed, and that the developing 
countries could operate together as one united front.  
 
The Norwegian Interests in the Negotiations 
A Norwegian dilemma in the negotiations was how to protect the agricultural sector without 
coming into conflict with the developing countries. It was maintained by many developing 
countries that agriculture should be given a high priority in the negotiations. The Nordic 
countries replied that the special characteristics of agriculture had to be recognised.37 For 
Norway, one challenge was to balance the demands for agricultural liberalisation from the 
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developing countries, and Norway’s claim for recognition of the special characteristics of 
agriculture. For a country as Norway that wanted to be viewed as friendly to developing 
countries, this was clearly a dilemma. The Norwegian delegation in Geneva advised the 
NMFA that due to different interests within agriculture between Norway and the developing 
countries, Norway should not play an active role in areas important for the developing 
countries.  
 
In light of the few possibilities the Nordic countries have for concrete concessions it is not natural 
that the Nordic countries take any kind of special initiative in questions important for the 
developing countries, with the exception of the least developed countries.38 
 
Also among the Nordic countries, it was agreed that due to the relatively small concessions 
the Nordic countries were willing to make in the agricultural negotiations, it was agreed to 
keep a low profile in this area.39 The Nordic countries would take a defensive position in the 
negotiations, since agriculture would create much tension and disagreement in the 
negotiations. A potential role as nations friendly to developing countries nations would 
therefore be challenged if the Nordic countries were identified as reluctant to make 
concessions in the agricultural negotiations.  
In order to draw attention away from the defensive agricultural position, the NMFA 
wanted to indicate a willingness to embark on a gradual dismantlement of the textiles 
restrictions, as well as a strong commitment on standstill and rollback. This could also 
overcome the scepticism among the developing countries about including new negotiation 
themes in the round.40 On textiles Norway had earlier GATT worked to maintain national 
control in textile production. However, when Portugal joined the EC Norway realised that the 
competition would be so high, that further protection would not be possible. Norway therefore 
decided to give extensive concessions in textiles, and underlined that this was an important 
area to the developing countries.  
A Norwegian strategy can be identified. To solve the Norwegian dilemma, Norway 
sought to protect the agricultural sector, whilst giving concessions in other areas important for 
the developing countries. On agriculture, Norway should keep a low profile, since Norway 
did not have much to offer in way of concessions. A low profile could prevent a negative 
focus on the Norwegian agricultural policy. However, on other areas important for the 
developing countries, Norway was ready to give concessions. This would show that Norway 
                                                 
38 NMFA 44.12/51, del. in Geneva to NMFA, 04.02.86. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
39 NMFA 44.12/51, summary of meeting, Ministry of Trade to MFA in Nordic countries, 17.02.86. 
40 NMFA 44.12/51, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs I NMFA, Nygaard, 02.06.86. 
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wanted to integrate the developing countries into the trading system. A dualism in the 
Norwegian policy can be identified. On the one hand, a willingness to work to improving the 
conditions for the developing countries existed, while on the other hand, it was important to 
protect national agricultural interests.  
In his speech on foreign policy on 4 December 1985, the Norwegian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Svenn Stray from the Conservative Party, informed the Storting about the 
latest development in GATT. He said that the preparations for a new round of multilateral 
trade negotiations had started. The Minister underlined that a successful result would lead to 
increased international trade and the increased participation of the developing countries in the 
trading system. Stray stated that, for the industrialised countries, the negotiations represented 
new possibilities but the industrialised countries had to be prepared to give concessions in 
traditional areas in which new countries in the trading system could produce better and 
cheaper products. This was a signal that Norway was prepared to give concessions on areas 
important to developing countries, however agriculture was not mentioned specifically. In the 
debate following, no Member of the Storting spoke about the GATT negotiations.41 The level 
of knowledge about GATT was low, and there are reasons to believe that the MP’s did not 
foresee the consequences and the huge implications the negotiations would have. The high 
level of consensus in Norwegian foreign policy, and a more or less common view on trade 
policy between the Labour Party and the Conservative Party may explain the lack of attention 
the preparations drew in the Storting.  
 
Drafting of the Ministerial Declaration 
The process to draft a Ministerial Declaration was difficult and the polarisation increased. The 
goal was for the Preparatory Committee to agree on one proposal for a Ministerial Declaration 
to be presented at the Ministerial Meeting. When it was realised that the drafting of a common 
proposal was difficult, especially since the hardliners opposed the inclusion of trade in 
services in the declaration, two different groups started to draft their proposal for a Ministerial 
Declaration.42 An informal group of industrialised countries held private meetings in the 
EFTA conference facilities and worked on one proposal. The US, the EC and Japan withdrew 
from the group for tactical reasons, so the group was associated with the EFTA countries.43 
The EFTA countries presented a document, and the main reaction from the developing 
                                                 
41 S.tid. (1985-86): 1269-1276. (04.12.85.)  
42 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 17.06.86 (written 1987). 
43 Preed 1995: 58. 
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countries was that the countries wanted clearer focus on differential treatment and a better 
draft on textiles and tropical products. Brazil opposed the proposal because it included trade 
in services, but Chile and Hungary said that the document could be a basis for further 
negotiations.  
On behalf of a group of ten developing countries,44 Brazil presented its draft 
ministerial document. The main issues were standstill, rollback, tropical products and 
agriculture. The overall reactions to the document were reserved and negative. Colombia 
expressed disappointment that the group of ten countries, the “G-10”, did not consult other 
developing countries while drafting the proposal. The industrialised countries strongly 
opposed the document since no new issues were included in the text. It also included strict 
standstill and rollback demands, which Norway said would delay a new round. The internal 
disagreements in the group of developing countries grew, and many countries reacted 
negatively that Brazil and India were taking such a defensive position in the negotiations.45  
The EFTA countries stood against G10, and both groups started to redraft their 
documents, especially to please the more “moderate” developing countries that were 
identified as  “G20”.46 The Norwegian delegation in Geneva wrote that the revised suggestion 
from G10 still was too far reaching. It was impossible to have a dialogue with G10 in the 
drafting procedure, so EFTA, G20, the EC and Japan were working together on a new 
common text.47 The formation of G10 and G20 was a clear signal that the developing 
countries were split, and had different opinions regarding a new round. However, the groups 
did not continue to act as formal groups in the negotiations after the preparation work. With 
such an identified disagreement among the developing countries, it was more difficult for the 
hardliners to claim to speak on behalf of the developing countries, since the majority of the 
developing countries actually agreed with the industrialised countries in the Preparatory 
Committee.  
The Preparatory Committee did not manage to agree on one common proposal for a 
Ministerial Declaration and ended its work on 31 July. Three texts were sent from the 
Committee to the Ministerial Meeting. The EFTA group with G20, the EC and Japan 
presented one text, and this group was now called the “G47”. The second text was the 
proposal from G10, and the third a draft from Argentina in an attempt to produce a 
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45 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 30.06.86. 
46 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 09.07.86. 
47 NMFA 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 16.07.86. 
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compromise between the two other documents. The main disagreement between the G10 and 
the G47 was whether to include new issues in the round. This situation where two groups 
disagreed on such an important point, caused increased fear of a difficult Ministerial 
Meeting.48 Again we can identify that the industrialised countries managed to get the majority 
of the developing countries to support their line in the negotiations. A united group of 
developing countries, with coordinated demands, could have influenced the Ministerial 
Document in a significant way. However, due to the position taken by the hardliners, to 
oppose new issues something that was viewed as extreme, the moderate developing countries 
rather formed alliances with the industrialised countries.  
The Ministry of Trade expressed satisfaction with the role Norway played during the 
preparatory phase of the negotiations. The draft ministerial document presented by G47 was 
considered to be a good proposal from the Norwegian perspective.49  
 
The Ministerial Meeting  
The difficult work in the preparatory phase could have lead to a difficult Ministerial Meeting. 
However, the Ministerial Meeting ended with a unanimously adopted declaration. It had been 
decided that Uruguay should host the Ministerial Meeting, a decision welcomed by the 
developing countries.50 The meeting was held in Punta del Este, a holiday resort near the 
coast. Meeting facilities in Punta del Este were absent. The head of delegation meeting took 
place in a hotel nightclub, and the plenary was conducted in a Casino.51 However, to hold the 
Ministerial Meeting in a developing country was regarded as an important signal that this 
round should address the special problems for the developing countries. 
The question of the participation of South Africa in the negotiations was expected to 
cause disagreement at the Ministerial Meeting. During the last meeting of the Preparatory 
Committee, Nigeria raised the question of the participation of the South African apartheid 
regime. Several African countries condemned South Africa and suggested excluding South 
Africa from the new round.52 At the beginning of the Ministerial Meeting, Jamaica formally 
suggested excluding South Africa. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the 
delegation to vote against this proposal with an explanation to the vote. The explanation 
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underlined that Norway considered universality as a basic principle within the United Nations, 
and therefore could not expel South Africa from the negotiations.53 After pressure from the 
Soviet Union, Jamaica did not raise the suggestion and the issue was not discussed.54 
On 20 September the formal decision to launch a new round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations was taken. The adopted Ministerial Document closely resembled the original 
text suggested by the G47. Trade in services, agriculture, intellectual property rights and 
investments were all mentioned.55 In the preamble it was said that the official name of the 
upcoming process was the “Uruguay Round” in honour of the host.56 The Punta del Este 
declaration also said that differential and more favourable treatment of developing countries 
should be applied in the negotiations.57 The declaration stated that the round should aim at; 
“bringing all measures affecting import access and export competition under strengthened and 
more operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines.”58 An important decision was the 
agreement on the so-called “single undertaking”. It meant that: “nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed.”59 The developing countries were the main proponents of the single 
undertaking. Latin American countries wanted to avoid what had happened earlier, that 
liberalisation of agricultural trade was not fully integrated in the agreements.60 By definition, 
all countries had veto-power regarding all parts of the agreement. However, it was not 
possible for a country to claim exemptions from some parts of the negotiations result.  
On agriculture the Contracting Parties agreed that there was “an urgent need to bring more 
discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade.” This was the first time agriculture 
was fully included in the negotiations. The declaration underlined the need for liberalisation 
and to bring agriculture under GATT rules. Also improved market access through a reduction 
of import barriers and increased disciplines on subsidies should be a part of the agricultural 
negotiations. Lastly the effects that sanitary and phytosanitarian regulations had on agriculture 
should be addressed.61 With the text on agriculture the countries with defensive interests on 
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this issue, such as Norway opened for increased disciplines, concessions and liberalisations in 
agriculture. This was regarded as important especially to the developing countries. Norway 
had opened up for structural changes in the agricultural sector and for a possible change in the 
import protection system. This was a challenge for Norway; however, the text was found 
acceptable since the reduction commitments had to be negotiated. Also, more rules and 
disciplines were regarded as important for Norway, in addition to include services.  
The negotiations were an opportunity for the US to reform domestic policy through 
international negotiations abroad.62 The US position in the negotiations was offensive and 
demanded political courage from the Reagan administration, due to increased domestic 
opposition to major reforms in agriculture.63 The US and the Cairns Group pushed for putting 
agriculture on top of the negotiation agenda, and managed this because other controversial 
issues such as trade in services and intellectual property rights took away some of the 
attention from agriculture during the Ministerial meeting.64 The Cairns Group had a quarter of 
the world exports of agricultural products and access to other markets was regarded as 
extremely important.65 
The EC wanted to limit the negotiations to a modification of existing agricultural policies 
rather than radical reform. However, the EC member countries were divided on how far the 
countries wanted to go in reducing support to domestic agriculture.66 The EC policy on 
agriculture was under pressure. Improved access to the EC market and an end to subsidised 
competition in third country markets were demands from the Cairns Group and other 
countries. There was also internal pressure for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy for 
budgetary reasons.67 In 1986, the EC subsidised price for wheat was more than double the 
world market price.68  
All decisions at the meeting were adopted unanimously, but the hardliners made some 
statements scepticism against including new issues in the negotiations were expressed. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
the reduction of import barriers; Improving the competitive environment by increasing disciplines on the use of 
all direct and indirect subsidies and other measures affecting directly or indirectly agricultural trade, including 
the phased reduction of their negative effects and dealing with their causes; Minimising the adverse effects that 
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conflict level was, however, lower than expected, and this was considered to be an important 
step towards fruitful negotiations. The opposition from the hardliners had weakened and most 
of the developing countries did not support their position. The level of confrontation was 
therefore less than feared. The NMFA wrote that it was positive that the results were achieved 
without increasing polarisation and that the atmosphere was better than at earlier GATT 
negotiations.69 Again the industrialised countries managed to isolate the hardliners, and due to 
the majority of the developing countries supporting a new round, the hardliners realised it was 
impossible to prevent new issues from being included in the negotiations. Norway was 
satisfied with the outcome of the meeting, which was considered to have taken place in a 
spirit of “conciliation and constructive deliberations”. The ministerial declaration contained 
all essential elements of the draft declaration from G47 important to Norway according to the 
Ministry of Trade.70  
 
The Norwegian Preparations 
There was no political attention in Norway on the negotiations in the initial phase, and the 
division of work between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade was not 
clearly defined. During 1986, the Minister of Foreign Affairs did not once comment upon the 
GATT negotiations in the Storting, nor did any members of the Storting raise the issue. 
General awareness of the round was limited and the Norwegian position represented the 
outcome of discussions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade. The 
lack of interest in the preparatory phase from the members of the Storting, the organisations, 
especially the farmers’ organisations and the media, may be explained due to a lack of 
information given by the government, but also because it was not expected that the round 
should be different from other GATT negotiations were the results had not lead to great 
implications for Norway. The Storting had traditionally not been involved in trade-related 
issues, and it was not therefore a tradition to discuss such matters in the Storting. The Punta 
del Este Declaration was not discussed and not presented to the Storting before 1987, 
something that was later criticised. It was questioned whether the Minister of Trade, Kurt 
Mosbakk from the Labour Party, had a mandate to agree on the Punta del Este Declaration 
that committed Norway to reductions and liberalisations in agriculture. However, Members of 
the Storting did not request information on the negotiations.  
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The Norwegian preparations were to be made under the supervision of the Ministry of 
Trade, since the negotiations were trade-related. The division of work between the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade was, however, unclear. In a memorandum from the 
North/South department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the disagreement was spelled out. 
The North/South department reacted to indications given in the OECD by representatives 
from the Ministry of Trade that Norway was positively disposed to including regulations of 
investments in the negotiations. The department questioned this position, and asked whether 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been consulted about this position. Officials in the 
North/South department were of the opinion that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have 
the coordinating and leading role in questions relating to international institutions.71 Also, in a 
note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of External Economic Affairs to the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the issue of the organisation of the Norwegian participation was 
raised. These officials expected the negotiations to be complicated and far-reaching, and they 
thought the next round would have more potential for political tension compared to earlier 
rounds. The foreign policy dimension was expected to be central, and the Department of 
External Economic Affairs argued for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs coordinating the round 
and playing a central role in the negotiations.72  
 
Conclusion 
Before the Ministerial Meeting three positions among the Contracting Parties can be 
identified: that of the industrialised countries that eventually all favoured a new round, that of 
the developing countries that favoured a new round and the developing countries that opposed 
a new round. The split among the developing countries helped isolate the hardliners and the 
industrialised countries, and especially the US and the Cairns Group managed to get all their 
important issues included in the Ministerial Document. A united group of developing 
countries could have achieved major influence on the Ministerial Document, and could even 
managed to delay the round, since it would be difficult to gain acceptance for a new round if 
all developing countries opposed it. However, the economical more advanced developing 
countries had interests in a new round, and to cooperate with industrialised countries to 
receive market access.  
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Norway, was at first sceptical to a new round before the Working Programme had 
been implemented. However, as many developing countries and industrialised countries 
signalled to be in favour of a new round, Norway’s position changed. The NMFA meant that 
small countries and developing countries had much in common and that both groups would 
gain from more effective GATT’s rules and regulations. For Norway it was important to keep 
national control in the agricultural policy. However, the developing countries wanted 
increased market access and liberalisation in the agricultural sector. A Norwegian dilemma 
has been identified. In the agricultural negotiations it was a challenge to Norway to meet the 
demands from the developing countries, and at the same time, working for acceptance for 
recognition of the special character of agriculture. To meet this dilemma, it was therefore 
important to the Nordic countries to underline those areas of common interest with the 
developing countries. On the issue of rules and procedures, the Nordic countries underlined 
the importance to strengthen this, for small countries and for developing countries. Norway 
was also open to giving concessions on areas important to developing countries, other that on 
agriculture. On tropical products, where Norway did not need to defend its own interests, 
Norway stated that greater liberalisation had to be prioritised because of the great importance 
of these products to developing countries.73 Also on textiles, Norway was willing to admit 
greater access for the developing countries, mainly since Norway had given ups its earlier 
restrictive position regarding textiles. In the area of services, however, Norway put pressure 
on developing countries to get this accepted as a part of the negotiations.  
Giving concessions to the developing countries was an idealistic stand, wanting to 
work to improve the conditions for the developing countries, but it was also a strategically 
position; the developing countries had to get concessions on areas important to them in order 
to accept issues important for industrialised countries to be included in the round. However, 
on areas such as agriculture, where the Nordic countries and the developing countries had 
interests that could be in conflict, the Nordic countries decided to keep a low profile.  
In the initial round there was virtually no public interest in the matter in Norway. This 
can be explained in that earlier rounds had had results that were either favourable or 
innocuous to Norway. Traditionally trade policy had not been an area with high involvement 
from the Storting, and the consensus between the Conservative Party and the Labour Party on 
these issues had been common.  
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CHAPTER III 
From The Initial Phase To The Mid Term 
Review 
 
 
 
The initial phase of the negotiations, from the Punta del Este meeting to the Mid Term 
Review in Montreal, shall be analysed in this chapter. The main discussion on agriculture was 
between the Cairns Group and the US on the one hand, that wanted an elimination of 
agricultural support, and the EC, the EFTA countries and Japan on the other, that wanted to 
continue to protect national interests in the agricultural sector. Differences between the 
agricultural positions among the developing countries shall de identified. The Mid Term 
Review failed to achieve any agreement due to disagreement in the agricultural negotiations. 
The reason for this failure and the implications shall be discussed. 
Informal meetings in a limited group of countries became a normal way to solve 
problematic issues during the negotiations. It shall be identified how these meetings affected 
the negotiations, and especially how they influenced the involvement of the developing 
countries. The agricultural negotiations posed a challenge to Norway. Norway had a 
vulnerable import protection system and it shall be discussed how the Norwegian government 
worked to maintain this system. However, the import protection system was put under heavy 
pressure. The Norwegian dilemma manifested itself, and the Norwegian Cabinet realised that 
concessions on agriculture had to be admitted, however, it was still a goal to give concessions 
on agriculture in line with the Norwegian import protection system.  
This chapter shall also describe how the Storting was updated on the status of the 
negotiations, and what the Storting expressed regarding the negotiations. Two different 
perspectives on the Norwegian import protection system with regard to increased import from 
developing countries shall be introduced in this chapter. 
 
The Special Challenges in Agriculture  
The Nordic countries had a defensive position in agriculture, and Norway was especially 
vulnerable due to the import protection system Norway used. Norway underlined the 
importance of national autonomy in agriculture, and that each country should have the 
possibility to protect its agricultural sector against competition from countries that produced 
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food at lower costs. Among the Nordic countries, the responsibilities for different negotiating 
themes were divided. Norway was responsible for the negotiations on safeguards, intellectual 
property rights and tropical products. Finland was responsible for agriculture, subsidies and 
textiles, and Sweden was responsible for the negotiations on services, market access and 
investments. As we have seen, the Nordic countries had different import protection systems. 
Norway used quantitative import restrictions and Sweden variable import taxes (as did the 
EC). Finland had a mix of both systems. Another challenge was the different level of food 
production, as Norway imported 50% of total food consumption, while Finland had a self-
coverage of 140%. These differences resulted in different needs and strategies between the 
Nordic countries.1 
As pointed out earlier, only Japan and Switzerland used the same import protection 
system as Norway, and in the negotiations the system was regarded as vulnerable. It was 
important to the Norwegian government, both to renew and to find justifications for the parts 
of the Norwegian system that were most important to Norway.2 However, the system was 
regarded as very protectionist, and it made it difficult for developing countries to access the 
Norwegian market. At the same time, it would be difficult to convince the agricultural 
organisations and the opposition in Norway to open up the Norwegian market and to 
eliminate the quantitative import restrictions. This contradiction between domestic pressure 
and international views posed a dilemma for the Norwegian negotiators.  
 
The Developing Countries in the Initial Phase 
The developing countries gradually became more involved in the negotiations, but informal 
meetings and lack of resources limited their influence. One challenge for the developing 
countries was the comprehensive meeting schedule and many parallel meetings that made it 
impossible for the developing countries with small delegations to attend all the meetings.3 
Another challenge was the number of informal meetings and consultations that were used in 
an attempt to speed up the negotiations. The number of countries attending these meetings 
could vary, but they were often held within a limited group of countries and chaired by 
Dunkel. The meetings were held in Dunkel’s green office and were therefore called “green 
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room” meetings.4 The green room meetings limited the influence of most of the developing 
countries that were not present at these meetings. In a formal conversation between the 
Norwegian Minister of Trade Mosbakk, and Dunkel, Dunkel expressed concern that the 
negotiations mainly took part within a limited group of countries. He pointed to the fact that 
more than 2/3 of the Contracting Parties felt that the process was beyond their control.5 These 
countries were mainly small developing countries, and especially least developed countries. 
They had limited resources and many were also new members in GATT. The comprehensive 
negotiation plan, the meeting schedule and the green rooms meetings made it impossible for 
small delegations to get a complete overview of the negotiations. Rubens Ricupero writes that 
Dunkel was aware of the importance of integrating the developing countries into the round.6 
The conversation with Mosbakk confirms this. However, Dunkel increased the use of green 
rooms meetings and informal channels in the Uruguay Round compared to earlier 
negotiations. Neither were concrete actions taken by GATT to involve the small developing 
countries in the negotiations.   
 Also the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs underlined that the majority of the 
developing countries had problems following the complicated and far-reaching negotiations. 
It was expressed that in all practical events the developing countries were almost cut off from 
the real negotiations. Norway, therefore, highlighted the need for technical assistance and 
openness in the negotiations.7 Norway suggested and funded a training and assistance 
programme for developing countries in the Uruguay Round. The Norwegian Cabinet wanted 
more active, developing countries, and saw therefore a training and assistance programme as 
necessary.8 The Norwegian willingness to assist the developing countries can be explained by 
an idealistic stand to work to improve the conditions of the developing countries. It was an 
important political goal to integrate the developing countries in the world trade system. It can 
also be explained as an attempt to meet some of the criticism that was expected to come from 
the developing countries against Norway in the agricultural negotiations. The initial phase had 
showed that the Norwegian defensive interests in agriculture would be challenged by the 
developing countries, so it was important from a Norwegian perspective to maintain a good 
relationship with the developing countries. 
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 Despite their limited resources and the use of green room meetings, the developing 
countries were more active in the negotiations than before.9 India and Brazil played an 
important role, and were always present at the green room meetings. The Cairns Group was of 
course also an important source of influence, as we have seen10, and Rubens Ricupero writes 
that the creation of the Informal Group of Developing Countries gave the developing 
countries more influence over the negotiations. However, since the developing countries were 
not one homogeneous group and had different interests, the Informal Group of Developing 
Countries fronted only general positions such as special treatment.11  
 
Different Positions in the Agricultural Negotiations 
After a period of negotiation, conflicting and different positions became clearer, especially 
when specific proposals were presented. Disagreement grew since some countries had 
defensive positions, while others had offensive agricultural interests. This division was also 
visible between the developing countries. Over a period of ten years, the US wanted to abolish 
all import barriers and all kinds of trade-distorting domestic subsidies in the agricultural 
sector. This was called the zero option. In addition, the US demanded discipline in the use of 
export subsidies, improved market access and a strengthening of the dispute settlement 
procedures.12 The Cairns Group presented a proposal demanding a reduction in the level of 
support for agriculture. The proposal suggested prohibiting all use of subsidies and other 
government support measures. The Cairns Group defined government support as the overall 
root of trade distortions, and during a meeting of the Group, the Australian Prime Minister 
gave a speech criticising the subsidising policy of the US, the EC and Japan. He stated: “we 
are fed up with their policies”.13  
 The EC, the Nordic countries, Japan and Switzerland strongly opposed the US and the 
Cairns Groups suggestions. These countries were only willing to reduce the level of 
production, reduce the use of export subsidies and, to a certain extent, increase market 
access.14 The EC was not willing to change the principles of CAP, and wanted to continue to 
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use variable import levies and export subsidies.15 The EC policy was later therefore 
characterised as reactive rather than innovative.16 However, the internal pressure in the EC to 
reform CAP and to consider export interests other than agriculture grew.17 
  Many developing countries also had a defensive position in the agricultural 
negotiations since the countries feared their special preferences would lose in value, and net 
food importing countries feared higher prices on food import due to an increase in the food 
prices after a reduction in subsidies. However, India, Brazil and the other developing 
countries in the Cairns Group were offensive and wanted increased market access and cuts in 
internal supports. This difference between the developing countries made it more difficult to 
coordinate their position, and the result was as we have seen, that the Informal Group of 
Developing Countries could only present general proposals and views.  
The “defensive” developing countries did not take a very active part in the 
negotiations, but started to be more visible, especially the net food importers, mainly African 
countries.18 At the fourth meeting of the agricultural group, Jamaica introduced the idea of a 
group of net food importing countries. Egypt and Mexico supported this idea and stated that it 
was important for the developing countries and the net food importing countries to join 
forces.19 This was an attempt to meet the challenges and pressure from the Cairns Group and 
to increase the focus on the challenges for the net food importing countries. However, support 
for creating such a group was not high, but it was underlined, from the Norwegian side as 
well, that broad cooperation among the net food importers was necessary.20  
 
Common Nordic Proposal 
The Nordic countries saw the need to present a common agricultural proposal, and after 
months of coordination the Nordic countries managed to agree on one common text. The four 
countries entered the discussions with markedly different preferences, and the outcome was 
clearly a compromise.21 The proposal was based on three elements: reduced agricultural 
                                                 
15 Hine, R.C,  K.A Ingersent and A.J. Rayner 1994b. “The EC Perspective”, in R.C. Hine, K.A. Ingersent and 
A.J. Rayner (eds.), Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: 55-87. Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 61- 62. 
16 Hine 1994b: 60. 
17 Croome 1999: 94. 
18 Croome 1999: 94. 
19 NMFA, 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Agriculture 02.11.87. 
20 NMFA, 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA, Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Agriculture 29.10.87. 
21 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Harald Neple and Bjørn 
Eidem, 02.02.89. 
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support, increased market access and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations.22 The proposal 
was not presented to the the Storting since it was understood that the proposal was in line with 
the Report No. 63 to the Storting (1986-87), which was later unanimously adopted in 
Recommendation No. 253 (1987-88).23 The Nordic countries underlined the specificity of 
agriculture, but at the same time that more market orientation in the agricultural sector was 
necessary, in addition to food security and other measures that had to be taken into account.24 
A dualism in the Nordic proposal can be identified. The proposal accepted the need for more 
marked orientation and liberalisation in agriculture, but at the same time it underlined that 
agriculture had some special characteristics. Even though Norway had defensive interests in 
agriculture, it was realised, especially after the Punta del Este declaration, that reform of the 
agricultural policy would be the result of the negotiations. 
 The proposal was welcomed but also criticised. New Zealand was open for a 
compromise between the Nordic countries and the proposal from the Cairns Group. Australia 
was more sceptical and wanted a more progressive reduction in agricultural support. 
Argentina requested a clear statement on the special and differential treatment of the 
developing countries, and this was also mentioned by Yugoslavia. Thailand, on behalf of 
ASEAN, criticised the lack of focus on elimination of all subsidies. Mexico underlined the 
problems in agricultural trade for the developing countries.25 This criticism shows that even 
though the Nordic countries had accepted more marked orientation in agriculture, the Nordic 
proposal did not go as far as many of the developing countries wanted, and it was mainly seen 
as an attempt to protect the agricultural interests of the Nordic countries. The reactions put 
pressure on the Nordic countries that even more concessions were necessary.  
 The initial phase was scheduled to end in 1987 and the actual negotiating process 
should start 1 January 1988.26 It was generally considered that the negotiations had been 
successful so far. A large number of proposals were presented and the participating countries 
maintained a high level of activity. The next phase of the negotiations was expected to be 
                                                 
22 NMFA, 44.12/51, proposal from the Nordic countries, 01.12.87. The proposal was: ”Immediate and long term 
measures to reduce agricultural support most seriously distorting agricultural trade.” “Increased market access 
through reduced import protection and strengthened GATT rules and disciplines.” “Minimize adverse trade 
effects of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations”. It was proposed a reduction of guaranteed prices, quantitative 
production restrictions, reduced volumes of subsidized exports and binding or reduced levels of direct or indirect 
subsidies affecting trade. It was also proposed that the participating countries should take steps to reduce their 
level of import protectionism, and a reduction and expanded level of bindings on the field of tariffs. The third 
element was a suggestion that all sanitary and phytosanitary measures should be based on non-discrimination, 
and should not be used as measures for barriers to trade. 
23 NMFA, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Neple and Eidem, 02.02.89. 
24 Croome 1999: 97. 
25 NMFA, 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 15.12.87. 
26 NMFA, 44.12/51, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Trade, 11.12.87. 
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more difficult, and increased political willingness from the participating countries would be 
necessary. It was decided that a Mid Term Review (MTR), at minister level should take place 
in Canada, Montreal at the end of 1988.27 
 
Two Different Perspectives  
On January 1 1988, the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Shipping was integrated into the 
NMFA. This led to improved coordination and disagreement almost disappeared after this 
reorganisation. Bjørn Tore Godal and Tor B. Næss confirm this. They both say that the new 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs emerged stronger, and that the skills of the Ministry were 
increased. The Department of External Economic Affairs had great expertise on trade issues.28 
The Report No. 63 to the Storting (1986-87), was presented to the Storting in May 
1987, and was mainly about the European Union, but also about the Uruguay Round. In the 
report, the Cabinet described the Norwegian position in the GATT negotiations and the main 
principles for Norway’s participation. This was the first time the Storting was informed about 
the results of the Punta del Este meeting, and the Cabinet regarded that the mandate for the 
Punta del Este declaration was given in this report even though the report was presented to the 
Storting almost one year after the Punta del Este meeting.  
  In the report, the Cabinet wrote that it would be in the interest of Norway to strengthen 
GATT’s rules on trade in agricultural goods, and to increase multilateral discipline. The 
Cabinet wanted to work actively for solutions in line with Norway’s import protection system. 
The negotiations on agriculture would be difficult for Norway, and according to the Cabinet, 
Norway had to be prepared to make increased commitments, but it was also underlined that 
trade in agricultural products had a special character due to national goals in agricultural 
policy. It was underlined that in the agricultural negotiations it would be a challenge to 
balance between these considerations.29 Again we can identify a dualism in the policy of the 
Cabinet, between keeping the national autonomy in agriculture, while at the same time being 
prepared to give concessions on agriculture as well. In the report it was pointed to the fact that 
Norway’s quantitative restrictions on textiles and agriculture were in conflict with the goal of 
increased import from developing countries. “Regarding Norway’s use of quantitative import 
restrictions, it is a fact that both for textile and agricultural goods, the desire for increased 
                                                 
27 NMFA, 562.0, memorandum NMFA, Leikvoll 05.02.88. 
28 Interview Næss 09.03.05. and Bjørn Tore Godal 31.01.06. 
29 Report No. 63 to the Storting (1986-87): 16-19. 
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import from the developing countries is in conflict with our national protective interests.”30 
The Cabinet recognised that there was a conflict between the Norwegian import protection 
system and market access for developing countries, however this was a controversial question 
in Norway. I have characterised this view as the “accept of incompatible interests” 
perspective. The Cabinet underlined that the goal was to maintain the Norwegian import 
protection system and to work for solutions in line with this system, but it was realised that 
this would be in conflict with increased import from developing countries. The Norwegian 
dilemma was therefore a political question, on how much to give up of national agricultural 
autonomy in order to give more market access.  
On 29 May 1987, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs decided not to discuss 
Report No. 63 to the Storting (1986-87). It was, however, discussed later in the 1987-1988 
session. Recommendations to the Storting No. 253 (1987-88), from the Committee, which 
was unanimously adopted, showed overall support for the Cabinet’s line in the negotiations.31 
We shall see that in the next parliamentary period, opposition grew, but the fact that the 
recommendations were unanimously adopted gave the Cabinet a strong mandate to continue 
on the same track of negotiation.  
The Committee remarked that it was in Norway’s interest to strengthen the multilateral 
aspects of the international trading system, and that the Committee was satisfied with the 
investigations and the coordination made by the government. The remarks from the 
Committee focused on Norway’s agricultural interests, and that the Norwegian import 
protection system should be maintained. The Committee stated that they understood that the 
Norwegian import restrictions on agriculture might be of special interest to developing 
countries, but wanted to underline that the Norwegian import restrictions were not on 
agricultural goods that were typical of developing countries. They maintained therefore, 
unlike the Cabinet, that the Norwegian import protection system neither harmed the 
developing countries, nor was it in conflict with increased import of goods from developing 
countries.32 This view I have characterised as the “none interest conflict” perspective. A 
united Storting, contradicting the Cabinet, believed that there was no conflict between the 
Norwegian import protection system and increased market access for developing countries. 
The Norwegian dilemma between national agricultural interests and increased import from 
developing countries was therefore not recognised as a problem. By way of these 
                                                 
30 Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
31 S.tid. (1987-88) 6a I, S.innst. No. 253, pp. 10-14.   
32 S.tid. (1987-88) 6a I, S.innst. No. 253, pp. 12-13.   
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recommendations, the Storting was signalising to the Cabinet that the most important issue 
was to maintain the Norwegian import protection system. However, measures should be 
considered that might increase the import of goods from developing countries, but this should 
not be in conflict with the Norwegian goals. “It should be considered whether Norway could 
give some concessions for import and still manage to maintain those aims that are behind the 
agricultural import protection system.”33  
It was most important to the Committee to maintain the Norwegian import protection 
system, while the Cabinet also focused on the situation for the developing countries. The 
position of the Storting gave a strong signal to the Cabinet and the Norwegian negotiators that 
Norwegian agriculture should be prioritised, and this may explain the strong Norwegian 
emphasis on special characteristics in the negotiations. The Storting argued that Norway was 
in a special situation and that the Norwegian system would not affect the developing 
countries. The developing countries, however, were sceptical to general exceptions and 
maintained that all industrialised countries had to accept more commitments in agriculture.  
 The following debate in the Storting 7 June 1988 only focused on the EC 
discussions.34 The Minister of Trade, Mosbakk, said that all countries would benefit from a 
liberal and functional trading system. He continued by saying that he was satisfied that the 
Committee supported the Cabinet’s policy towards developing countries, adding that Norway 
had to be aware of the demands that were proposed.35 By saying this he signalled that the 
Cabinet recognised the dilemma in the Norwegian position, and that he did not agree with the 
Storting claiming the Norwegian import system did not affect increased import from 
developing countries.  
 
Pressure from Developing Countries   
The upcoming Mid Term Review Meeting led to more focus on the negotiations, and the 
developing countries wanted to put pressure on the industrialised countries, also on Norway. 
The developing countries wanted more emphasis on areas important to them. A representative 
from the Nigerian government in a discussion with the Norwegian Embassy in Lagos 
emphasised that it was difficult for the developing countries to see which positive effects the 
negotiations could have. The African countries felt to be “trapped” between the big 
industrialised countries when it came to fields of great importance to them, such as tropical 
                                                 
33 S.tid. (1987-88) 6a I, S.innst. No. 253, p. 13. Author’s translation from Norwegian.  
34 S.tid. (1987-88) 7c: 3880-3956. 
35 S.tid. (1987-88) 7c: 3921-3922. 
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and agricultural products. Technical assistance to the developing countries was very important 
and the Nigerian representative thanked Norway for its initiative within this field. The general 
perspective was, however, that the Nordic countries had supported the position of the EC, and 
Nigeria hoped that the Nordic countries could be more visible in favouring the developing 
countries in the future negotiations.36 
 In a memorandum to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Brazilian 
Embassy in Oslo wrote that Brazil would only accept the inclusion of the new issues in the 
round if the developing countries could get advances in tariffs, non-tariff barriers and 
safeguards. Brazil wanted a dialogue with the Norwegian government.37 In a conversation 
between the Norwegian embassy in Brasilia and the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Brazil expressed strong criticism of the industrialised countries’ agricultural subsidies.38 
 Criticism of the industrialised countries was also made at a UNDP funded conference 
that focused on how the countries in the Asia Pacific region could participate fully in the 
negotiations. Representatives from 14 developing countries39 in the Asia Pacific region 
expressed concern that the industrialised countries insisted on reciprocal concessions in many 
fields of the negotiations. Trade in agriculture was considered to be important for the 
development of developing countries, and extended safeguard measures were necessary for a 
successful result in the agricultural negotiations.40 Many of the developing countries with 
offensive interests in agriculture were disappointed by the defensive strategy from the EC and 
the EFTA countries. Agricultural liberalisation was underlined as a key to development for 
the developing countries. The interests of the developing countries therefore challenged the 
Norwegian interests in the agricultural negotiations. The challenge for the Norwegian 
negotiations was to balance between the mandate given in the Storting to focus on 
maintaining the Norwegian import protection system, and an idealistic desire to meet the 
needs of the developing countries.  
During a meeting in the agricultural group, the developing countries underlined again 
the importance of special and differential treatment. Egypt was very active, presenting a 
proposal highlighting the problems in the developing countries, wanting to minimise the 
sanitarian regulations, increase market access and cut subsidies. India found that the overall 
                                                 
36 NMFA 562.0, fax Emb. in Lagos to NMFA, 21.07.88. 
37 NMFA 562.0, memorandum Brazilian Embassy to NMFA, 28.04.88. 
38 NMFA 562.0, fax Emb. in Brasilia, 20.05.88. 
39 The countries were Bangladesh, Burma, China, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. 
40 NMFA 562.0, Press Release, UN Information Service, 28.10.88. 
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goal should be to abolish all trade barriers, but that special treatment for the developing 
countries in the transitional period was essential.41  
 
Prior to the Mid Term Review 
The agricultural negotiations faced difficulties before the Mid Term Review. One possible 
compromise was a suggestion to freeze the total amount of support to agriculture. This was 
considered a short-term solution, and many countries wanted to discuss this. However, the US 
opposed short-term solutions on agriculture if agreements on the overall goals of the 
negotiations could not be reached.42 The Nordic countries were positive to a freeze in 
agricultural support with regard to tariffs and quantitative restrictions, but the Norwegian 
Ministry underlined that the freeze in support had to take account of inflation and therefore be 
in real terms.43 Sweden and Finland were willing to present a list of areas in which a freeze 
commitment could be used. This was strongly opposed by Norway.44 From the Norwegian 
perspective, the best results would entail each country individually being able to decide where 
to implement the liberalisations.45  
 The internal disagreements regarding the Norwegian policy became visible when a 
draft governmental note was presented at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The North/South 
department commented that they saw the need for a sentence stating that Norway was 
supporting special and differential treatment of developing countries. Another important 
question was that Norway had to be prepared to make concessions in difficult areas. The 
department also wanted increased focus and attention on the developing countries, and found 
that such a focus was lacking in the NMFA general framework for the negotiations.46 The 
Ministry of Finance commented that they wanted the governmental note to have a stronger 
statement on liberalisation and cuts in the import restrictions on agriculture, regardless of the 
outcome of the meeting.47  
 
                                                 
41 NMFA, 562.31-2, fax Finnish MFA to MFA in Nordic countries, 01.11.88. 
42 NMFA, 562.0, memorandum NMFA, Leikvoll, 29.11.88.  
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Mid Term Review 
The Mid Term Review was held in Montreal, 5-8 December 1988. 600 journalists were 
present, 1000 delegates and 90 ministers attended the meeting. The interest in the meeting 
was greater than ever before, and the first agricultural demonstration against the negotiation 
took place.48 As stated above, the discussions prior to the meeting were hard, especially 
between the EC and the US. Since progress was expected to be easier at the Ministerial 
Meeting, due to both time pressure and political pressure, the atmosphere was positive, and 
there was optimism about achieving results.49 It had, however, not been possible to agree on 
one common recommendation regarding short-term measures and long-term goals to the 
meeting.50  
 The Norwegian Minister of Trade, Jan Balstad from the Labour Party, made it clear in 
a statement that all countries were bound by the Punta del Este mandate. A long-term 
objective was to allow more market signals in agriculture, but the Minister also underlined 
environmental protection, food security and employment as aspects that had to be 
considered.51 The statement is a typical example of the dualism in the Norwegian policy; it 
underlined the Norwegian special needs, but at the same time made it clear that Norway was 
willing to make concessions on liberalisation. 
On Thursday 8 December it became clear that the Contracting Parties would not 
manage to reach an agreement on agriculture. The US wanted a phasing out of trade-distorting 
government farm support over ten years, while the EC only wanted to discuss short-term 
measures.52 By the Norwegian delegation it was pointed to that the US was not willing to 
accept a compromise and that this made the negotiations difficult.53 The Norwegian 
delegation blamed the US for the failure, while the international literature points to the EC as 
the reason for the breakdown. The EC opposed an agreement on agriculture, and therefore 
five Latin American members of Cairns insisted that until there was an agreement on 
agriculture, these countries would not accept any agreement. Several African countries 
supported this. This showed that the developing countries were willing to use a veto if an 
agreement on agriculture was not reached.54 The developing countries wanted results in 
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agriculture in return for concessions given in other areas.55 Since the negotiations on 
agriculture failed, the Latin American countries opposed any agreements on other issues. The 
head of the Argentinean delegation, Barnando Grinspun said: “We don’t like to pay and have 
nothing to receive.”56 
 
The Results of the Breakdown  
Dunkel proposed suspending the Mid Term Review until April 1989. The results already 
achieved in Montreal were put on hold, and only informal consultation should take place until 
April 1989.57 A mandate was given to Dunkel to start consultations. The biggest fear was that 
these consultations would only include the US and the EC. The situation was analysed as not 
being good, and the Norwegian ambassador wrote that if an agreement was not achieved by 
April, there could be reasons to fear for the future of the round. The most difficult part would 
be on agriculture, and this would most probably represent a threat to the Norwegian 
position.58 
The discussions on agriculture showed that a clear majority supported changes 
towards more free trade in agriculture and a reduction in the agricultural support. Sweden and 
Finland supported this position, while only Norway and Switzerland worked for a freeze and 
not a reduction in the agricultural support. The Norwegian delegation in Geneva wrote: “It 
would be a miscalculation if we from the Norwegian side did not meet this challenge from a 
more or less unanimous international society in a constructive way.”59 It was clear to the 
Norwegian delegation that the vast majority of the Contracting Parties supported increased 
cuts in the support, more than Norway could accept. The delegation pointed to the difficulties 
Norway would meet in the negotiations, and saw a need for a revised position. It would be 
impossible to continue to work for a freeze when Norway was isolated on this question. The 
Norwegian position was now challenged by the development in the other countries’ position. 
However, a revised Norwegian position would need domestic support and this might be 
difficult.  
  The Montreal meeting represented a change in the Norwegian media coverage of the 
Uruguay Round. The Norwegian newspaper Nationen had not previously paid much attention 
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to the round, but the conflict in the agricultural negotiations at the meeting reached the front 
pages. It was realised that the negotiations could influence the Norwegian agricultural sector, 
and the newspaper speculated over the possible consequences of a decision to freeze.60 
 
Conclusion 
The developing countries were more active in the negotiations than ever before, but scarce 
resources limited their influence, together with a lack of information and informal meetings 
among the major trading partners. The Mid Term Review ended in a breakdown, since the EC 
and the US did not reach an agreement on agriculture, and the developing countries did not 
want to give concessions without getting anything in return. The developing countries refused 
to accept any agreement if the industrialised countries did not make commitments to liberalise 
agriculture. This was an important manifestation of power from the developing countries. 
The most important aspect for Norway in the agricultural negotiations was to maintain 
the Norwegian import protection system and to have national autonomy in the agricultural 
sector. This implied, having the continued right to protect the sector and focusing on non-
economic factors. However, this position was challenged by the development in the 
negotiations in which all countries except for Norway and Switzerland gradually accepted a 
reduction in the support to agriculture. The Norwegian delegation realised that a new position 
was needed. However, it would be difficult to get domestic acceptance for concessions that 
were not in line with the current Norwegian import protection system.  
The Norwegian dilemma in the negotiations continued, and sought to be solved by a 
compromise between the two aspects, domestic pressure and international acceptance. The 
Norwegian position was an attempt to meet both of these demands, and a dualism in the 
Norwegian policy has been identified. This can be seen in the common Nordic proposal where 
liberalisations in agriculture were admitted but at the same time it had a focus on non-
economic factors. However, the proposal was met with criticism from the developing 
countries that wanted more commitments for liberalisation, reduction in subsidies and 
increased market access. 
It has been identified two different perspectives of the Norwegian agricultural policy 
versus the demands from the developing countries; the “acceptance of incompatible interests” 
perspective, and the “none interest conflict” perspective. The Cabinet pointed to the fact that 
there were incompatible interests between the Norwegian system and the aim to give 
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increased market access for developing countries, especially on textiles and agriculture. It was 
therefore underlined that the negotiations would be difficult. However, the Storting rejected 
this conflict and argued by the latter perspective, i.e. that there was no conflict since the 
developing countries mainly produced products that were not in competition with Norwegian 
agricultural production. If the Norwegian import protection system were to allow more market 
access this would benefit the industrialised countries and not increase import from the 
developing countries, according to the Storting. 
 58
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CHAPTER IV 
Between Two Failed Ministerial Meetings  
 
 
 
This chapter covers the period from the conclusion of the Ministerial Meeting in Montreal up 
to the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels. The Mid Term Review was finalised at a Trade 
Negotiation Committee (TNC) meeting in April 1989, and the final phase of the negotiations 
started. The negotiations were supposed to be finalised at the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels 
at the end of 1990, but as with the meeting in Montreal, the Brussels meeting also broke down 
due to disagreements over agriculture. We shall identify why the meeting in Brussels did not 
succeed and what role the developing countries played in this event.   
At the TNC meeting that ended the Mid Term Review, Norway delivered an 
explanatory statement underlining the special characteristics of its agriculture, and the reasons 
for this statement shall be identified. The Norwegian position was put under pressure. In this 
chapter we shall discuss how the development in the negotiations led to the Cabinet realising 
that a new Norwegian negotiation position was necessary and the domestic reactions to this 
will be pointed out. The Norwegian Cabinet had to find a position that balanced what could be 
accepted in the negotiations and what could be accepted in Norway. This manifested itself in 
a new Nordic proposal and a Norwegian offer and the reactions to these proposals will be 
pointed out. In this period internal disagreement between the Nordic countries increased. 
Sweden worked for liberalisation, and Finland became more flexible. How this influenced 
Norway’s possibilities in the negotiations and how the Nordic countries resolved the 
disagreement shall be analysed.  
The developing countries argued that more concessions, especially on agriculture and 
textiles, had to be given to the developing countries. How the industrialised countries met this 
criticism shall be discussed. On many occasions the Norwegian government underlined that 
Norway wanted to be a bridge builder between developing countries and industrialised 
countries, and how this was implemented in the negotiations shall be discussed. 
 
The Norwegian Strategy after Montreal  
The Norwegian Cabinet realised that changing the Norwegian position was necessary. This 
was due to a new flexible position assumed after the Montreal meeting by the EC, Sweden, 
Finland and Japan. Norway and Switzerland were isolated in opposition to short-term 
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reductions in agricultural support, and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs questioned 
whether Norway and Switzerland alone would be able to prevent a decision to reduce support 
to agriculture. Norway would meet international pressure to accept a reduction in agricultural 
support, while at the same time the domestic debate could be quite heated, and on such a 
sensitive issue the political fallout could easily be detrimental to Labour’s future position. It 
was therefore essential to convince negotiation partners that Norway had national interests in 
agriculture and that the special characteristics in agriculture had to be considered; at the same 
time, the Cabinet had to work to get domestic acceptance for a new Norwegian position. The 
Department of External Economic Affairs II at the NMFA proposed that the Minister of 
Trade, Balstad, should discuss different alternatives with the Minister of Agriculture, Gunhild 
Øyangen, from the Labour Party.1  
The Ministers were aware of how sensitive discussing a reduction in agricultural 
support would be in the Storting and in Norwegian society in general. It was therefore 
important to have a clear strategy on how to handle internal opposition against a new position. 
The Ministers concluded that it would be difficult for Norway to continue to oppose a 
reduction in support, and that a possible reservation from Norway on this issue would harm 
Norway’s general interests in the negotiations.2 On other areas where Norway had offensive 
interest, as for example in the negotiations on services, the Norwegian interests could be 
challenged if Norway was the only one to oppose reduction in agricultural support. Such an 
issue could easily be a symbolic question for the developing countries, and it would be 
noticed if Norwegian resistance led to a failure to make a consensual decision. The 
developing countries had made it clear to not give concessions on areas important to 
industrialised countries, if not the industrialised countries implemented reductions in 
agricultural support and increased market access. It was realised that Norway had no other 
option than to accept a reduction. The Norwegian challenge would therefore be to convince 
domestic pressure groups and the Storting.  
On 19 January Balstad informed the Storting about the negotiations. He said that there 
was increased international support for liberalisation of trade in agriculture. He also 
underlined that a possible compromise between the EC and the US would have repercussions 
for Norwegian agricultural policy, especially on internal support and subsidies to the 
agricultural sector.3 Balstad had to perform a delicate balancing act. It was important to signal 
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that the Norwegian position was under pressure and that concessions had to be given, but at 
the same time it was important not to signal that the Cabinet was giving up on the Norwegian 
position and was sacrificing too much. This might mobilise pressure groups and the 
opposition and would limit the room for compromise. However, the president of the 
Norwegian Farmers’ Union criticised Balstad after his speech in the Storting, and said that it was 
very important for Norway not to change its import protection system.4  
Referring to Putnam’s model, the Norwegian win set was limited both by a unified 
position from all the Contracting Parties and by the space for manoeuvre provided by the 
Storting. The challenge was to find a Norwegian position acceptable to the trading partners 
and to the Storting. It was therefore necessary to negotiate on two levels. In Norway, the 
Cabinet worked for gradual acceptance of a reduction in the support, while in the negotiations 
and in bilateral meetings Norway always underlined the non-economic factors in agriculture, 
e.g. at a meeting with New Zealand. The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, from the Labour Party said that agriculture was the most difficult negotiation 
issue for Norway. He emphasised that the climatic, geographical and topographical conditions 
in Norway with small and scattered farms limited agricultural export to a minimum level.5   
This internal pressure in Norway was presented to the other Nordic countries. It was 
underlined that the Norwegian government had but limited possibilities to take a flexible 
approach on agriculture. The domestic situation was used by the Cabinet to create an 
understanding for the situation in Norway that could, according to the Cabinet, be 
characterised as special. Up to a point, the strong internal pressure against giving up the 
Norwegian import protection system benefited the Norwegian negotiators, since the NMFA 
could refer to the domestic situation when international pressure increased. In Sweden, 
Parliament had given a broader negotiation mandate to accept liberalisation and a cut in 
agricultural support.6 The Swedish Cabinet wanted to use the negotiations to reform the 
agricultural sector in Sweden. This was not possible in Norway, as the Storting had stated that 
continued support to agriculture was essential. The situation in the two neighbouring countries 
was therefore very different. The fact that Sweden wanted to implement reforms in its 
agricultural sector weakened the Norwegian position, both internally among the Nordic 
countries, but also among the other countries in GATT.  
 
                                                 
4 Aftenposten 21.01.89. 
5 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Eidem, 16.02.89. 
6 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Eidem, 10.02.89. 
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Negotiations before the TNC Meeting 
At the Trade Negotiation Committee meeting in April, Dunkel presented a text that was 
intended to be the basis for discussion. The text led to negative reactions in Norway. 
Regarding short-term measures, Dunkel suggested freezing subsidies and support to the 
agricultural sector, which meant that it would not be possible to increase support during the 
negotiations. The Norwegian Ministry of Agriculture thought a freeze would not create major 
challenges for Norway, as only a freeze was being suggested, but the most problematic issue 
was whether the freeze would be measured in real terms. If this was adopted, it would be 
necessary to ask for approval by the Storting.7  
However, the farming organisations in Norway presented a common paper on 
Dunkel’s text criticising the suggestion. The overall long-term measures suggested by Dunkel, 
a reduction in all direct and indirect subsidies, would lead to liberalisation and market 
orientation in trade in agriculture, and according to the organisations this was not in line with 
the Norwegian agricultural policy. They underlined that it was necessary for Norway to make 
a reservation if an agreement in Geneva was arrived at in line with the Dunkel text. A small 
increase in import access and a small reduction in support would have serious repercussions 
for the Norwegian agricultural sector, the organisations argued.8 At a meeting of the reference 
group, the NMFA underlined that it was implied in the negotiation declaration that the results 
would have some repercussions for the Norwegian agricultural policy.9 The Norwegian 
government did focus on Norway’s special needs in the negotiations, but wanted to avoid 
being viewed as inflexible. However, the organisations wanted Norway to be even more 
outspoken against cuts that would have a negative effect in Norway.  
 
The Storting and the Negotiation Plan 
Interest in the negotiations in the Storting increased, especially after heightened media 
attention. Before the closing of the Mid Term Review in April 1989, Kåre Gjønnes from the 
Christian Democratic Party asked the Minister of Agriculture if she considered the 
government’s negotiation plan to be in line with the view of the Storing on import protection 
                                                 
7 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Harald Bøyum to 
Deputy Minister, 17.03.89. 
8  NMFA, 562.31-2, letter the Norwegian Farmers' Union and the Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union 
to NMFA, 30.03.89. 
9 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Eidem, 31.03.89. 
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for agriculture.10 It was one of the first times the Cabinet’s negotiations’ strategy had been 
questioned in the Storting. In her answer, the Minister of Agriculture stated that the level of 
subsidies for food in the industrialised countries had led to a price level below production 
costs. This had a negative impact on the developing countries. The Nordic proposal presented 
earlier focused on to reduce support to agriculture that affected trade and to implement 
increased market access through reduced import protection. The Minister used the “accept of 
incompatible interests” perspective in her argumentation, and referred to the needs of the 
developing countries to justify Norway supporting reductions. Gjønnes followed up by saying 
that Norway had agreed on the common goals for agriculture in Punta Del Este in 1986, but 
that the Storting had not been informed about this. He did not agree that the Storting had 
accepted the negotiation plan, and referred to Report No. 63 to the Storting, in which it was 
stated that Norway did not want general liberalisation, as this would lead to an increase in 
import from the industrialised countries and thereby harm Norwegian agriculture. Øyangen 
replied that the negotiation plan was stated in the Report No. 63, and that the position of the 
Cabinet was in line with that mandate.11  
 
End of Mid Term Review 
The Mid Term Review was finalised at the TNC meeting in April. The Norwegian delegation 
strongly warned against Norway not being a part of any consensual decisions. One possible 
solution might be that Norway could make an explanatory statement underlining the special 
characteristics of Norwegian agricultural policy and the non-trade concerns Norwegian 
agricultural policy had to take.12  
After long negotiations, on 8 April the Contracting Parties managed to reach an 
agreement. The US left its position and accepted reductions in agricultural support rather than 
total elimination. Internal tensions in the US and anti-liberalisation lobbies brought pressured 
to bear to change the US policy.13 The mid term package was a short-term freeze,14 and the 
long-term goal was “to provide for substantial progressive reduction in agricultural support 
                                                 
10 S.tid. (1988-89) 7b: 2623. (15.02.89.) 
11 S.tid. (1988-89) 7b: 2623. (15.02.89.) 
12 NMFA, 562.31-2, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA, Ministry of Agriculture and the Office of the Prime Minister 
07.04.89. 
13 Hillmann 1994: 40-41. 
14 Provided that support prices to producers were not raised and import access was reduced during 1989 and 
1990. 
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and protection.”15 The reform of agriculture was to be attained by committing to an Aggregate 
Measure of Support (AMS), a system to measure the level of protection. It was further agreed 
that developing countries would be entitled to special and differential treatment, and that 
special considerations of the negative effects of the reform on the net food importing 
developing countries should be introduced. The value of non-trade concerns was also 
recognised, something that was important for Norway.16 Both the EC and the US had given up 
their staunch positions, and agreed to “establish a fair and market oriented agricultural trading 
system.” This put an end to the Montreal Meeting disagreements, but there were still many 
issues which remained unresolved prior to the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels in December 
1990, a meeting which was supposed to close the negotiations.17  
Norway did not have any reservations about the text since it was considered to be in 
line with the Norwegian position. It was important as far as the short-term measures were 
concerned that only a freeze was agreed on, and not a reduction in support. However, 
Ambassador Huslid made an explanatory statement underling the importance of non-trade 
concerns and non-economic factors such as food security, the environment and regional and 
social policy.18 The explanatory statement was a strategically important move to meet the 
Norwegian dilemma.  It underlined the Norwegian position in the negotiations, and it pleased 
the opposition and interest groups in Norway. At the same time it made it possible for Norway 
to be part of the consensual agreement, so that the Norwegian position would not block the 
negotiations on other areas important to Norway.19 Later it was explained by the NMFA that 
the explanatory statement was given mainly due to domestic reasons.20 
The Norwegian position challenged Nordic cooperation. Huslid reported that 
cooperation on agriculture was difficult. The Swedish government wanted general 
liberalisation and was extremely reluctant to support the other Nordic countries and the 
demands for continued import restrictions. The Swedish negotiators opposed the inclusion of 
elements such as non-trade concerns in the common Nordic statement. Huslid proposed 
signalling disappointment with the cooperation on agriculture.21 The NMFA saw no need to 
start a discussion on cooperation since both Finland and Sweden had most likely understood 
                                                 
15 Preed 1995: 92. 
16 Stewart 1993: 194. 
17 Croome 1999:150. 
18 NMFA 562.31-2, memorandum NMFA, 12.04.89, attached to memorandum 14.04.89  
19 Interview Næss 09.03.06. 
20 NMFA 563.8, memorandum Department of External economic Affairs II NMFA, Neple, 16.11.89. 
21 NMFA 562.31-2, fax del. in Geneva to NMFA and Ministry of Agriculture, 10.04.89. 
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why Norway had to make an explanatory statement.22 Nordic cooperation was considered to 
be so important to Norway that it would be risky to challenge it. It was considered that their 
influence would be much greater if the Nordic countries operated together, and that it would 
be impossible for Norway to follow the negotiations in all groups on its own. Nordic 
cooperation led to compromises and sacrifices, but a break with the other Nordic countries 
would have much more severe consequences.23 
After the consensual decision in April 1989, Nationen wrote about whether the 
developing countries’ demands were in conflict with  national agricultural interests. Balstad 
commented to Nationen that: “There has so far not been any conflict between Norwegian 
interests and the interests of the developing countries in the GATT negotiations.”24 This was 
rejected by Bernt Bull from “Idegruppen om Ny Økonomisk Verdensorden”, a Norwegian 
NGO working with the New Economic World Order. Bull said in the newspaper “If the needs 
of the developing countries are to be secured in the international economy, it will not be 
enough only to accept those products that we do not produce ourselves.”25 The statement from 
Bull point to an important characteristic with the Norwegian position, that Norway only 
wanted to give concessions on areas were Norway did not have any national interests. As 
pointed to earlier, Norway was willing to give concessions on textiles, but this came after it 
was realised that Norway anyway would meet competition on this area from Portugal. We can 
identify that the Minister of Trade actually argued in line with the “none interest conflict” 
perspective, and refuse any conflict even though the developing countries had presented 
demands that Norway meant were to far reaching. The “none interest conflict” perspective 
was also supported by Norwegian Farmers’ Union. Nationen was of the opinion that the 
conflict between Norwegian farmers and developing countries was constructed and that the 
export subsidies rather than the import protection system were the problem. 
 
The Nordic Position 
Despite the disagreement, the Nordic countries agreed at a meeting on 18 October 1989 to 
present a concrete Nordic proposal before the end of 1989. Sweden and Finland doubted 
whether this would be possible, but Norway pushed for this for tactical reasons.26 If the 
                                                 
22 NMFA 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Eidem, 27.04.89. 
23 NMFA 563.8, memorandum Department of External economic Affairs II NMFA, Neple, 16.11.89. 
24 Nationen 19.4.89 in Jakobsen 2001: 66. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
25 Jakobsen 2001: 67. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
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Nordic countries presented a common proposal, the position of the Nordic countries would be 
clear, and it would be more difficult for Sweden to oppose Norwegian demands  at a later 
stage in the negotiations. The main disagreement between the Nordic countries was whether 
quantitative restrictions and variable import tariffs should be illegal within the GATT 
framework. Sweden found that exceptions focusing on non-economic factors might be a 
solution for some countries, but only in a transitional period. However, this was not accepted 
by Finland, Iceland or Norway. These countries were willing to accept strong discipline, but 
argued that the exceptions for non-economic concerns should be permanent.27  
Despite the disagreements, a Nordic agreement was reached and the proposal was to 
be presented to the Contracting Parties on 19 December 1989. The Minister of Trade, Kaci 
Kullmann Five from the Conservative Party, informed The Enlarged Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the proposal. The Minister stated that the proposal was in line with the 
Norwegian position, particularly with reference to non-economic factors. The submission was 
a commitment to the mandate of the negotiations to reduce agricultural support and protection 
and to abolish export subsidies. Special treatment and a longer implementation phase would 
be necessary for the least developed countries and the net food importing countries.28 On 
agricultural support, the Nordic countries wanted a gradual reduction of support, and 
supported the motion that border protection should be organised by means other than 
quantitative restrictions, but in well-defined exceptional cases still wanted to have the 
possibility to use quantitative restrictions. This was the result of a compromise between 
Sweden and the other Nordic countries.29 The Norwegian Cabinet had to give up its 
opposition to a reduction in support to agriculture, and Sweden had to give up the position 
that exceptions on quantitative restrictions should only be possible in a transitional period. 
The Nordic submission was presented to the Contracting Parties by Finland. The countries 
that commented on the submission were satisfied that the Nordic position was more flexible.30 
The Nordic statement focused on the importance of non-economic factors and non-trade 
concerns, and raised the issue that the negotiations were of particular importance to 
developing countries. The Nordic countries also called for more attention to the group of net-
food importing countries.31  
                                                 
27 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Næss, 01.12.89. 
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The Nordic proposal marked a clear change in the Norwegian position since the 
Montreal meeting, and the attempt to get acceptance for a new Norwegian position had 
succeeded. The NMFA knew that the Norwegian participation would only have very little 
impact on the final results, and Norway could only hope for moderate achievements. They 
suggested therefore that Norway should concentrate on the non-economic factors, which were 
considered to be of greatest importance to Norway. If this were accomplished, it would be 
easier to gain support for the results of the negotiations in Norway.32 Strong Norwegian 
opposition to agriculture could conceivably result in less goodwill for Norway on other issues 
of importance to Norway. To oppose all proposals to bring about liberalisation in agriculture 
would not therefore be fruitful. 
The Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union was critical of the Nordic proposal. 
They found that non-economic factors should be underlined to a greater extent, and wanted 
quantitative restrictions and variable import taxes to remain legal in GATT. The organisation 
concluded that the submission accepted a general liberalisation of the agricultural sector, and 
deemed that it would have been better if Norway had not presented a proposal at all, since 
Norway then would have had more flexibility in future negotiations.33 This reaction from was 
not surprising, and it was also important for the Norwegian negotiators that the farming 
organisations kept up high pressure domestically in Norway. As Putnam proposes, the other 
Nordic countries would understand that the Norwegian win sets were limited and that Norway 
had little to give in negotiations, and that in fact the Nordic proposal was a big sacrifice for 
Norway.  
 
Criticism from the Developing Countries   
The Informal Group of Developing Countries made a statement about lack of balance in the 
negotiations.34 The developing countries were especially worried that the industrialised 
countries did not want to fully integrate textiles and agriculture into the negotiations. In a 
statement, the developing countries explained why the developing countries originally wanted 
a new round of negotiations, and the statement underlined that the current negotiations were 
benefiting the industrialised countries. 
                                                 
32 NMFA, 562.31-2, memorandum Department of External Economic Affairs II NMFA, Eidem, 
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The developing countries gave their backing to the Uruguay Round because they were 
convinced that it represented an opportunity to secure a fair and equitable and a more open, truly 
multilateral trading system, as a means of promoting the economic growth of all participants and 
the development of less developed participants. […] However, after assessing the state of the 
negotiations, developing-countries participants note with deep concern the current lack of 
balance in the negotiations, which stems from a failure by many developed-country participants 
to engage meaningfully in the traditional areas while at the same time pressing for cross linkages 
to and far-reaching results in the new areas. […]35 
 
The Norwegian delegation in Geneva wrote that they did not expect a majority of the 
developing countries to support the strong criticism.36  
Industrialised countries rejected the statement from the informal group and it was not 
considered to be a view shared by all developing countries.37 It was in the interest of the 
industrialised countries to keep the developing countries divided, and when the impression 
was made that the statement did not represent the view of all the developing countries this 
would make it easier to designate the criticism as something stated by “unconstructive” 
countries.   
However, developing country unity was stronger than assumed by the industrialised 
countries. At a session in UNCTAD, India, on behalf of G77, presented a long statement 
where the industrialised countries were blamed for the lack of progress in the negotiations. 
The trading system was at a critical stage according to the Indian speaker, and benefited the 
industrialised countries, with a high degree of protectionism which harmed the developing 
countries. India maintained that during the round protectionism had risen, standstill and 
rollback had still not been implemented, and the developing countries’ share of total world 
trade declined from 24 percent in 1985 to 20 percent in 1989. The developing countries 
wanted to be integrated in the round, and the Indian speaker concluded that only integration 
could lead to a successful outcome.38 Again the Norwegian delegation in Geneva questioned 
the statement, and found that it aimed to create a view that the developing countries only had 
rights and no obligations.39  
After the UNCTAD meeting, India invited representatives from 18 developing 
countries to a meeting in India to discuss the negotiations.40 The countries were encouraged to 
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agree on a common negotiation strategy to include the development dimension in the round, 
in order to assure that results would also benefit the developing countries.41 All delegates 
welcomed the initiative from India and were concerned about the current situation.42 In the 
agricultural negotiations the developing countries would need special treatment and the 
interests of the net food importing developing countries had to be considered. The countries 
also expressed that establishing an International Trade Organisation (ITO), as suggested by 
Canada, was not part of the mandate from Punta del Este.43 
 India gathered support for the strong criticism also voiced by the developing countries 
that had been more positive to the round. The statements and criticism from the developing 
countries were repeated several times, and this therefore could not just be brushed aside as the 
position of just a small group, or that India had misled the other developing countries. 
However, the industrialised countries did not put developing countries’ demands on the 
agenda. India had taken much of the coordinating role among the developing countries, since 
the Brazilian government was showing more willingness to cooperate with the industrialised 
countries.44  
 
Text from De Zeeuws  
A new text on agriculture was presented, and the NMFA considered the text to be in line with 
the Norwegian position. Between 19 to 20 April 1990 an informal ministerial meeting was 
held in Mexico with Sweden as the only Nordic participant.45 The participating countries 
agreed to make efforts to try to speed up the negotiations in order to reach an agreement in 
December. Canada reintroduced a proposal to establish an International Trade Organisation 
and wanted the closing meeting in Brussels to make a decision to establish this organisation. 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs commented that if the Canadian proposal was 
aiming to strengthen the multilateral system, the suggestion would be in line with the 
principle in Norwegian trade policy.46  
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Concern regarding the lack of progress grew, and it was decided that the negotiation 
groups had to produce a text that should be the basis for the Ministerial meeting in Brussels.47 
The chairman of the negotiation group on agriculture, De Zeeuws, prepared a text on 
agriculture as a basis for discussions before and during a TNC meeting in July.48 He 
suggested tariffication, but the text also underlined that measures to meet non-trade concerns 
were necessary. Dividing support into two boxes was suggested; support in green and support 
in amber box where support that could be characterized as green would have less reduction 
commitment than the support in the amber box. The support in the green box was support that 
was not linked to production, while the remaining support in the amber box should be 
substantial and progressively reduced through AMS. The Cairns Group and the US were in 
favour of De Zeeuws text, while the EC said that this put CAP under attack.49 However, at the 
meeting in July it was agreed to use the text written by de Zeeuws as a basis for negotiations. 
The countries committed to presenting offers on reduction of support and import protection 
before the 15 October.50  
The Nordic countries were satisfied and found that the text constituted a realistic 
assessment. However, it would had been desired if reduction targets had been defined in real 
terms, and that non-trade concerns should influence internal support in special situations. 
Also, the Nordic countries expressed scepticism about tariffication.51 Thus the traditional 
Nordic position prevailed. The countries wanted to be flexible and positive negotiation 
partners, but at the same time it was important to underline central demands on the most 
important agricultural issues. 
 
Increased Disagreement in Norway 
De Zeeuws’ text led to Norwegian reactions and an increased polarisation in Norway may be 
identified. The Conservative Party and the Labour Party had similar positions in the 
negotiations. There were few signs of change in the Norwegian positions as the Cabinet 
changed. The Labour Party and the Conservative Party have a long tradition for reaching 
consensus in foreign affairs policy. The fact that the negotiations were mainly discussed 
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inside the NMFA, and that the negotiations were not politicised contributed to continuity in 
the Norwegian negotiations. However, in the Coalition Cabinet of Jan P. Syse that was 
established in October 1989, with the Conservative Party, with the Centre Party and the 
Christian People's Party, disagreements were more visible. The Minister of Finance, Arne 
Skauge from the Conservative Party, wanted to use the opportunity the negotiation presented 
to implement necessary structural changes in Norway, as Sweden had done.52 As a reaction, 
the Minister of Agriculture, Anne Vik from the Centre Party, wrote that the De Zeeuws text 
would make it impossible for Norway to have a national agricultural policy. She underlined 
that if central goals in the Norwegian agricultural policy were to be met, Norway would have 
to oppose some of the suggestions in the De Zeeuws text. She also wrote that if a 
disagreement within the Cabinet existed, this should be discussed among the leadership of the 
political parties.53 Internal disagreements are easier to identify in a coalition Cabinet, and the 
Centre Party that had the support of the electorate consisting of farmers and people in rural 
areas, opposed Norwegian membership of the EC much because of the agricultural policy of 
the EC. It was therefore expected that a Minister of Agriculture from the Centre Party would 
be more concerned about Norwegian agricultural interests than a minister from the Labour 
Party.   
The disagreement was also to be found between the Ministry of Finance, the NMFA 
and the Ministry of Agriculture. Different opinions existed on the extent of agricultural 
support reduction and the extent to which it should be defined as green. The Ministry of 
Finance was in favour of a small green box, which implied that the reduction commitment 
would be higher, while the NMFA warned against changing the Norwegian positions. In 
addition, the Ministry of Finance wanted to abolish all quantitative restrictions, while the 
Ministry of Agriculture wanted a continuation of the use of such restrictions.54  
 The De Zeeuws text was discussed at a meeting with the Norwegian Farmers’ Union 
and the Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union. They stated that the suggestions in the 
text would make it impossible to continue with agricultural production in Norway. Gjermund 
Haga from the Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union criticised the Norwegian 
negotiators for “giving up” on the Nordic position. The Minister of Trade, Five, said that she 
shared the organisations’ worries regarding tariffication, but said that Norway was not in a 
position to block the negotiations alone. If Norway turned obstructionist it would merely be 
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left without influence. Five underlined that the current Cabinet, the previous Labour Cabinet 
and the majority in the Storting shared the same view on the positions in the negotiations.55  
The answer from the Minister underlined the Norwegian dilemma. Domestic pressure 
to maintain the import protection system against what it was possible to achieve in the 
negotiations with other countries. The farming organisations wanted the Cabinet to reject the 
text due to the lack of focus on non-trade concerns. For the same reason, the Cabinet wanted 
the text to form the basis for negotiations as it had a focus on non-economic factors. An 
alternative to the text might involve a compromise between the EC and the US, where the 
Nordic views would not be considered at all. Norway also met resistance from the Nordic 
countries, since Sweden and Finland wanted an overall positive evaluation of the text. The 
change in the Finnish position was a result of internal political processes in Finland that led to 
a more positive attitude to reforms and liberalisation in agricultural policy. This weakened the 
Norwegian position, and left Norway even more isolated.56  
Besides the involvement of the farming organisations, and to a certain extent, NHO 
and LO, other organisations were not involved, nor did they know much about the 
negotiations. NHO was satisfied with the cooperation with the Norwegian government and 
underlined the importance of reaching an agreement especially on agriculture, anti-dumping 
and trade in services.57 LO also had a positive attitude towards the negotiations. Through the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, LO supported the liberalisation of trade in 
agriculture.  
A newly established ad hoc organisation, the Norwegian GATT campaign, was 
sceptical about many of the aspects of the negotiations and opposed liberalisation in 
agriculture. Together with the environmental organisation, Nature and Youth (NU), they 
called for more focus on environmental issues and food security.58 
 
The Norwegian Offer 
As we have seen, the Contracting Parties committed themselves to presenting offers to reduce 
support and protection before the 15 October. The new Minister of Trade, Eldrid Nordbø from 
the Labour Party, informed the Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee of the Norwegian offer 
on 12 October. The key point was to freeze the level of the total internal support in real terms 
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at the 1988 level. Norway also accepted an import protection system based on tariffs and an 
elimination of quantitative import restrictions but with the exception of milk, butter and wild 
animals. Norway was also committed to abolishing export subsidies before 1996. Norwegian 
total support to agriculture was NOK 17.2 billion in 1988, the second highest sum of all 
OECD countries. 40 percent of total Norwegian support could be characterised as green box 
with no reduction commitment, while 60 percent had to be subject to reductions.59 Together 
with the Common Nordic proposal, the Norwegian offer represented a change in the 
Norwegian policy regarding quantitative restrictions, since it was realised that this system 
were under strong pressure. Most important now for Norway was to get continued acceptance 
for restrictions on milk and game animals. The Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union 
was disappointed that the Norwegian offer did not maintain quantitative restrictions on grain. 
They also found the offer too moderate.60  
The internal EC disagreement grew, and the EC members failed to agree on the 
common offer from the EC commission.61 Great Britain, the Netherlands and Denmark 
supported the suggestion of a 30 percent reduction in internal support. France and Germany 
opposed the suggestion.62 The US presented its offer on 15 October 1990, with a commitment 
to reducing trade distorting domestic agricultural subsidies by 75 percent over a 10-year 
period.63  
 
Norway and the Developing Countries  
Norway wanted to be a bridge builder between the industrialised and developing countries, 
but only in areas where it was possible to combine this role with national interests. In Report 
No. 13 to the Storting (1989-90), Norway’s cooperation with the developing countries64 the 
Norwegian position towards the developing countries in the Uruguay Round was described. 
The report underlined the increasingly diversity between the developing countries. It was 
underlined that the ASEAN countries, countries from Latin America and India had been most 
active in the round, while African countries had so far been passive observers. The report 
focused on the different interests of the net food exporting countries and the net food 
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importing countries. It was important to underline the diversity between the developing 
countries, and for Norway it was especially important to underline that the net food importing 
countries had different interests from the net food exporting countries that so far had been the 
most active developing countries in the round. It stated that the Nordic countries traditionally 
were among the most active industrialised countries defending the interest of the developing 
countries in GATT. In the conclusion, Norway’s role as a bridge builder was emphasised:  
 
Where it is possible to combine it with central national interests, Norway and the Nordic 
countries are seeking a role as bridge builders between the industrialised and the developing 
countries. This is actively done in the group for textiles and tropical products.65  
 
The conclusion confirms the Norwegian dilemma that Norway wanted to work for the 
developing countries as long as this did not conflict with national goals and interests. In 
agricultural policy, this was difficult. Due to the situation in agriculture, it was important for 
Norway to point to other areas where Norway could give concessions and work as a bridge 
builder. The question was whether this was possible without giving concessions on 
agriculture, since this was one of the most important areas for the developing countries.  
 
Before the Ministerial Meeting 
The situation before the Ministerial Meeting was not optimal, and by the end of October 1990 
there was a high degree of pessimism about the outcome of the round. The Nordic countries 
feared a situation where the EC, the US and Japan would agree on major points and that a 
package deal would be presented at the meeting. Most of the negotiations took place in green 
room meetings. Many developing countries expressed that an acceptable solution on 
agriculture was necessary if the result should be acceptable.66 10 days before the meeting in 
Brussels the negotiations were close to a crisis. The disagreement between the EC and the US 
over agriculture continued.67 The NMFA feared a breakdown due to a lack of time and 
political willingness.  
The Ministerial Meeting was to be conducted at a time at which international attention 
was on places other than on the GATT Uruguay Round. Important historic events happened 
that drew attention away from trade negotiations, and the international atmosphere was not 
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optimal for holding a closing meeting of the Uruguay Round.  In Europe, the fall of the Berlin 
Bwall and the first unified all-German election took place on 2 December. This, together with 
the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, diverted much of the European 
attention. In addition, John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in Great 
Britain. In Asia, the massacre in Tiananmen Square, the democratisation processes in South 
Korea and Taiwan, and deepened economic integration in East Asia were more important to 
Asian politicians that the GATT negotiations.68 On 2 August, Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the 
following attack on Iraq drew the attention of the US president and European prime 
ministers.69 The American President George Bush also intended to focus more on regionalism 
and free trade zones in America.70 Together, these factors led to a lack of the political 
attention and will that would have been necessary to close the agreement. 
The Norwegian negotiation mandate accepted that Norway should be prepared to offer 
tariff reductions in order to achieve increased market access for Norwegian products. The 
Norwegian delegation should continue to work for an acceptance of support to agriculture 
based on non-economic factors, and it was still important for the reductions to be in real 
terms. The delegation was given a mandate to support the establishment of an International 
Trade Organisation, as it was in Norway’s interest to strengthen the multilateral trading 
system.71 This mandate went quite far in accepting reductions in agricultural support, and the 
Cabinet understood that to protect other national interests, Norway had to be prepared to give 
up some of its agricultural demands. This view was, however, not shared by all of Members 
of the Storting. Inger Dag Steen from the Socialist Left Party posted several questions in the 
Storting in 1990 regarding the Uruguay Round.72 In November 1990 she asked the Minister of 
Agriculture about the developments in the negotiations. She referred to the explanatory 
statement given by Huslid, and wondered whether Norway could continue to have a national 
agricultural policy.73 Øyangen replied that Norway had focused on non-economic factors, and 
that the Nordic countries had gained acceptance for this. She also stated it would be harmful 
for Norway if the negotiations broke down, and that the developing countries wanted 
increased market access.74 In the debate that followed, Arne Alsåker Spilde from the 
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Conservative Party, made it clear that the Conservative Party fully supported the government 
and that it was surprising that the Socialist Left Party was negative to GATT.75 
 
The Ministerial Meeting 
The Ministerial Meeting was held in Brussels from 3 to 7 December. The meeting in Brussels 
was extensive with 2000 delegates participating and 1000 journalists present. Several NGOs 
present came from developing countries and they announced their opposition to GATT.76 The 
anti-GATT movement was symbolically launched during the meeting via a demonstration 
with some 30,000 participants in Brussels.77  
No single text existed on which to base the negotiations on agriculture, but there was 
still hope that it would be possible to reach an agreement.78 Dunkel said that it would be 
possible to find a solution if the participating countries showed evidence of a political 
willingness to do so. Eight negotiation groups were established, and the Swedish Minister, 
Mats Hellström, chaired the group on agriculture. The Minister of Trade, Nordbø, underlined 
the importance of a successful outcome. She said that a good set of GATT rules and 
disciplines were of great importance not only to small countries but also to developing 
countries. The Norwegian Minister argued that sustainable development should be secured by 
making trade and environmental policies mutually supportive.79 
The negotiations were difficult and meetings with no progress were held. Hellström 
presented a text in an attempt to speed up the negotiations.80 The paper called for a five-year 
reform with a 30 percent cut in internal support and border protection.81 The text also focused 
on commitments to reduce export subsidies, reduction in farm subsidies and barriers to market 
access. The EC opposed the proposal, mainly since it used 1988 and not 1986 as a basis for 
reduction commitments.82 Norway had problems with the text due to the lack of focus on non-
economic factors and the level of reduction commitments. Several other countries had 
problems with some parts of the texts also, but most of the countries except South Korea and 
Japan accepted it as a platform for further negotiations. However, after some time, the EC 
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said that it could not accept the paper if it was not changed according to the EC’s 
amendments. The developing countries said that this was unacceptable to them, and 
representatives from the Cairns Group and the US also expressed that it would be impossible 
to continue to negotiate if the EC presented such demands. Countries from Latin America 
instructed the negotiators in other negotiation groups to stop the negotiations because of the 
lack of results in the agricultural group.83  
The situations closely resembled the situation after the Mid Term Review in Montreal. 
The EC demands led to a reaction among the developing countries, and the Latin American 
countries did not want to continue negotiations on other areas if results on agriculture were 
not achieved. Through this action the developing countries showed not to accept any 
instructions from the EC on agriculture, and that the willingness to go far in order to reach 
agreement in agriculture was there.  
The Ministerial meeting closed on 7 December without having reached any agreement, 
and the round had to be prolonged, since more time was needed.84 The Contracting Parties 
decided that via consultations before the end of the year Dunkel should establish the basis for 
further negotiations. For the Nordic countries it was important to secure the negotiation 
results already achieved. The problems at the meeting led to increased media attention. The 
newspaper, Aftenposten, attended the meeting, and Øyangen said to the newspaper that the 
suggested text went too far. The newspaper feared a breakdown, which would lead to 
increased bilateralism. 85 
From the Norwegian perspective, there were several reasons explaining the lack of 
results of the meeting. Firstly, the Uruguay Round was complex and complicated with many 
areas of negotiations. Secondly, the developments in Eastern Europe, the changes in the EC 
and the crisis in the Gulf drew political attention away from the negotiations. Thirdly, it was 
pointed out that the Ministerial Meeting was badly organised.86 
 
Conclusion 
The negotiations went from pessimism at the Mid Term Review to optimism and then to 
pessimism again after the breakdown in Brussels. There were several reasons for the 
breakdown. However, action from developing countries, where Latin American countries 
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expressed that there would be no consensus if results on agriculture were not achieved, was an 
important factor.87 Similar action also led to the breakdown in Montreal. This situation gave 
the developing countries much influence, and since it was decided that the negotiations should 
be conducted by the principle of a single undertaking, this action was effective. The fact that 
the Latin American countries decided that negotiations on issues other than agriculture also 
had to be put on hold if results were not achieved in agriculture implies that the Latin 
American countries were willing to go far to reach acceptable results for them. The influence 
of the developing countries was also possible due to the disagreement between the EC and the 
US. In earlier negotiations, and also to some extent later in the Uruguay Round, an agreement 
between the US and the EC left the other Contracting Parties without influence on the result. 
This was not the situation at the Ministerial Meetings in Brussels and Montreal since the EC 
and the US were in fact the main opponents.88  
The Norwegian position was put under pressure both by demands from developing 
countries but also because the Norwegians’ allies changed their position. Gradually, a new 
and more flexible Norwegian position emerged. The fact that Norway was almost isolated in 
the negotiations, together with international pressure and development in the negotiations 
made it clear to the Cabinet that a new Norwegian position had to be established. Both in the 
common Nordic proposal and in the Norwegian offer, a new position can be identified with 
acceptance for a reduction in the total support to agriculture, and that quantitative restrictions 
should be limited. The Norwegian Cabinet had to balance the Norwegian position between 
what was realistic to achieve in the negotiations and domestic pressure. The Cabinet and the 
NMFA generally recognised the need to be flexible and were partly willing to exploit the 
negotiations to achieve goals on areas other than agriculture. However, in the coalition 
Cabinet there were disagreements in how far Norway could go in accepting liberalisations in 
agriculture. Also the Storting emphasised the importance of giving concessions in line with 
the Norwegian import protection system. The negotiators were trapped in the dilemma 
between the Norwegian agricultural interests in line with the farmers’ organisations view, 
while at the same time being a constructive negotiation partner and having a common 
platform with the Nordic countries. The reality in the negotiations was more difficult than the 
internal Norwegian debate reflected, since in fact Norway was viewed as a protectionist 
country. This weakened the Norwegian position, but this was not obvious to the farmers’ 
organisations and the Storting. Also the fact that the other Nordic countries had established a 
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more flexible position was a challenge to Norway. However, it was partly in the interests of 
the Norwegian Cabinet to be put under high domestic pressure since this could be used as an 
argument for small Norwegian concessions in agriculture.  
The Norwegian explanatory statement was an important strategic manoeuvre by 
Norway. The domestic pressure groups were satisfied that non-economic factors were being 
underlined, which at the same time enabled Norway not to make any reservations in the text. 
Another strategic step was the common Nordic proposal. The proposal was criticised by the 
Norwegian farming organisations, but Cabinet believed that the proposal would prevent 
Sweden from leaving the common Nordic positions. This would have caused severe 
difficulties for Norway and the Norwegian negotiation position.  
 80
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CHAPTER V 
From Crisis To Agreement 
 
 
 
The last phase of the negotiations lasted from the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels to the end 
of 1993 when an agreement was finally reached. 1991 and 1992 were a period of transition 
and the negotiations were reorganised. Growth in Eastern Asia and liberalisation in Eastern 
Europe represented important changes in the world trade regime that had a positive influence 
on the negotiations.1 But the period was also characterised by stagnation and difficulties. 
There were long periods when the negotiations only took place between the US and the EC, 
and these discussions resulted in the Blair House agreement. How this affected the 
negotiations shall be discussed. An agreement was reached finally and the processes that led 
to this agreement shall be described.  
Dunkel presented a proposal, the Draft Final Act (DFA), in order to speed up the 
negotiations. The proposal was positively evaluated by the Norwegian Cabinet, but received 
negative reactions from the farming organisations. How the DFA influenced the Norwegian 
debate shall be analysed. Through Reports and Propositions, the Storting was briefed and 
involved in the negotiations. The process during which Norway gave up some of the essential 
demands continued. However, non-trade concerns were still underlined. The Cabinet received 
support in the Storting for its new agricultural position, but it was also criticised by the 
opposition. The polarisation in Norway and the domestic debate shall be described in this 
chapter. 
Brazil and India relented in much of their criticism, and how this affected the 
negotiations and why this happened shall be discussed. This chapter will also describe how 
the developing countries reacted to the DFA and the Blair House Agreement.  
 
After the Failure in Brussels 
At a TNC meeting on 26 February 1991, the Contracting Parties decided that the negotiations 
should continue without a time frame.2 It was still uncertain whether it would be possible to 
end the negotiations in 1991, or even before the US election in 1992.3 However, again there 
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was optimism that closure was possible. Some progress was made, but the EC and the US had 
the key to the solution as it was the EC and the US that disagreed the most, and there was also 
gradually weakened opposition from the hardliners from the developing countries.4 As the 
new governments in India and Brazil were more in favour of an open economy and 
liberalisation, opposition from India and Brazil reduced.5 Brazil changed its development 
strategies and started liberalising reforms in 1990,6 while India started with liberalisation and 
the dismantling of trade barriers in 1991.7 On agriculture, India was neutral in the dispute 
between the EC and the US and was willing to accept a compromise on this issue 8 Internal 
discussion and disagreements in the EC was one of the main reasons for the lack of progress. 
Germany supported France, and this resulted in an inflexible EC position. However, as 
Germany gradually changed its approach this influenced the position, and the EC became 
more positive towards considering deeper cuts in domestic support levels for farmers and to 
negotiate commitments on export subsidies.9  
In a demarché from Canada, Japan, Korea, Norway and Switzerland, the countries 
expressed that “tariffication without exception should not be considered as the only way to 
contribute to the expansion of agricultural trade.”10 Norway found it necessary to seek 
alliances outside the Nordic group on the question of tariffication. This indicates that Norway 
regarded support from the other Nordic countries to be weakened, since Finland had changed 
to a more positive attitude towards liberalisation in agriculture. Canada also found it 
necessary to seek alliances outside of the Cairns Group. Even though Canada wanted 
liberalisation in agriculture, it was important to still have an import quota for products that 
were used to support national supply management programmes.11  
 
The Draft Final Act  
 On 20 December 1991, Dunkel presented a Draft Final Act with suggestions for texts within 
each of the negotiation areas. It was hoped that the DFA might lead to a conclusion of the 
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round.12 Special focus was placed on agriculture, and Dunkel suggested that internal support 
levels be reduced by 20 percent and import barriers be cut by 36 percent. On export subsidies, 
a 36 percent cut in budget support and 24 percent cut in the volume of exports over six years 
were suggested.13 Dunkel also proposed creating an organisation as suggested earlier by 
Canada, and he proposed calling it the Multilateral Trade Organisation (MTO). Immediately 
France, Japan and Korea rejected the DFA since it went too far on reduction in support.14  
In a written statement from the Norwegian delegation, it was expressed that Norway 
had serious problems with some aspects of the agricultural proposal.15 At a Nordic meeting on 
22 December, the text from Dunkel was examined. The reduction in internal support would, 
according to the NMFA, lead to negative consequences for Norway and Finland. But since the 
implementation period had been increased from five to seven years, the text on agriculture 
was evaluated as being better than expected.16 The NMFA understood that a total rejection of 
the text would not be fruitful, and indeed not even possible. The initial Norwegian position to 
reject reductions in import barriers and internal support was now left. This came after the 
realisation that the original Norwegian position would have been impossible to defend, and 
that a more flexible position would give better overall results for Norway. It was also 
important to change the image that Norway did not want access for developing countries to 
the Norwegian market. However, Norway continued with its opposition to tariffication across 
board and underlined the special characteristics of agriculture. Norway got some 
understanding for this view, but many countries expressed that Norway had a high support 
level and Norway was regarded as protectionist.17 
Due to the changed position, the Norwegian Cabinet started to be more offensive in 
the domestic debate on agriculture. This was of course important to generate support for a 
new position. However, in the negotiations Norway kept focusing on the special challenges 
for Norway and on non-trade concerns. It was important for Norway to keep the focus on the 
negative parts of the agreement, even though it was deemed more positive than expected. By 
this, the Norwegian government underlined its sacrifices, and gave domestic signals in 
Norway that one was striving to achieve results according to the Norwegian position. In the 
negotiations, the NMFA underlined the special Norwegian needs, while in the domestic 
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debate the NMFA stressed that Norway had to give concessions on areas that would be 
difficult to Norway. By using this strategy, the NMFA was trying to meet both the 
international and domestic pressure, and to find a solution to the Norwegian dilemma. This 
dualism in the Norwegian position was regarded as necessary, since Norway was dependent 
on an open world economy, while at the same time Norway had defensive interests on 
agriculture. The political challenge was to balance these conflicting aspects.18 
 
The Organisations Reactions to the DFA 
The DFA led to reactions in Norway, and it resulted in increased disagreement among the 
Cabinet and the farming organisations. The NMFA sent a letter to a number of organisations 
for comments on the DFA. The media had written mostly about the agricultural negotiations 
and the farming organisations’ scepticism. The request to other organisations to express their 
point of view was a strategy designed to get reactions from other organisations and 
institutions as well and to draw focus to views other than those coming from the farming 
organisations. 
Nature and Youth sent a resolution adopted at their congress arguing that Norway 
should pull out of the Uruguay Round. The organisations stated that the agreement would 
make it more difficult to combat hunger in the developing countries and maintain food 
security. Free trade in food would not benefit the world population and poor farmers in the 
developing countries that were placed outside the global economy, according to the 
organisation.19 In an answer to the resolution, the Minister of Trade, Bjørn Tore Godal from 
the Labour Party, wrote that it was necessary to have clear rules in international trade, 
something that was important to developing countries. Godal stressed that the developing 
countries wanted clear results, and had participated actively in the negotiations and supported 
the DFA.20 The dispute between NU and NMFA is an example of both the opponents and the 
supporters of the negotiations using the needs of developing countries in their arguments. The 
Cabinet’s wish to improve the conditions for the developing counties was ideologically 
motivated, according to Godal.21 
In a press statement, the Norwegian Farmers’ Union wrote that the Dunkel text was a 
complete rejection of the Norwegian agricultural policy, and Norway would have to seek 
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reservations if Dunkel’s text were to be adopted. The suggested import protection system 
would, according to the organisation, create problems for Norway’s agricultural policy and 
for small farms in Norway especially. It would be impossible to attain central policy goals 
such as food security, environmental and regional policy. Continued possibilities for 
quantitative restrictions and that internal support should be measured in real terms were the 
most important issues to the organisation.22 This was also official Norwegian policy, but the 
Cabinet knew that it would not be possible to get acceptance for all the Norwegian demands, 
and a focus on non-trade concerns and continued use of quantitative restrictions on milk and 
game animals was regarded as most important. The Cabinet had to focus on what was 
possible to achieve in the negotiations, while the role of the farming organisations was to keep 
constant pressure on the Cabinet for their demands. It was important for the government to 
show that the negotiations were about both sacrifices and achievements. The sacrifices were 
criticised, but it was important to have meetings with the organisations to create 
understanding of this situation.23 There were frequent meeting between the farming 
organisations and Minister of Trade and Minister of Agriculture to get acceptance for 
Norwegian proposals and negotiation strategies. The farming organisations understood the 
dynamism in the negotiations and that access for developing countries was needed. However, 
this was not very clearly expressed in public according to Godal.24 
As a reaction to a Dunkel proposal that industrialised countries should make greater 
commitments to products of particular export interests for developing countries, The 
Norwegian Farmers' Union said that this would harm Norwegian production. They were, 
however, willing to give developing countries preferences on “non-sensitive” products.25 This 
statement shows that the organisation meant there was an actual conflict between Norwegian 
interests and market access for developing countries. The organisation argued in line with the 
“accept of incompatible interests” perspective, while the opponents of a reduction in the 
Norwegian import protection system earlier had used the “none interest conflict” perspective.  
In a press release issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Godal commented on the 
consequences an agreement would have for agriculture in Norway. He said that it was time to 
adapt to a new era and to implement structural changes in Norwegian agricultural policy. 
Godal stated that the consequences of the DFA as presented by the Norwegian Farmer’s 
Union were exaggerated, and that they did not take into consideration that changes outside of 
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Norway that would affect Norwegian production. Changes, such as higher world market 
prices, would in turn have positive effects on Norway’s agricultural industry. The public 
attention on the negotiations resulted in increased information from NMFA, underlining how 
important an agreement would be to Norway.26 In a press release issued by the Minister of 
Agriculture, Øyangen stated that the Farmers’ Union was interpreting the GATT document in 
an extremist way.27 The polarisation between the Cabinet and the farming organisations grew. 
The Cabinet became more positive to liberalisation of trade, while the farming organisation 
became more confrontational in their argumentation.   
The appeal from the NMFA, i.e. that organisations which did not represent farming 
interests should also enter the discussion, succeeded. Many of the organisations in the private 
sector underlined that there were areas in the negotiations more important than agricultural 
issues. The Federation of Norwegian Commercial and Service Enterprises stated that the DFA 
was in line with their expectations of the round.28 The Norwegian Trade Council wrote that 
increased market access would lead to an increase in Norwegian exports. The Trade Council 
warned against Norway seeking reservations in agriculture that could harm the round as a 
whole.29 NHO underlined that the agreement was about much more than agriculture, and that 
the debate in Norway was only focusing on the agricultural parts of the agreement. It was 
important that Norway should have a flexible approach in the negotiations, and NHO feared 
that the farming organisations would dictate the Norwegian positions.30 NHO was not very 
active in the negotiations, but played a constructive role, according to Godal.31 LO was also 
positive to an agreement, and wrote in a comment that it was in Norway’s interest to have free 
international trade and a strong set of rules.32 The backing from LO was important for the 
Cabinet. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, John Ivar Njålsund, came from LO, and had 
frequent contact with the organisations.33 The former Minister of Trade, Jan Balstad, held a 
central position in LO. According to Chaffey, LO at that time was dominated by private sector 
industry that needed market access.34 
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Political Reactions to the DFA 
Two days after Dunkel presented the DFA, Godal informed the Enlarged Foreign Affairs 
Committee about the text. He emphasised the importance of an agreement. On agriculture and 
services Norway’s positions were not fully met, but the negotiations had been complicated 
and a country could not expect to reach all goals in all areas. However, Godal underlined that 
the Norwegian goal was to maintain the environmental and regional profile as well as food 
security aspects in the agricultural sector. It was difficult for Norway that the text did not open 
up for a reduction in real terms, only in nominal terms. As the period of reduction was seven 
instead of five years, however, the Minister argued that this was acceptable. Since the DFA 
was based only on tariffication, Norway could not continue with quantitative restrictions on 
milk and game animals and this was regarded as being negative for Norway. Godal also 
underlined the importance for the developing countries of an agreement being reached, and 
said that the developing countries had participated actively in the round, and were expected to 
judge the overall value of the results of the negotiations as positive. He also informed the 
Committee about the plans to create a trade organisation, and that Norway had been positive 
to such an organisation. The creation of an MTO would not lead to changes in Norwegian 
law, according to Godal.35  
The information presented by Godal and his statement that the DFA was acceptable to 
Norway, show that Norway was about to give up two important demands; first, that the 
reduction had to be in real terms and, secondly, continued possibilities to use quantitative 
restrictions. However, Norway was still working for the original Norwegian positions, 
especially for exemptions on tariffications, but it was important to prepare the Norwegian 
interest groups and the Storting for the possibility that Norway might have to give up these 
demands. As Putnam describes it, international negotiations are negotiated on two levels; in 
the actual negotiations and domestically. Norway had to balance the negotiations between 
these levels. In Norway, the Cabinet was criticised for giving up on central Norwegian 
demands, while in the negotiations Norway was criticised for being too protectionist and for 
giving too few concessions in agriculture.  
 After the meeting of the Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee, the Centre Party and the 
Socialist Left Party demanded a debate about the negotiations in the Storting. This was 
according to a proposal from Dag Steen.36 On 28 January 1992, the Minister of Trade 
informed the Storting about the GATT negotiations. He said that the agricultural negotiations 
                                                 
35 NMFA 562.0, Minister of Trade to The Foreign Affairs Committee, 09.01.92. 
36 Interview Inger Dag Steen 15.10.05. 
 88
were difficult, and the Norwegian goal was to secure the non-economic factors in agriculture. 
Godal used the developing countries in his argument in favour of the agreement, saying that 
the developing countries had underlined the importance of reaching concrete goals in the 
round. He also said that the developing countries had expressed some disappointment with 
parts of the total package, and wanted more special treatment.37 Both in the information to the 
Storting, and to the Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs, the developing countries were 
used in the argumentation. It was underlined that the developing countries wanted a quick end 
to the negotiations. This was partly correct; however, Godal did not mention the strong 
criticism that was coming from the developing countries regarding a lack of focus on what 
these countries regarded as important.  
 On 6 February the Storting debated the speech. Gunnar Berge from the Labour Party 
started by saying that he was sorry that the press was not present during the debate. Even 
though attention had grown, this shows that the national debate on the negotiations was still 
limited. Berge said that the agreement would be a challenge for the agricultural sector in 
Norway, but that the situation was not as bad as made out by the agricultural organisations. 
The draft agreement was, according to Berge, positive for the developing countries due to 
better market access, reform of the textile sector and reform in the agricultural sector.38  
 Erik Solheim from the Socialist Left Party said that the traditional criticism of the 
market system was missing from Berge’s speech. He wanted the Cabinet to support an 
initiative taken by hundreds of NGOs to postpone the closure of the negotiations until after 
the Rio meeting.39 Anne Enger Lahnstein from the Centre Party said that the DFA would 
lead to a dramatic change in the agriculture sector and food production in Norway. She 
criticised the Cabinet for being passive and for not paying attention to the calculations from 
the farming organisations.40 The Labour Party and the Conservative Party criticised the 
Socialist Left Party for only focussing on national interests, without paying attention to what 
was the actual demands from the developing countries were. Kirsti Kolle Grøndahl referred to 
a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Indonesia, where he had expressed the 
need for a fast end of the negotiations.41 In his answer, Godal said that the Cabinet was not 
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satisfied with the agreement on agriculture, and that Norway had to continue to work for 
criteria for green support and quantitative restrictions.42 
Kaci Kullmann Five from the Conservative Party said that the Cabinet had kept the 
same line in the negotiations, as had her Party when she was Minister of Trade. She wanted a 
quick end to the negotiations and referred to the developing countries, as she stated that the 
developing countries wanted trade not aid.43 Paul Chaffey from the Socialist Left Party said 
that it was strange that everyone was speaking on behalf of the developing countries, even 
people who had not been active in development work in the third world. He continued by 
saying that there were no absolute answers for the developing countries. For exporting 
countries the agreement might be positive, but unfavourable for importing countries. Chaffey 
also said that no guarantees existed that reduced food production in Norway would lead to 
increased imports from the developing countries.44 As we have seen earlier, the developing 
countries were used both by the opponents of freer trade in agriculture, and those that wanted 
a continued high Norwegian import protection system. Dag Steen argued that the developing 
countries had to access the market with own preferences and needed food security, and that 
she was the only person addressing these problems. She underlined that the developing 
countries needed protectionism, and that farmers in the developing countries would not 
benefit from free trade.45 Chaffey has stated that not many of those that used the developing 
countries in their arguments really knew what the actual needs of the developing countries 
were. Many people on the political left believed that if something benefited the agricultural 
sector, it also benefited the developing countries. If there were common interests between 
developing countries’ needs and agricultural interests, this was used in the argumentation. 
However, it was in fact the agricultural interest that was the important issue.46 Former 
Minister of International Development from the Centre Party, Tom Vraalsen, said it would be 
a catastrophe for the developing countries if the negotiations broke down, since it would lead 
to increased protectionism, trade wars and economic stagnation.47 However, Haga from the 
Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union believed that an agreement would be 
catastrophic for the developing countries, and that the developing countries needed 
protectionism and not free trade.48  
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Even though scepticism about the negotiations among politicians grew with increased 
information, the majority in the Storting supported the Cabinet’s position. The Labour Party 
and the Conservative Party shared positions and agreed on the most central elements and 
principles. On the other hand, awareness of and opposition to the negotiations grew locally in 
Norway. Several regional and local councils made official statements regarding the 
negotiations. They underlined the importance of a national agricultural policy and were 
worried about employment in the agricultural sector.49 
In March 1992 the Cabinet accepted tariffication on all agricultural products except 
milk and game animals. This was communicated to the parliamentary leaders, but not to the 
Enlarged Foreign Affairs Committee. The Farmers’ Union was negative to the acceptance, 
and said that the Cabinet had not considered food security and non-economic concerns.50 Dag 
Steen believed that Norway had departed from the opening offer from 1989 without having a 
mandate from the Storting.51 She stated that the Norwegian offer was used as an alibi to adapt 
to the EC and give up a national agricultural policy.52  
 
The Contracting Parties Reactions to the DFA 
The Contracting Parties evaluated the DFA differently. The Indian government wrote that 
India was “extremely unhappy with several elements in the Dunkel package, especially in the 
areas of textiles and intellectual property rights”.53 Brazil supported the Dunkel text, and the 
government did not want to open for changes in the text.54 The chief of the financial 
department at the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in a meeting with the Norwegian 
Embassy that the Dunkel agreement would imply sacrifices for Brazil, but that it also had 
some positive elements. Since the Brazilian government had started a liberalisation 
programme for Brazilian foreign trade, it was important for Brazil to have a clear set of 
rules.55  
The disagreement on agriculture between the EC and the US was again high. 
However, the countries within the EC had different opinions on how far to could go in 
meeting American demands. France was the clearest opponent, and the French government 
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did not accept the Dunkel document.56 In France, internal pressure rose, and violent riots by 
farmers occurred.57 The Minister of Commerce from Bangladesh wrote a letter to the 
Norwegian Minister of Trade, emphasising that the round did not address vital interests of the 
least developed countries. Bangladesh wanted therefore the following terms to be 
incorporated in the final act: 
 
Least developed countries, recognised as such by the United Nations, for becoming parties to 
the instruments negotiated in the course of the Uruguay Round, shall not be required to make 
concessions or contributions and undertake any additional or new commitments and obligations 
which are inconsistent with their individual development, financial and trade needs, or, beyond 
their administrative and institutional capabilities. 
 
The letter concluded by emphasising that the Norwegian government had always supported 
and understood the situation in Bangladesh, and that the government had played a leading role 
in promoting the interests of the least developed countries.58 Bjørn Tore Godal responded to 
the letter and wrote that the Norwegian government shared the concerns of the developing 
countries. “Together with other North European countries we have therefore during the 
multilateral negotiating process supported several initiatives to improve the possibilities of the 
developing countries in international trade.”59 
 
Norway’s Cooperation with Developing Countries  
 In Report No. 16 to the Storting (1990-91), About Norway’s cooperation with the developing 
countries, the Uruguay Round was characterised as important to the developing countries so 
as to gain access to western markets.60 The report went far in admitting that protectionism in 
industrialised countries had caused problems in the developing counties, and underlined that 
Norway felt a responsibility to address the problems of the developing countries in GATT. It 
was stated, as earlier, that Norway was seeking to be a bridge builder between industrialised 
and developing countries. It was however underlined that this was only the case when it did 
not conflict with central, national goals.61 Again the dualism in the Norwegian policy can be 
identified. It was realised that protectionism in the North created problems in the South, but at 
the same time Norway only wanted to be a bridge builder in areas not in conflict with national 
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goals. One result of this position would be that Norway did not work for the interests of the 
developing countries in agriculture, but considered itself to be a bridge builder in other areas 
such as on textiles and tropical products. The question was whether the developing countries 
found that satisfactory since agriculture was one of the most important issues. However, the 
new Norwegian position in agriculture did accept changes in agricultural policy, such as a 
more liberal import protection system and increased market access, something the developing 
countries were demanding.  
 Report No. 51 to the Storting (1991-92), Development in the North/South relationship 
and Norway’s cooperation with developing countries, also discussed the developing countries 
in GATT and how to improve their trading opportunities. The Report emphasised that it was 
necessary to give more access to developing countries and that it was western countries that 
were partly to blame for a lack of economic development in developing countries due to 
protectionism. “Many western countries including Norway, have been giving developing aid, 
while at the same time doing little to work for increased import from developing countries.”62 
It was also stated that there was no doubt that the protectionism in industrialised countries 
made it more difficult for the developing countries to reform the economic policy through 
increased focus on export.63 Report No. 51 underlined that developing countries met higher 
tariffs than industrialised countries. The report also admitted that Norway did not always 
follow what it preached. “Norwegian trade barriers for textiles and agricultural goods meant 
that we protected ourselves against import of goods that were of central importance for the 
export from the developing countries.”64 It was underlined that the Cabinet was working for 
the best possible solution to the trade problems for the developing countries in the Uruguay 
Round, and that Norway wanted to improve the import of agricultural goods from developing 
countries.65 However, the contradiction in Norwegian policy can still be identified in this 
Cabinet statement:  
 
[…] developing countries shall be given better import conditions to the Norwegian market than 
industrialised countries generally have […]. Such preferences for agricultural goods from 
developing countries shall be created so that it still is possible to reach the goals in the national 
agricultural policy.66  
 
                                                 
62 Report No. 51 to the Storting (1991-92), Om utviklingstrekk i Nord-Sør forholdet og Norges samarbeid med 
utviklingslandene [Development in the North/South Relationship and Norway’s cooperation with the Developing 
Countries], p. 13. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
63 Report No. 51 to the Storting (1991-92): 123. 
64 Report No. 51 to the Storting (1991-92): 18. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
65 Report No. 51 to the Storting (1991-92): 25 
66 Report No. 51 to the Storting (1991-92): 251. Author’s translation from Norwegian. 
 93
A discussion on whether this was possible or not did not take place. The Report No. 51 
emphasised the “accept of incompatible interests” perspective, and that protectionism in 
industrialised countries was one of the reasons for the lack of economic development in 
developing countries. More than before, the new Norwegian position was spelled out in a 
Report to the Storting. However, it was still emphasised that concessions should not be given 
on areas that would challenge the national agricultural policy.  
 
A new Agricultural Policy 
As we have seen, the Cabinet wanted to gain acceptance for a change in the Norwegian 
position, to being more positive to cuts in agricultural support as well. In Recommendation 
No. 191 (1990-91), regarding the annual agricultural agreement, the Labour Party, the 
Conservative Party and the Progressive Party in a joint remark stated that Norway had to 
calculate with changes in the agricultural policy. The parties also noted that an overview in 
OECD put Norway on top with regard to protection and support to agriculture. The remarks 
show that the new Norwegian position including acceptance of more market orientation in 
agriculture had support in the Storting. However, the Socialist Left Party, the Christian 
Democratic Party and the Centre Party wanted an agricultural policy emphasising long-term 
goals and food security. They criticised the Cabinet for giving up the Norwegian position, and 
argued that the Cabinet was using the negotiations as an alibi for changing Norwegian 
agricultural policy.67 
The modified agricultural policy was clearly presented in Proposition to the Storting 
No. 8 (1992-93), Agriculture under Development. The Labour Party Cabinet emphasised that 
changes in the agricultural sector were necessary and that OECD had criticised Norway for 
high support to agriculture and too much protectionism. The main strategies for Norwegian 
agriculture were to create a more sustainable agricultural sector, with increased competition 
and reduction in expenditure.68 Proposition No. 8 had increased focus on the market and 
adapting to the international situation, and the goal of an income standard for the farmers was 
left.69 The Labour Party presented joint recommendations with the Conservative Party and the 
Progress Party.70 This coalition was, however, not seen as anything unusual as the Labour 
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Party and the Conservative Party had acted together in the debate on Norwegian membership 
of the EC.71 The Socialist Left Party, the Centre Party and to a certain extent the Christian 
Democratic Party believed that the changes to the agricultural sector were neither good nor 
necessary. They opposed liberalisation of GATT.72 The discussion in the Storting led to 
farmers turning up to protest in Oslo, criticising the Cabinet strongly, claiming that 
agricultural policy was to become too market-orientated. 
 
Standstill in the Negotiations 
The disagreement between the EC and the US remained unresolved, and it was questioned 
whether it would be possible to reach an agreement by the end of 1992. This led to increased 
frustration, especially among the developing countries. The negotiations were planned to end 
on 15 April 1992, but no one expected this to happen.73 The American presidential election 
was drawing closer, and Bush did not want focus on the round during the elections.74 If Bill 
Clinton won the election, the outcome of the negotiations would be more uncertain, and it was 
predicted that it might take one more year to finalise the negotiations.75  
The Contracting Parties had still different positions on agriculture. The US, the Cairns 
Group and Canada wanted to abolish trade intervening support and a reduction in the general 
support level. The EC was willing to reduce some of the subsidies to agriculture, but did not 
want to reduce export subsidies. Japan, Switzerland, Austria and the Nordic countries wanted 
a reduction in the trade intervening support but due to non-economic concerns the need for a 
continuation of the support to agriculture was underlined. The net food exporting developing 
countries wanted liberalisation and reduction of support, while the net food importing 
developing countries wanted to protect national agriculture, and wanted subsidised 
agricultural products.76 
   In a meeting between Godal and Dunkel, Dunkel said that it seemed that an 
agreement could not be reached by 1992. Dunkel said that he had received a lot of complaints 
and that countries were frustrated that the only negotiations that took place were between the 
EC and the US. Godal underlined the problems Norway had with the lack of focus on non-
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economic factors in agriculture.77 At a TNC meeting on 10 November 1992 Dunkel said the 
round came close to a crisis, and many countries were frustrated by the lack of progress in the 
negotiations between the EC and the US. It was pledged that the EC and the US had to act 
responsibly and find a solution.78  
 
The Blair House Agreement 
Negotiations between the EC and the US took place in Washington in November at the Blair 
House presidential guest quarters. On 20 November a joint statement was announced and an 
agreement was reached. “In agriculture we have resolved our differences on the main 
elements concerning domestic support, export subsidies and market access.”79 The Blair 
House Agreement introduced a “blue” box, in addition to the green box and the amber box, 
which was support to production under production-controlled programmes that should not be 
subjected to cuts.  
For Norway the blue box was deemed to be positive, as much of the Norwegian 
support that earlier had been defined in the amber box and therefore had to be reduced, could 
be put in this box and be exempted from reduction commitments. Also, other countries were 
to a large extent pleased that an agreement had been reached.80 The French Prime Minister 
said, however, that the agreement between the EC and the US was unacceptable, and that he 
was considering vetoing it. Large demonstrations consisting of farmers took place in France.81 
This coincided with the French election and all the main candidates opposed the Blair House 
agreement. The centre right won the election and the new prime Minster, Edouard Balladur, 
said he wanted to renegotiate the Blair House agreement.82  
The Blair House Agreement reopened the DFA and other countries also presented 
proposals for changes. The Nordic countries opposed this; however, the NMFA considered 
presenting a Norwegian suggestion on changes in tariffication, especially exemptions on the 
tariffication of milk. Several countries, such as Japan, Korea and Switzerland, had presented 
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changes and Norway feared that a defensive position would be harmful. Such a suggestion 
would also be positive in relation to the farm organisations.83  
 
From Breakthrough to Deadlock 
The Blair House Agreement was a breakthrough. However, there was still a long way to 
reaching an agreement, especially because of the French position. At a green room meeting on 
18 January 1993, Dunkel stated that despite the Blair House Agreement, the negotiations were 
not in the final stages, and a longer delay could lead to a breakdown. On behalf of the African 
countries, Morocco expressed frustration and disappointment that the African countries had 
not been involved in the consultations that had taken place. The countries in Africa had not 
been very active in the negotiations, and had limited bargaining power and influence over the 
negotiations.84 Many countries wanted to send a signal to the new American President Bill 
Clinton that the round had to be finished before the American mandate expired. The American 
President had, however, decided to ask Congress for a new mandate, since the new 
administration considered that fast closure of the round was impossible.85 The negotiations 
were therefore almost put on hold, since there were no longer any reasons to speed up the 
negotiations.86  
 Arthur Dunkel resigned as the General Director of GATT in July 1993 and Peter 
Sutherland was elected as the new General Director. He was Irish and nominated by the EC.87 
Dunkel had negotiated through green room meetings and did not push for decisions. 
Sutherland was the opposite and acted more as politicians do, pushing for agreements. He was 
dynamic and outspoken, and this provoked renewed enthusiasm.88 Sutherland wanted to use 
the TNC meetings more actively and efficiently in the negotiations, and wanted to limit the 
use of green rooms meetings. Sutherland said that due to the activity in the green room, some 
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countries felt to be left outside the process.89 That a new person became General Director in 
the last phase of the negotiations, was positive for the possibilities for achieving a result.90 
 
Norwegian Offer 
On 14 January 1993 a Norwegian GATT offer was presented. Norway wanted to keep 
quantitative restrictions on milk, but accepted reductions from 15 percent up to 80 percent on 
other food products.91 The Norwegian Standing Committee on Agriculture met Dunkel in 
Geneva. He said that it was good that Norway wanted to end the round, but Norway could not 
at the same time present reservations on agriculture that would clearly be viewed as blocking 
measures that would lead to delays. He said that if it were not for the opposition from 
Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Japan and Korea on tariffication without exceptions, the round 
would already have been finished.92 The signal from Dunkel was clear, and the Norwegian 
wish to make the impression that Norway was a constructive negotiation partner did not 
succeed when Norway refused to accept tariffication on all areas. 
A revised Norwegian offer approved by the Storting was presented in GATT on 31 
August 1993. Norway considered the offer to be a good contribution to the negotiation 
process, and it represented a major change in the Norwegian import protection system. The 
offer was based on the DFA and the Blair House agreement. However, Norway still 
demanded exceptions for tariffication of milk and milk products.93 The Norwegian demand 
for exceptions for tariffication was not appreciated and Norway was still considered to be 
protectionist. It was important for the NMFA to explain why it was necessary to keep 
quantitative restrictions in Norway. In a letter to Sutherland, Godal wrote that Norway was 
ready to contribute actively in the effort to conclude the round. He wrote however:  
 
[…] that Norway still maintains that there should be room for carefully circumscribed 
exceptions to the principle of tariffication across the board. Such exceptions should be based on 
a clarified and strengthened art. XI. The products in question for Norway are milk and milk 
products which are of vital importance in a regional context in Norwegian agricultural policy.94 
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The Position of the Developing Countries 
The developing countries were not satisfied with the situation and had suffered most from the 
deadlock and disagreements during the past years. The countries had to wait until the main 
trading countries had agreed, and had few possibilities to present demands in the negotiations. 
After India and Brazil became more positive to the negotiations, much of the criticism from 
the developing countries disappeared. The other developing countries did not have the same 
possibilities to address the Contracting Parties, and the opposition was not as visible as when 
Brazil and India were active opponents.  
A group of Latin American countries met in Montevideo in November 1993 to analyse 
the current status of the negotiations. The countries expressed their concerns, underlining that 
protectionism had increased since the start of the negotiations. Agriculture was regarded as 
the key priority sector for the Latin American countries, and the countries wanted substantial 
liberalisation of market access, a reduction of internal support and of export subsidies.95  
Minister Sayed Jamaluddin from the Bangladesh delegation in Geneva visited the 
Norwegian delegation with a paper he personally wanted to give to countries that were 
positive to the least developed countries. The least developed countries thought the DFA did 
not consider their needs. They wanted to demand some changes, but did not believe their 
demands would result in a change in DFA. However, the minister hoped that the Nordic 
countries would give the paper serious attention. The least developed countries wanted special 
and differential treatment included in more paragraphs and agreements in the DFA.96  
 
Towards an End of the Negotiations 
At a meeting with the Norwegian reference group on agriculture in October 1993, Næss from 
the NMFA expressed only careful optimism that it would be possible to reach a result by 15 
December. Increased activism, also from developing countries during the last weeks, was 
considered to be very positive. The pressure on Norway to give up the demands for 
exceptions regarding tariffication of milk and milk products increased and if Japan changed 
position and accepted tariffication on rice, it would be difficult for Norway to continue to 
demand quantitative restrictions on milk and milk products.97 
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Bilateral meetings with the EU98 and the US were held frequently in November, and 
the main task was to complete an agreement on agricultural tariffication.99 France and the US 
became more flexible, and on 3 December the US gave up its opposition to establishing an 
MTO,100 but wanted the name to be changed to World Trade Organisation.101 In a 
memorandum to the NMFA the Norwegian ambassador in Geneva, Erik Selmer, wrote that he 
believed that it would not be possible to get exceptions on tariffication across the board.102  
On 6 December 1993, the Minister of Trade gave a speech on trade issues to the 
Storting. He said that within a few days they would know whether the Uruguay negotiations 
could end. Godal said that the commitments in the agreement on agriculture would fulfil 
Norway’s goals on non-economic concerns.103 On 13 December, a debate followed the speech 
by the minister. Håkon Blankenborg from the Labour Party said that free trade was good, but 
could be a threat to the poor in the developing countries. However, the alternative was not 
better.104 Lahnstein from the Centre Party said that environmental organisations and farmers 
in poor countries had protested against the agreement. In the discussions that followed, 
several MPs mentioned the developing countries, and discussed whether the developing 
countries would gain from an agreement or not.105 Lars Sponheim from the Liberal Party 
asked the Minister whether Norway had supported demands from the developing countries, 
and what Norway had done during the negotiations to improve the result for the developing 
countries.106 Summing up, Godal said that the issue of more rules and procedure was an area 
where the Nordic countries had worked hard, and this was also important to the developing 
countries. Godal said that Norway had to be prepared to give up the demands regarding 
exceptions on tariffication.107 Vegard Bye from the Socialist Left Party posed a question to 
the Minister of Trade regarding the OECD’s numbers that calculated that out of the USD 200 
billion that was expected to increase in the world trade, only USD 18 billion would benefit 
developing countries. The differences between North and South would increase and 
UNCTAD had calculated that the poor countries would lose out from an agreement according 
to Bye. Godal replied that almost all developing countries wanted an end to the negotiations. 
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There was, however, no doubt that the agreement was more positive for the most advanced 
developing countries, and not so positive for the less developed countries. The developing 
countries wanted even better market access than what would be offered in the negotiations.108  
 
The Agreement  
After eight years of formal negotiation, an agreement was reached. On 7 December 1993, the 
EU and the US agreed on agriculture. Each country had to make commitments to market 
access, internal support and export support, and to present a list on how to achieve this. The 
revised Blair House Agreement modified the DFA, especially regarding internal and export 
support.109 The timetable and methodology for the subsidy reduction were also modified.110 
The delegation in Geneva wrote that Norway would have to give up the Norwegian position, 
since the modified DFA did not accept exemptions on tariffication.111 In a meeting during the 
night prior to 13 December the text on agriculture was accepted in the informal group of heads 
of delegation. The Norwegian ambassador, Selmer said:  
 
The question of tariffication across the board will be decided upon my government following a 
debate in the Parliament tomorrow. You will understand that I am not able to pre-empt that 
decision. The case of Iceland is similar. Also here a decision will be taken tomorrow. Under 
these circumstances I have to make a waiting reserve.112 
 
The negotiations among the Contracting Parties continued, and after Canada, Japan and South 
Korea lifted their demands on exceptions on tariffication, Norway decided to do the same.113 
To conclude the agreement, Sutherland gathered one person from each country in a room, 
with Sutherland sitting on a podium. That country that had rejections against the proposed 
final agreement had to state it in the meeting. This method put pressure on the head of 
delegations, so that an agreement was possible to be reached.114 On 15 December, Sutherland 
declared the Uruguay Round concluded.115 It was decided that a conference in Marrakesh 
would take place in mid April 1994 where the agreement would be signed by the negotiating 
countries. It was agreed to establish a World Trade Organisation that should reach agreements 
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by consensus.116 Malaysia, on behalf of the developing countries, underlined that the 
agreement lacked commitments for special treatment for developing countries, but the 
agreement was “a victory for international trade which set a new era for our future 
generations, to benefit and contribute to the increased global welfare.”117 In the developing 
countries it was emphasised that more open trade was in the interests of the developing 
countries. Criticism also surfaced, however, claiming that focus on issues especially important 
to developing countries was lacking.118  
 
Conclusion 
The negotiations were almost put on hold, in order to wait for an agreement between the EC 
and the US. The opposition from the hardliners declined since Brazil and India elected 
governments that were more positive towards the negotiations. However, in Europe, 
opposition increased; in France in particular, farmers’ riots and demonstrations took place. 
After the failure of the Ministerial Meeting in Brussels and the presentation of the DFA, 
domestic interests and attention stayed on a relative high-level throughout the negotiations. 
Members of the Storting wanted to be updated, the farming organisations criticised the 
development more loudly, the newspapers wrote more frequently about the negotiations, and 
other organisations expressed interests in the round. However, the debate regarding 
Norwegian membership of the EC was still the main trade related issue debated in Norway.  
The Norwegian Cabinet agreed with the farming organisations that parts of the DFA 
would be difficult for Norway, but it was realised that the text could have been worse. The 
positive evaluation of the DFA by the Cabinet, together with the acceptance of tariffication on 
all agricultural products except milk and game animals marked a significant new policy 
within agriculture. The new position manifested itself in Proposition No.8 (1992-93) and 
received the necessary support from the majority in the Storting. The opposition criticised the 
Cabinet and said that the negotiations had been used as an excuse to liberalise Norwegian 
agricultural policy. However, the Cabinet stated it was necessary to adapt to the international 
development. We have identified that Norway worked for acceptance domestically for a 
revised Norwegian position, while at the same time in the negotiations it was underlined by 
Norway the special characteristics of Norwegian agriculture and the need for continued focus 
on non trade concern. In Norway, it was also important to focus on issues other than 
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agriculture to show that overall, Norway would benefit from the negotiations. It was a 
strategy to make visible to the Norwegian public that Norway was giving in agriculture but 
receiving on rules and procedures, and again giving in textiles but receiving in agriculture.119   
We can still identify the dualism in the Norwegian policy. In Report No. 51 to the 
Storting it was underlined that agricultural protection caused problems for developing 
countries, but preferences given to developing countries should only be given in line with 
Norwegian national agricultural interests. It was however not discussed whether this was 
actually possible. That the Report argued in line with the “incompatible interests” perspective 
while at the same time underlining that Norwegian national interests should be given first 
priority shows the inconsistency of the Norwegian policy on this area. However, the fact that 
the Cabinet were about to change the agricultural policy might imply a change in what the 
Cabinet regarded as “national interests”. It may also be that the Cabinet underlined this 
mainly because of domestic reasons, since it was clear to the Cabinet that changes in the 
Norwegian import protection system would result from the Uruguay Round.  
  The developing countries’ needs were used in the Norwegian debate. Godal referred to 
the needs of the developing countries and that many countries wanted a quick end to the 
negotiations, but he did not refer to the criticism from the developing countries. However, 
also the opponents of the agricultural negotiations argued with the needs of the developing 
countries, and that the developing countries needed to have the right to protect their national 
markets and agricultural production, the same as Norway needed.   
 The Blair House Agreement between the US and the EU introduced a blue box that 
was welcomed by Norway. Much of the Norwegian support could be defined as blue, and the 
negative consequences for Norway, that earlier had been predicted as a result by the 
agreement, would be limited. When it was realised that an agreement would be reached, and 
that Japan and Korea gave up their demands for exceptions from tariffication, Norway had to 
do the same, since it would be impossible for Norway to veto the agreement.  
When the Brussels meeting ended in failure due to the political circumstances, the 
finalisation of the agreement was possible due to political changes. India and Brazil had left 
their position as hardliners, and had implemented economic liberalisation. In addition, 
ASEAN had decided to create an Asian free trade agreement. The EC had started a process to 
reform CAP, and the liberalisation in Eastern Europe, together with economic growth in East 
Asia, made the process of finalising the round easier.120  
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CHAPTER VI 
The Closure Of The Round 
 
 
 
In this chapter we shall describe the final agreement and analyse its consequences for Norway 
and the developing countries. How did the developing countries react to the final agreement? 
By the end of the round, it was clear that the results of the round would affect the developing 
countries differently, and different views concerning how the result would affect the 
developing countries will be discussed. It shall also be describe how Norway evaluated the 
round, both with regard to Norwegian interests and the interests of the developing countries.  
The debate in Norway and how the Cabinet presented the results to the Storting shall 
be identified. In addition, the debate in the Storting and the different views the political parties 
in Norway had on the agreement shall be described. We shall also see that almost all the 
parties used the developing countries in their argument.  
 
The Final Agreement  
The negotiations concluded by agreeing to the creation of the World Trade Organisation, and 
an extensive agreement was reached. The member countries of WTO were committed to all 
parts of the agreement. On agriculture the agreement had four parts. 
1. The general agreement: 
The goal was to establish a more market-oriented trading system for agricultural products, and 
to strengthen GATT’s rules and disciplines. Reduced commitments to export subsidies and 
internal support, together with increased market access, would lead to reforms of the 
agricultural sector. The developing countries gained more flexibility in implementation, had 
to bind fewer tariffs, and received longer transitional periods. In addition, technical assistance 
was offered to the developing countries. In the preamble to the agreement it was stated that 
developing countries needed special attention and more favourable treatment.1  
2. Commitments on market access, internal support and export support: 
The member countries’ import protection system was to be based on tariffs, and products 
earlier protected by other means should now be tarifficated. The tariffs should be reduced by 
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an average of 36 percent within a period of six years. For developing countries, the tariff 
reduction should be 24 percent on average over 10 years, while the least developed countries 
were not committed to reducing any tariffs. Internal support should be reduced by 20 percent 
over a period of six years. The developing countries were committed to reducing their support 
by 13.3 percent over a period of ten years. The basic period was set to 1986-1988. The 
internal support was divided in three boxes: amber, blue and green. Support that was 
subjected to reductions was support in amber box, and was support that was classified as trade 
affecting support and direct support. Direct budget support under production-limiting 
programmes was support in blue box, and did not have to take any reduction commitments. 
Support put in green box was not subject to reduction commitment, and that was support that 
did not directly affect trade, such as support to the environment, districts and direct income 
support. For export support, the level of the subsidies should be reduced by 36 percent within 
six years, and the amount of subsidised export in total should be reduced by 21 percent. The 
developing countries had to reduce their export subsidies by 24 percent within ten years.  
3. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Regulations (SPS): 
The SPS agreement was based on how possible conflicts between health interests and trade 
interest should be dealt with. The main rule was that countries could still decide their own 
level of security.  
4. Action for the least developed countries and net food importing developing countries: 
Since it was realised that these countries would be affected by higher food prices it was 
agreed that a committee should be established to control the implementation of the agreement 
and possible negative results for the least developed countries and the net food importing 
countries. The agreement had, therefore, stated goals on food support and increased 
developing aid.2 
 
Consequences for the Developing Countries 
An evaluation of the consequences of the agreement for the developing countries was made in 
the GATT Secretariat just before the final agreement was reached. The evaluation showed 
that the effects of the agreement varied between countries and regions, but that the developing 
countries would gain from increased market access and the strengthening of GATT rules and 
disciplines. However, figures were presented that indicated that tariff reductions were 
generally lower for products exported by developing countries. The evaluation was discussed 
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in a meeting in Geneva and the developing countries expressed disappointment that the 
industrialised countries were the winners of the round. The least developed countries were 
especially critical towards the agreement. The developing countries exporting agricultural 
products criticised the industrialised countries for a lack of willingness to open up their 
markets to agricultural products. The Latin American countries commented upon the 
evaluation and were concerned that the commitments made by the industrialised countries 
were inadequate. The African countries expressed that the evaluation only focused on what 
the developing countries would gain from a reduction in tariffs, without considering that the 
preferences given in the GSP would diminish in value. Most of the African countries were 
also net food importing countries and would be adversely affected by increased prices on the 
world market. The least developed countries said that the result of the Uruguay Round was a 
disappointment, especially due to little increase in market access in areas important to the 
poorest countries.  
On behalf of the Nordic countries, Norway expressed understanding for the situation 
of the least developed countries. The Norwegian ambassador, Selmer, said, however, that 
there were many positive aspects in the agreement for the developing countries as well. He 
underlined the huge differences among the developing countries, and that the benefits “[...] 
could not be expected to be evenly distributed among this large group of countries […].” On 
agriculture, Selmer said that tariffication and disciplines on subsidies and quotas would have 
significant effects for many developing countries, but that increased world market prices 
would be a problem for the net food importing countries. He concluded by saying that the 
Nordic countries believed that the negotiations to a large extent had taken into account the 
special needs of the developing countries. “All in all, it therefore seems to us that there are no 
real losers but that some are bigger winners that others.”3  
The Norwegian statement contained a positive evaluation of the agreement for the 
developing countries, and it was important to Norway and other industrialised countries to 
create a positive impression of the round. The negative results were there, but all in all the 
agreement was a step forward, according to Norway. Again it can be identified that the 
criticism from the developing countries was not given adequate attention from the 
industrialised countries. The statement from the Norwegian ambassador implied a positive 
evaluation, even though it was realised that the industrialised countries were the countries that 
gained most from the round. The Department of External Economic Affairs II at the 
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Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also evaluated the results of the round as positive for 
the developing countries. It was underlined that global economic growth would benefit the 
industrialised countries the most, but the developing countries would not lose out as a result 
of the round, and the agreement would lead to increase imports from the developing countries 
and also increased development aid.4 From the above, we can see that the African countries 
did not share this view, since these countries feared losses due to increased prices of food, and 
losses after the effect of the preferences would lose value. The NMFA did not consider the 
fact that the developing countries profiting less than industrialised countries would lead to 
bigger differences between North and South. According to the NMFA, a strengthening of the 
multilateral framework for international trade, the establishment of the WTO and a more 
efficient dispute settlement procedure would also be in the interests of all developing 
countries. It was pointed out that several developing countries had expressed dissatisfaction 
with the level of market access for products the developing countries had exporting interests 
in, especially for textiles and agriculture. The NMFA stated that it was difficult to say whether 
this dissatisfaction “[…] is of genuine or “professional” character”. However, there was no 
doubt that market access for these areas were generally improved, even though the 
expectations were higher. It was also pointed out that the negotiations had considered the 
special needs of the developing countries, e.g. longer transitional periods for these countries. 
The Norwegian evaluation underlined that big differences existed between the developing 
countries, and that the developing countries did not negotiate as one group in the Uruguay 
Round. It was concluded that the new agreement was a step in the right direction for the 
developing countries.5  
 
The Ministerial Meeting in Marrakech  
After nine years of negotiations the negotiations had finally come to an end. On 15 April 
1994, Ministers from 125 countries gathered in Marrakech, Morocco. 111 countries signed the 
Final Act, and the agreement to establish the World Trade Organisation was signed by 104 
counties.6 The countries committed themselves to implementing the WTO agreement 1 
January 1995.7 The Norwegian Minister of Trade, Grete Knudsen, underlined the challenge to 
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connect trade and the environment, and that it was necessary to intensify the work on this 
issue. She expressed, however, satisfaction that trade and development were put on the 
agenda.8 In a press statement from Morocco, satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting was 
expressed. “The result reached in Marrakech appears balanced and cannot be considered as 
the fruit of pressure from industrial countries”. This statement met some of the criticism that 
was raised by the end of the negotiations. It was, however, underlined during the meeting by 
the Moroccan Minister of State of Foreign Affairs, Abdellatif Filali, that special attention had 
to be given to Africa, and that “[…] developing countries still were affected by various 
questions, including the plummeting of raw material prices, foreign debt and restrictive trade 
practices.” The Kenyan Minister of Trade complained “[…] that certain countries took 
advantage of the fact that African countries adopted macro-economic measures, to inundate 
African markets, without considering African countries’ welfare.”9 Focus on Africa had been 
lacking in the negotiations, and few African countries had been very active in the round. 
When it was realised that Africa would be the continent that would benefit least, or even 
might lose out as a result of the negotiations, the focus on the continent increased. It was also 
due to more African countries attended the meeting than before, and the fact that the 
Ministerial Meeting was conducted in an African country signalled that problems typical to 
Africa had to be addressed in the future.  
 
Two Step Forward, one Steps Back? 
In the literature available there are different opinions regarding how the agreement would 
influence the developing countries, and whether it would lead to an improvement or a 
worsening of the situation for the developing countries. Anne Krueger in her book, Trade 
Policies and Developing Nations, underlines that the developing countries are benefiting from 
increased trade and liberalisation.10 She states to that the developing countries were active in 
the Uruguay round,11 and that the agreement was a compromise between developing countries 
and industrialised countries.12 The Uruguay Round was viewed as a great achievement for the 
developing countries since these countries traditionally had limited possibilities to negotiate 
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within the framework of GATT.13 This argument was also used by the Norwegian Cabinet 
underlining that it was the developing countries that wanted a fast end to the negotiations and 
that the agreement had to be viewed as an achievement for the developing countries. 
 John M. Stewart Breen points to the fact that the final agreement represented 
substantial progress in improving market access. Even though there were exceptions to the 
rules, the established regime was considered to be positive. According to Breen ambitious 
initial proposals to eliminate export subsidies, or to cut back domestic support to agriculture 
“fell victim to political realities.” But the fact that subsidies would be reduced was a major 
achievement.14 
 Kym Anderson points to that many industrialised countries set the tariffs in the basic 
period 1986-1988 at higher level than the actual tariffs had, and this led to a rather limited 
reductions in tariffs. This was later known as “dirty tariffication”. He states that the 
implementation of the agricultural reforms from the Uruguay round would only lead to 
limited liberalisation, but that it was important that agriculture be integrated into the 
agreement.15 Graham Dunkley also focus on this factor, and writes that many developing 
countries feared that western countries would manage to retain protection via loopholes.16 A 
common criticism was, according to Dunkley, that the agreement continued with the selective 
protection that benefited the industrialised countries, while at the same time opening up the 
developing countries to western multinational companies. The losers were Indonesia and 
African countries due to higher world markets price, and loss of benefits due to the erosion of 
the GSP system.17 
Will Martin and Alan Winters write that the round was important for the integration of 
developing countries in the world trade regime.  That agriculture was included was considered 
a major achievement, as was as all countries accepting tariffication. However, the way in 
which non-tariff barriers were converted into tariffs limited liberalisation, and exceptions 
weakened the results to developing countries. Martin and Winters also point to the problem of 
dirty tariffication, and the fact that the 1986-1988 period was chosen as basic. Due to these 
reasons the round was considered to be: “two steps up and one step down.”18 This is also the 
conclusion of a World Bank report, Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round. 
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One Step Forward, One Step Back. Merlinda D. Ingco writes: “the tariffication and binding of 
all tariffs on agricultural products represents a significant step forward.” However, studies 
showed that it would be liberalised less than expected mainly since the basic period chosen, 
1986-1988, was a period with high border protection.19 
Rubens Ricupero writes that it was new in international trade that it was the 
industrialised countries that resisted liberalisation and the developing countries that wanted 
more liberalisation. Ricupero points to the strengthening of the system, increased multilateral 
disciplines and dispute settlement as positive sides of the agreement. On the negative side, 
one finds that tariff reductions on products important to developing countries were limited, 
and that the poorest countries suffered from lost value of the preferences.20 
Chakravarthi Raghavan’s main view is that the Uruguay Round can best be 
characterised as negotiations where powerful nations were seeking to control the developing 
countries. Even though the agreement was critical to the developing countries, governments 
and NGOs in the South paid little attention to the negotiations.21 Raghavan is also critical of 
the fact that sustainable development was not included in GATT. According to the author, it 
was impossible to combine the view of the Brundtland commission, namely intervention with 
the free trade of GATT. “Brundtland has not so far carried her fight into GATT, nor have the 
Nordic governments who have been trying to get other organisations to adopt the WCED 
report”.22  
After the agreement was reached, several studies were presented that evaluated the 
results for the developing countries. It was difficult to foresee the benefits and costs, and 
models produced different results. Some models suggested that the benefits to developing 
countries would be limited, only a 10 percent share of the total global increase, while some 
models suggested a 60 percent share of the total increase in welfare gains after the 
agreement.23 There were also different views on whether the developing countries would 
benefit from a more liberal trade regime or not. It was pointed to that African food importing 
countries were the biggest losers.24 However, an IMF working paper referred to a study 
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saying that developing countries that liberalised their own trade policy would most likely 
benefit from the round. Cuts in subsidies might lead to increased prices, but the study 
concluded by stating that an increase in net food import costs was only a small proportion of 
the total net food import.25 
 
Proposition to the Storting  
After the Ministerial meeting in Marrakech, the Norwegian Storting had to ratify the 
agreement. This were to be done in The Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94), The 
results of the Uruguay Round (1986-1993) and acceptance of the ratification of the 
Agreement to establish the World Trade Organisation (WTO) etc., and was presented to the 
Storting on 30 September 1994. In the agricultural negotiations, the goal had been to improve 
the situation on the world market by reducing overproduction and the sale of heavily 
subsidised agricultural products. This overproduction had, according to the Cabinet, made it 
more difficult for the developing countries to export agricultural products. In addition a goal 
had been to implement a market orientated trading system through a reform process. 
Protection and support should gradually be reduced with regard to market access, internal 
support and export subsidies.26 The Norwegian goal had been to secure national self-
determination in the agricultural policy in order to secure jobs and regional development.27 
For Norway it had been important to underline the non-economic factors in Norwegian 
agricultural policy.28 However, during the last negotiating phase, it was impossible to gain 
acceptance for the Norwegian demands on exceptions for tariffication on milk and game 
animals.29  
It was concluded that the results of the Uruguay Round made it possible to continue to 
have a national agricultural policy in Norway that was based on non-economic factors as well. 
The Cabinet underlined, however, that the agreement would lead to more efficient agriculture 
due to increased competition.30 The overall evaluation of the round was that the result was 
close to the Norwegian goals for the negotiations. The Cabinet wanted to underline that it was 
possible to continue with a national agricultural policy, even though Norway had to give up 
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some of its most important agricultural demands. Norwegian agriculture’s share of Norwegian 
economy had declined during the last 35 years and the number of jobs had fallen. The level of 
costs was high compared to that of other countries, as was the level of support, which in 1993 
amounted to 76 percent of the value of the production.31  
The reduction of trade barriers and tariffs was expected to be beneficial to the OECD 
countries and Western Europe; EFTA and Japan in particular were expected to gain much as 
agricultural production would be lower and cuts in subsidies would benefit the national 
economies.32 But according to the proposition, the agreement would also be positive to the 
developing countries since the control and the dispute settlement procedure would be 
strengthened.33 The Cabinet referred to a study from 1993 by the OECD and the World Bank. 
Calculations based on the DFA indicated that the agreement would be positive to the 
developing countries, especially those in Latin America and Asia. The calculation indicated 
that some countries in Africa would lose due to cuts in export subsidies that would lead to 
higher prices for products.34 It was, however, not discussed in the proposition that other 
studies indicated more negative results for developing countries.  
Despite the negative reaction that had come from the developing countries after the 
final agreement was reached, the Cabinet evaluated the round for the developing countries as 
positive. It was stated that there had been a close relationship between the Nordic countries 
and representatives from the developing countries in the round.35 The special treatment for the 
developing countries and the possibilities to differentiate between developing countries was 
important according to the Cabinet. Tariffication would make it easier for industrialised 
countries to give preferential advantages to developing countries, and it was emphasised that 
the developing countries had increased their participation in GATT. The Uruguay Round was 
perhaps the most important event in the relationship between North and South for many years, 
according to the Cabinet.36 Further, it was stated that developing countries differed and that it 
would not be fruitful to evaluate the outcome of the negotiations for the group as a whole.37 
Many of the least developed countries were food-importing countries, and for these countries 
increased prices for agricultural products would entail a deteriorating economic situation.38 
The Cabinet wrote: “The results could ideally have been better for the developing countries. 
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At the same time it is clear that the developing countries as a group will also enjoy benefits 
from the outcome.”39 Even though Africa would experience a set back, in relative terms the 
solution for Africa could not be to reject trade liberalisation according to the proposition. 
More aid, counselling and technical aid could be the solution for those countries that would 
experience problems as a result of the agreement.40 That developing countries were 
disappointed with parts of the agreement and had expected stronger commitments was not 
discussed, and the Proposition emphasised the positive results for the developing countries, 
without pointing to the negative results that had come up in the debate, such as higher food 
prices, loos of the value of preferences, disappointment with lack of commitment and that the 
western countries would benefit the most from the agreement.  
 
Hearings with Norwegian Organisations 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a hearing letter to organisations in Norway about the 
results of the Uruguay Round.41 The answers were presented in the Proposition No. 65. Two 
organisations opposed Norwegian ratification. The Norwegian GATT campaign wanted a 
mini GATT based on the Tokyo Round instead.42 The Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ 
Union would not recommend Norway ratify the agreement since the outcome of the 
negotiations would weaken food security and lead to a reduction in the number of jobs in 
agriculture. The organisation saw the need for common rules in international trade, but the 
negotiation result was only in the interest of the industrialised countries, and the losers were 
the developing countries, especially in Africa. The Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ 
Union did not want free trade in food, especially since Norway was a net food-importing 
country.43 The argument against the agreement was also due to reasons for developing 
countries. This had, however, not been one of the The Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ 
Union concerns in previous contact with the Cabinet. Awareness of the situation for the 
developing countries, and particularly in Africa, did, as we have seen, increase. To use the 
interests of the developing countries was therefore an effective way to argue against the 
round, since reports implied that African countries would not benefit from the round.  
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The Norwegian Farmers' Union shared many of the same views as presented by the 
Norwegian Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union, but it did not oppose ratification. The 
organisation wanted an import protection system that would safeguard Norwegian agriculture, 
and concluded by stating that if the political will existed, it would be possible to maintain 
Norwegian agricultural policy, based on small-scale production, making environmental and 
regional considerations.44 
The North-South Coalition expressed that tariffication was a step in the right direction 
since it made it easier for the developing countries to access markets in the industrialised 
countries. The North-South Coalition criticised the agreement for not taking into 
consideration the fact that internal support in developing countries was an important factor in 
increased food production.45 
The Committee for International Questions of the Church of Norway’s Council on 
Ecumenical and International Relations was satisfied that an agreement had been reached 
because a breakdown in the negotiations might harm the developing countries. The 
Committee expressed, however, that it was not fully satisfied with the agreement, and referred 
to a study by the World Bank and the OECD claiming that the Uruguay Round would lead to 
a USD 140 billion growths every year in the industrialised countries. Developing countries 
would gain USD 70 billion while Africa would lose USD 2.6 billion every year.46 
The trade unions and the private sector had many similar views on the agreement. LO 
was positive to the outcome and to free trade. The organisation stated that in order to make 
positive discrimination easier, more market mechanisms in agriculture were necessary in 
favour of developing countries.47 NHO was also satisfied with the overall result of the 
agreement, and focused on the benefits of a strengthened set of rules and procedures. NHO 
supported a liberalisation that would lead to economic growth. On agriculture, the NHO was 
positive to removing quantitative restrictions.48  
 
Ratification in the Storting 
The Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs discussed the proposition and presented its 
remarks in Recommendations No. 43 (1994-95). The Committee referred to earlier 
                                                 
44 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94): 760-761. 
45 NMFA 562.0, letter, hearing answer, the North South Coalition, Wenche Hauge to NMFA 21.03.94. 
46 NMFA 562.0, letter, hearing answer, Church of Norway’s Council on Ecumenical and International Relations 
to NMFA 05.05.94. 
47 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94): 756. 
48 Proposition to the Storting No. 65 (1993-94): 769-773. 
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Recommendations where consensus on the need to strengthen GATT with a strong set of rules 
based on free trade had been expressed.49 The majority in the committee, consisting of 
representatives from the Labour Party, the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, 
welcomed the establishment of the WTO. The parties pointed to the fact that a big group of 
developing countries were members of GATT, and many developing countries had become 
members during the negotiations. This fact was used as an argument for developing countries 
being in favour of the WTO. The criticism from African countries was, however, not 
discussed. The three parties supported tariffication since it would be easier to identify hidden 
protection and to reduce tariffs. The Norwegian goal, to get acceptance for non-economic 
factors, had been successful since support to the environment, districts and direct income 
support and food security were not subject to reduction commitments. But it was underlined 
that the agricultural sector would be put under efficiency demands and be subject to increased 
competition. The three Parties stated that Norway had to contribute actively so that the 
agreement would work out positively for the developing countries, and agreed with the 
Cabinet in saying that increased trade, higher income and more investments would lead to 
growth and better welfare for developing countries. They also wrote that they were aware of 
the varying outcome of the negotiations for different developing countries, but few critical 
voices were raised during the meeting in Marrakech. The three Parties therefore supported 
Norwegian ratification.50 
 The Norwegian Centre Party was critical of the fact that the Committee had been 
given little time to work on the Proposition. The Centre Party believed ratification should be 
postponed, also due to the debate on Norwegian membership of the EU. They were also 
concerned that Africa would lose as a result of the round, and that the differences between 
rich and poor countries would increase. On agriculture, the Centre Party stated that the net 
food importing countries would have fewer possibilities to produce food for their own 
population. The Centre Party was critical of parts of the agreement, and stated that Norway 
had to find a role as a bridge builder between rich and poor countries. On the basis of this, the 
Centre Party supported Norwegian ratification. Similar to the farming organisations, the 
Centre Party argued against the agreement much on the basis of the situation for the 
developing countries. The Centre Party is however a party with strong focus on Norwegian 
                                                 
49 S.innst. (1987-88) No. 253 and S.innst. (1989-90) No. 181. 
50 S.tid. (1994-95) 6a Ia, S.innst. No. 43: 13-17. 
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agricultural interests, and they might therefore have used the situation for the developing 
countries to cover up the focus on its own interests.51 
 The Socialist Left Party saw the need for a committed set of rules to regulate world 
trade. As with the Centre Party, the Socialist Left Party wanted to postpone the ratification, 
but supported ratification. They were sceptical about the parts of the agreement that would 
weaken a country’s possibility to secure its own food production. Further, the Socialist Left 
Party wanted the WTO to be under the control of the United Nations.52  
The Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party suggested postponing Norwegian 
ratification until the spring session in 1995. This did not get enough support when the Storting 
discussed the negotiations on 30 November. The Labour Party and the Conservative Party did 
not want to postpone ratification until 1 January 1995, and did not see the point in delaying if 
the agreement was going to be ratified anyway.53  
 The Christian Democratic Party agreed to many of the remarks of the majority. The 
negative consequences for the net food-importing countries were, however, more underlined, 
and the Christian Democratic Party wrote that the industrialised countries would benefit the 
most from the agreement. The Christian Democratic Party focused on the situation for 
countries in Africa, and said that losses for the least developed countries had to be 
compensated.54 
We can identify that all the parties in the Storting used the situation for the developing 
countries in the argument whether they were in favour or sceptical about the agreement. This 
may be explained by a sincere interest in improving the conditions for the developing 
countries. However, it may also have been used to legitimise the Parties’ positions, and to 
take away some of the focus on national agricultural interests. The strong focus on the needs 
of the developing countries was not in line with the previous statements, as may be seen for 
example in Report No. 51 (1991-92), where preferences should be given to developing 
countries in line with Norwegian agricultural interests.  
 
Disagreement in Socialist Left Party 
Inger Dag Steen was the person in the Socialist Left Party who had most knowledge about the 
negotiations. She was the spokesperson on agriculture in the Parliamentary Caucus and had to 
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52 S.tid. (1994-95) 6a Ia, S.innst. No. 43: 20-24. 
53 S.tid. (1994-95) 6a Ia, S.innst. No. 43:.27 and S.tid. (1994-95)7b: 1471- 1474. 
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cooperate on this issue with Paul Chaffey who was the foreign affairs spokesperson. There 
were disagreements between Chaffey and Dag Steen over the approach to the negotiations. 
Dag Steen was of the opinion that Chaffey was not contributing to the process and that Dag 
Steen did all the work involved in the negotiations.55 Dag Steen created a forum to discuss the 
negotiations, with its base in the Farmers’ and Smallholders’ Union. There was a 
disagreement internally in the Socialist Left Party between those who wanted to give access to 
developing countries’ goods and those who claimed that access to western markets would not 
solve the problems in the developing countries. Since there were disagreements on these 
issues a reference group was established to make a basis for the Socialist Left Party’s policy 
on the issue.56 Even though the group was established in January 1994 the first meeting was in 
November 1994, just before Proposition No. 65 was to be discussed in the Storting. Dag Steen 
tells that it was emphasised that the Socialist Left Party had to be united on this issue and that 
the Party had to be in favour of the round since it would not be strategically in the debate 
regarding Norwegian membership in the EU, to also oppose the WTO. Socialist Left Party 
issued information regarding the EU and GATT and underlined that it was important to say 
yes to the Uruguay agreement, especially if Norway voted against EU membership.57 For 
these reasons the Party Leader, Erik Solheim and Chaffey pushed Dag Steen to become in 
favour of the negotiation results.58 Chaffey believed it surprised others that the Socialist Left 
Party was in favour of the round. This decision came after a telephone conference of the 
National Executive Committee 29 November, the day before the discussions in the Storting 
and the same day as the referendum on Norwegian membership in the EU. Dag Steen 
believed that the Socialist Left Party should have voted no, especially since Norway voted no 
in the EU referendum.59 The proposal to postpone the decision in the Storting was regarded as 
mere “play for the gallery”. Those who were against got at least the voting for postponement, 
and it functioned as a compromise.60  
 
Debate in the Storting 
In the debate in the Storting 30 November 1994, Five from the Conservative Party said that 
Norway was a small country that gained from trade with other nations. The fact that the 
                                                 
55 Interview with Dag Steen, 15.10.05. 
56 Members were: Paul Chaffey, Erik Solheim, Inger Dag Steen, Aina Edelman, Haldorsen. 
57 EU argument! From Socialist Left Party, 22.11.94. 
58 Interview with Dag Steen, 15.10.05. 
59 Fax, Dag Steen to Hans Ebbing, 29.11.94.  
60 Interview with Dag Steen, 15.10.05. 
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Norwegian population the previous day had voted no in the referendum regarding Norwegian 
membership of the EU increased the need for protection in GATT, according to Five. She 
underlined that it was the developing countries that most wanted to end the negotiations, and 
that Norway had to work to ensure the agreement was positive for the developing countries. 
She continued by saying that agriculture was the part that had received most attention in 
Norway, and it would be possible to maintain current Norwegian agricultural policy.61 
 Ragna Berget Jørgensen from the Labour Party focused on the need Norway had to 
trade with other countries. She also focused on the importance of a strengthened set of rules 
for the developing countries, and that small and poor developing countries would eventually 
benefit from the agreement.62 Jørgensen said that the African countries would not see the 
effects of the new agreement. Hilde Frafjord Johnson from the Christian Democratic Party 
said that Africa would see the effects of the agreement, because the countries would lose as a 
result of the negotiation results.63 
 Marit Arnstad said that the Centre Party would agree to ratify the agreement, but that 
she was sceptical about several parts of it. Liberalisation would not solve the problems in 
international trade, and Africa in particular would lose. She continued by saying that each 
country had to have the possibility to produce food for its own population. Arnstad focused on 
the net food importing developing countries that would suffer from the agreement.64 This led 
to reactions from MP’s from both the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, who 
questioned whether the Centre Party had changed its policy favouring developing countries’ 
needs over Norwegian agricultural goals. She answered that trade in food was not healthy. 
Anders Talleraas from the Conservative Party said that the Centre Party was not concerned 
about the developing countries, only about Norwegian farmers.65 
 Chaffey from the Socialist Left Party opened by saying that the agreement needed 
more attention, and that the debate had taken place in the shadow of the EU debate. He said 
that the Socialist Left Party wanted rules for international trade but that the Socialist Left 
Party did not agree with the goals of the Uruguay Round. He continued by saying that the 
Socialist Left Party supported national food production, and that the developing countries had 
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to have the right to protect their own markets. The agreement was not good enough and there 
was too much focus on free trade.66  
 Kjell Magne Bondevik from the Christian Democratic Party said that it was important 
to have a permanent organisation, but he also underlined the special needs of the developing 
countries.67 Fridtjof Frank Gundersen from the Progress Party also mentioned the developing 
countries in his speech.68 The Minister of Trade, Grete Knudsen, said that the developing 
countries had been active in the whole process and that the agreement was one of the most 
important things that had happened in the relation between industrialised countries and 
developing countries for many years.69 Frafjord Johnson said that the Minister of Trade erred 
in focusing on the consequences for developing countries. She said that that the sub-Saharan 
African countries would lose from the agreement due to increased food prices.70 
  Red Electoral Alliance suggested that Norway continued its membership of GATT 
based on the Tokyo agreement. In addition, the representative suggested not ratifying the 
agreement. The last suggestion got 3 votes since two MP’s from the Socialist Left Party 
supported Red Electoral Alliance’s position.71 The two persons who voted against went 
against the decision in the party and received much attention. The Centre Party was also upset 
that its “unity” was broken.72 
 
Conclusion 
The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluated the Final Agreement as positive, both 
for Norway and for the developing countries. The introduction of the blue box reduced much 
of the negative consequences for Norway. However, Norway had to give up quantitative 
restrictions on milk and milk products. On the issue of the developing countries, Norway 
pointed to several factors that would benefit the developing countries. It was important to the 
industrialised countries to underlie that the developing countries would also gain from the 
agreement, even though the industrialised countries would benefit the most.  
The special focus put on the developing countries, especially the net food importing 
countries and the least developed countries, came after knowledge that these countries would 
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benefit less from the agreement, or might even lose due to higher world market prices on food 
and a reduction of the effects of the existing preferences. The developing countries expressed 
dissatisfaction with parts of the agreement, mainly due to lower reductions on tariffs and 
market access from industrialised countries than expected. Even though different studies 
varied with regard to how the results affected the developing countries, it was clear that the 
effects varied by country and region. It was, however, obvious that Africa would benefit the 
least of all continents.  
In the literature, there are also different views on the effects on the developing 
countries from the agreement. The conclusions vary with regard to whether agricultural 
liberalisation benefits the developing countries or not. Positive effects for the developing 
countries pointed out in the literature are that the developing countries would benefit from a 
liberal trade regime with increased market access, reduction in subsidies in western countries 
and more effective rules and procedures. In addition, it has been pointed to the fact that the 
Uruguay Round integrated agriculture in the agreement, and that the developing countries are 
also an integrated part of the trade regime. Negative sides pointed out are that the 
industrialised countries received exceptions and would still be able to protect some of their 
agricultural sector via loopholes. In addition, it is noteworthy that 1986-88 were set as a basic 
period since tariffs were exceptionally high in this period, and that industrialised countries via 
dirty tariffication set the tariffs higher than they actual were, so that the effects of a reductions 
of 36 percent would only be limited. For developing countries it has been pointed to the fact 
that tariff reductions on productions exported by developing countries were less than products 
exported by industrialised countries. Higher food prices due to a reduced amount of 
subsidised products and an erosion of the GSP system would affect the poorest countries the 
most.  
 The proposition regarding the agreement presented to the Storting by Cabinet 
contained an overall positive evaluation of the agreement. Norwegian organisations 
underlined both positive and negative aspects but the majority supported Norwegian 
ratification. In the debate on the negotiations, the Labour Party, the Conservative Party and 
the Progress Party agreed on many points and supported ratification of the agreement. It was 
stated that both Norway and the developing countries would benefit from a more liberal trade 
regime. The Socialist Left Party and the Centre Party also used the developing countries in 
their argumentation, pointing to the results of the agreement that would not be beneficial to 
the developing countries. The relatively high focus on the developing countries in the 
Proposition from Cabinet, the Recommendation from the political parties and in the debate in 
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the Storting was not in accordance with the domestic focus on these countries during the 
negotiations. It may have been a result of knowledge that the developing countries and Africa 
especially would benefit less than the industrialised countries from the agreement. However, 
the developing countries may also have been used to legitimise a position and take focus away 
from domestic interests.  
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CHAPTER VII 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
The Uruguay Round was the longest and most comprehensive of all negotiations in the 
history of GATT. The political consequences and the impact of the round on the international 
trade regime, especially because of the creation of the WTO, makes the round the most 
significant development in international trade after World War II. As Roy MacLaren points 
out, the Uruguay Round coincided with one of the most remarkable periods in modern history 
and the establishment of the WTO was the founding of the first international post-Cold War 
institution.1 The Uruguay Round was the first negotiation in GATT at which the developing 
countries had an significant influence. The round took place at a time of economic growth and 
liberalisation in East Asia, and the Uruguay Agreement was concluded at a time when 
developing countries in Asia had embarked on unilateral trade liberalisation reforms.2 It also 
coincided with the fall of the Soviet Union that led to liberalisation in Eastern Europe. At the 
same time, however, African countries faced economic stagnation and falling prices in raw 
materials.  
This thesis has focused on the Norwegian agricultural policy and the developing 
countries in the Uruguay Round, and asked how Norway combined the goal of protecting 
national agricultural interests with the demands of the developing countries. This appears as a 
dilemma to the Norwegian negotiators. Norway wanted to be viewed as a national friendly to 
developing countries, but at the same time it was underlined that the Norwegian agricultural 
interests should be maintained. 
 
The Involvement of the Developing Countries 
How successful was the involvement of the developing countries? Differences in economic 
development and different approaches and solutions challenged the unity of the developing 
countries. The informal group of developing countries therefore presented general proposals 
that mostly had little political content. We have seen that the industrialised countries used the 
                                                 
1 MacLarsen, Roy 1998. “Globalisation and the Uruguay Round”, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Mathias Hirsch 
(eds.), The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel: 154-194. Heidelberg: Springer. 
2 Adhikari 2002: 80. 
 122
split between the developing countries to achieve support for a new round of negotiations and 
to include new issues in the negotiations.  
However, the developing countries also managed to influence the negotiations. By 
way of the Cairns Group, for the first time in GATT the developing countries joined forces 
with industrialised countries. About the Cairns Group, Rod Tyers writes:  
 
For the first time in modern history of the GATT a group comprising industrial, developing and 
centrally planned economies worked together to advance a common aim. And it succeeded, 
overcoming opposition from within the EC and ensuring that agriculture would receive 
unprecedented attention during the remainder of the Round.3  
 
The Cairns Group with the US managed to get agriculture included in the negotiations, and 
the net food exporting developing countries worked via the group to achieve liberalisation of 
trade in agriculture.  
The hardliners did not succeed in getting support for their two main demands: that no 
round of negotiations should be introduced before the Working Programme from 1982 had 
been implemented, and to reject the inclusion of trade in services. However, the hardliners did 
influence the Uruguay Round since their strong opposition most likely led to more focus on 
special treatment for developing countries in the Punta del Este declaration. During the round, 
India managed to get support from the majority of developing countries in statements 
criticising the lacking focus on issues that were regarded as important to the developing 
countries. However, both India and Brazil witnessed a change of government during the 
negotiations. The new governments opened up the economy and were positive to trade 
liberalisation. Therefore, critical voices from the developing countries decreased towards the 
end of the round.  
The final negotiations on agriculture between the EC and the US excluded the 
developing countries in the end stages of the round. The green room meetings, limited 
resources and an extensive meeting schedule made it difficult for the smaller developing 
countries to influence the negotiations. However, the developing countries contributed to the 
breakdown of the Ministerial Meetings in Brussels and Montreal. The Latin American 
countries refused to continue with negotiations if achievements were not reached in 
agriculture. These actions show that the developing countries did influence the negotiations, 
and managed to draw focus to issues important to them, e.g. agriculture.   
                                                 
3 Tyers, Rod 1994. “The Cairns Group Perspective”, in R.C. Hine, K.A. Ingersent and A.J. Rayner (eds.), 
Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: 88-109. Basingstoke: St. Martin’s Press, pp. 89-90. 
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The developing countries were disappointed by the lack of commitment from the 
industrialised countries on areas important to the developing countries. John Whalley points 
to the fact that the negotiations were a success for the developing countries on points 
concerning the strengthening of the GATT system and reacting against regionalism.4 
According to him, the active participation of the developing countries was driven by a fear 
that the system might collapse if the round failed. “By that stage, developing countries 
appeared to be willing to accept almost any agreement by the end of the Uruguay Round, as 
long as it was a firm agreement that preserved multilateral accommodation.”5 
The participation of the developing countries was higher than in any earlier 
negotiations in GATT. We have seen that the developing countries contributed in the 
negotiations in agriculture, especially in the Cairns Group but also through the Latin 
American countries at the Ministerial Meetings, and the pressure put forward by the 
hardliners in the first part of the negotiations. However, we have also identified that the 
industrialised countries, including Norway, refused some of the criticism raised by the 
developing countries.  
Due to the liberalisations and economic growth in many of the developing countries it 
was important for the industrialised countries to include these countries in the world trading 
system. Concession in some areas important to the developing countries, such as textiles and 
tropical products and also in agriculture were given, however, the developing countries 
expressed disappointment when the Final Agreement was reached. The countries meant that 
the given concessions were limited and the developing countries had expected deeper cuts in 
subsidies and more market access. The literature identifies both negative and positive 
consequences for the developing countries by the agreement. Some countries and regions 
benefited while Africa was regarded as the continent that might loose as a result of the 
agreement.  
 
Agricultural Disagreement 
Which were the demands proposed by different groups and countries in the negotiations? In 
the agricultural negotiations mainly two groups disagreed. The US and the Cairns Group 
wanted significant reductions in agricultural support and increased market access for 
agricultural products. The EFTA countries, the EC, Korea and Japan opposed this and 
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underlined the special characteristics of agriculture. The US worked initially according to a 
zero option, and wanted to ban all import barriers and trade-distorting subsidies within ten 
years. Also the Cairns Group wanted a prohibition of all use of subsidies and support 
measures. The EC on the other hand did not want to focus on agriculture in the negotiations, 
and wanted to continue with export subsidies and variable import levies.  
We have also identified differences between the net food importing developing countries, 
and the net food exporting developing countries. To a certain extent these two groups had 
incompatible interests, but both groups of countries demanded better access to western 
markets, cuts in export subsidies and reduction in agricultural support. However, the net food 
importing developing countries would be negatively affected by increased prices on food due 
to the reduction of subsidies on food. The net food importers also demanded the right to 
protect own agricultural production.  
 Norway, together with Switzerland, South Korea and Japan, were regarded as the most 
protectionist countries. The Nordic countries, especially Norway, wanted to maintain the 
national autonomy in agriculture, and the special characters in agriculture were underlined. 
Due to the import protection system used by these countries, with an extensive use of 
quantitative restrictions, tarrification across board was rejected. These countries demanded 
exceptions for some products, but the Final Agreement did not open for this, and Norway, as 
the last country, decided to accept tariffications, also on milk and game animals. Initially 
Norway and Switzerland opposed a reduction in agricultural support, but accepted a freeze 
option. But after the EC and the other Nordic countries accepted a reduction in agricultural 
support, Norway realised that a new Norwegian position had to be established.  
 We have seen that the disagreement between the EC and the US on agriculture delayed 
the negotiations and for a long time bilateral meetings with only the EC and the US took 
place. The Blair House Agreement, and a revised version of this agreement, finally settled the 
negotiations. For Norway the introduction of a blue box made the results better than feared, 
since the majority of the Norwegian support could be defined as blue, and were therefore 
exempted for reduction commitments.  
 
The Norwegian Dilemma 
To what extent did Norway take the developing countries’ situation into consideration when 
establishing the Norwegian position, and to what extent did domestic agricultural interests 
influence the Norwegian policy? We have identified a Norwegian dilemma in the agricultural 
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negotiations between the demands from the developing countries wanting increased market 
access, cuts in subsidies and tariff reductions, yet at the same time efforts to promote 
Norwegian national interests in agriculture, maintaining a high level of protection. This 
dilemma was a challenge to the Norwegian negotiators. The international pressure, also from 
the developing countries, for increased commitments on the one hand, and domestic 
reluctance to grant concessions within agriculture on the other hand, were by the Norwegian 
negotiators supposed to be solved by a dualism in the Norwegian position. The Norwegian 
Cabinet tried to establish a Norwegian position that balanced these two demands, as a sort of a 
compromise. A reduction of support was eventually accepted by Norway, but the focus on 
non-economic factors in agriculture was strongly emphasised. The Norwegian explanatory 
statement is an example of the Norwegian negotiators trying to please the domestic pressure 
groups while at the same time wanting to be a constructive negotiation partner. However, 
Norway was only willing to give agricultural concessions that were in line with the 
Norwegian import protection system. Since Norway then had few possibilities to give 
important concessions to developing countries in agriculture, the Cabinet put focus on other 
areas that were regarded as important to developing countries, such as textiles and tropical 
products. On these issues Norway was willing to grant extensive concessions, and this was 
underlined both domestically and internationally in the negotiations. It was also pointed to 
areas that were regarded as important both to Norway and to the developing countries, such as 
strengthening rules and disciplines and an effective dispute settlement procedure. 
When it was realised that a change in the Norwegian position was necessary, the 
Cabinet had to work domestically to get acceptance for a new line. The Norwegian Cabinet 
argued therefore that changes in agricultural policy were necessary in order to adapt to 
international developments and implement a more market orientated agricultural system in 
line with recommendations from OECD. We can see that even though Norwegian agricultural 
interests were the main priority in the negotiations, by the end of the negotiations 
liberalisation and increased market access was accepted. The developing countries were 
disappointed, however, that more concessions were not given, but the fact that agriculture was 
included in the agreement and that industrialised countries had accepted greater market 
discipline in the sector was regarded as important to the developing countries.   
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Conflicting Interests 
Was there a conflict between Norway’s desire to be viewed as a nation friendly to developing 
countries and at the same time protecting Norwegian agricultural interests? We have 
identified two different perspectives on whether the Norwegian import protection system was 
in conflict with the developing countries’ demands. Even though the Norwegian Cabinet 
underlined that protecting the agricultural sector was its main priority in the negotiations it 
was stated, i.e. in Report No. 63 to the Storting (1986-87), that the quantitative restrictions on 
agriculture and textiles were in conflict with increased import from the developing countries. I 
have called this view the acceptance of incompatible interests perspective. By this acceptance 
the Cabinet stated that there existed a conflict between the interests of the developing 
countries and Norway in the field of agriculture. The Norwegian dilemma was therefore a 
political question on how much Norway was willing to give in agriculture to please the 
developing countries in the negotiations.  
In the first phase of the negotiations, a united Storting refuted this conflict’s existence 
and argued that the Norwegian system was not a hindrance to increased import from 
developing countries, mainly due to the fact that Norway and developing countries had 
interests in different products. This perspective I have called the none interest conflict 
perspective. The Storting expressed that there was no conflict between the developing 
countries’ demands and Norwegian interests in the negotiations. Norway could therefore 
continue with its import protection system, without conflicting with the developing countries. 
Towards the end of the negotiations the majority in the Storing, involving the representatives 
of the Labour Party, the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, departed from the none 
interests conflict perspective, and agreed with the Cabinet that a conflict actually existed 
between Norwegian agricultural interests and access for developing countries to the 
Norwegian market. This coincided with the establishment of a new, more flexible Norwegian 
agricultural position, as seen primarily in Proposition to the Storting No. 8 (1992-93), in 
which a change in the Norwegian agricultural policy was agreed on. The minority believed 
however, that this change of policy was unnecessary, and that the Cabinet was using the 
negotiations to legitimise structural changes in the Norwegian agricultural sector.   
 It was stated by the Cabinet that Norway wanted to be a bridge builder between 
developing countries and the industrialised countries. This was not emphasised within the 
agricultural aspect, and it can be questioned whether the developing countries in fact saw 
Norway as a bridge builder at the same time as Norway was regarded as one of the most 
protectionist countries. However, the least developed countries did approach Norway during 
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the negotiations and Bangladesh stated that Norway was a nation regarded as understanding 
the situation of the least developed countries.  
Even though the Cabinet acknowledged that a conflict existed between Norwegian 
agricultural interests and the demands of the developing countries, the Cabinet stated that 
preferences to developing countries should be given in line with the Norwegian national goals 
in agricultural policy. This is a strong indication that it was the Norwegian agricultural 
interests that was the first priority. However, when realising that a new position had to be 
established, and by acknowledging the acceptance of tariffications, it may be argued that 
Norway gave important concessions also to developing countries.  
 
The Domestic Debate 
What role did the Storting play, and how did interests groups influence the Norwegian 
position? The fact that the Storting did not discuss the Punta del Este Declaration until one 
year after the Ministerial Meeting may be difficult to comprehend when we know the great 
impact the negotiations had. However, the debate on Norway’s membership of the EC drew 
much of the attention away from the GATT negotiations. The Storting had not been involved 
in earlier negotiations in GATT, and trade policy was an area within which there was broad 
consensus between the Labour Party and Conservative Party. This was also the case in the 
Uruguay Round. It was also difficult to predict the huge consequences stemming from the 
negotiations. In the debate regarding the Punta del Este declaration only few MP’s mentioned 
the Uruguay Round, while by the end of the negotiations many questioned were posed to 
especially to the Minister of Trade and Minister of Agriculture.  
There was greater involvement from the Storting than in earlier GATT negotiations, 
especially after the Ministerial Meetings in Montreal and Brussels that ended in breakdowns. 
The breakdowns increased the media attention both internationally and in Norway. After these 
meetings, it also became clear that Norway had to give commitments in agriculture and that 
the negotiations would entail changes to the Norwegian import protection system. Towards 
the end of the negotiations, polarisation in the Storting increased. The Socialist Left Party and 
the Centre Party in particular, but also the Christian Democratic Party questioned the 
negotiations and underlined the need of having a strong Norwegian import protection system. 
 In the debate on Norwegian ratification of the negotiations, the developing countries 
were much used in the debate. It was debated what was the best strategy for economic 
development in developing countries, and whether the agreement benefited the developing 
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countries. The Conservative Party, the Labour Party and the Progress Party pointed to the fact 
that the developing countries wanted a quick end of the negotiations, and that all countries 
would benefit from strengthening rules and procedures. In addition it was underlined the 
importance of integrating the developing countries in the trading system. The Centre Party 
and the Socialist Left party that were more sceptical towards the agreement used the 
developing countries’ situation as an argument criticising the agreement. It was pointed to the 
fact that Africa would not benefit from the results and that the net importing developing 
countries wanted to protect their agricultural sector. That almost all parties used the 
developing countries’ situation in the argument implies that the focus on this group had 
increased by the end of the negotiations. However, since both sides used the developing 
countries in their argument it can be stated that the developing countries were used to 
legitimise the parties’ position, and that what was the best for the developing countries was 
regarded as an effective argument favouring their stand in the negotiations.  
The involvement of Norwegian interest groups was also at a higher stage by the end of 
the negotiations. The farming organisations had been involved in the agricultural negotiations 
throughout the round. Cooperation between these organisations and the NMFA was regarded 
as good. However, when Norwegian proposals were presented, the organisations criticised the 
NMFA for giving up the Norwegian positions. Other interests groups did not play a 
significant role until the last phase of the negotiations, and many did not get involved before 
the agreement in fact had been reached. LO and NHO had common interests and pointed to 
the fact that Norway did indeed have interests beyond agriculture in the negotiations.  
We have identified that the Labour Party and the Conservative Party agreed on the 
issue of trade policy, and also on the Uruguay Round. A continuation in the Norwegian 
position is therefore visible and it cannot be pointed to a change in the Norwegian position, 
when Cabinet was changed. However, in the coalition Cabinet the disagreement have been 
more visible especially since the Minister of Agriculture from the Centre Party was more 
reluctant to give concessions that were not in line with the Norwegian import protection 
system. There were also some disagreement between the different Ministries, but when the 
Ministry of Trade was merged into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this problem disappeared.   
Just as Putnam describes international negotiations, it is necessary to negotiate at two 
levels. Norway had to be a constructive negotiating partner, while at the same time follow the 
instructions given by the Storting, and please the farming organisations that did not want the 
Cabinet to give up the Norwegian agricultural policy. The Norwegian win sets was a result of 
the Norwegian dilemma, between national agricultural interests and the pressure form other 
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countries in the negotiations. The new Norwegian position established in agriculture was an 
attempt to extend the Norwegian win sets. This succeeded since Norway was a part of the 
Final Agreement, and expressed that the results was in line with Norwegian interests, while at 
the same time acceptance that reductions in support had to be implemented. However, since it 
was regarded as almost impossible for a small country as Norway with high dependence on 
international trade, not to be a part of GATT, the Norwegian Cabinet would be quite ensured 
that the Storting would agree in a Norwegian ratification.  
The opposition in Norway expressed that the negotiations was used as an excuse for 
implementing more market orientation in Norwegian agriculture. As Melchior and Victor D. 
Norman point out, trade agreements are necessary to create a more liberal trade regime. In 
Norway the new policy established in Proposition to the Storting No. 8 (1992-93) came as a 
result of international development, as argued in the Proposition. It would have been difficult 
for the Norwegian Cabinet to push for structural changes in agriculture without referring to 
the Uruguay negotiations, which anyway would have made Norway change the import 
protection system. 
 
Further Research 
Due to the extensive archive it was necessary to limit the study to the agricultural parts of the 
agreement. For further research it would be interesting to identify if the same dilemma to 
Norway is visible with regards to the negotiations in other areas, especially in the fields of 
services and goods. Norway had offensive interests in shipping and fisheries; areas were 
many developing countries had defensive interests. It would also be interesting to identify if 
the Norwegian dilemma continued in the WTO, and if changes in the Norwegian policy have 
taken place with increased focus on the WTO in Norway.  
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